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2 results

  • 17 - Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief

  • from Part III - New Directions
  • Edited by Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri, John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
    Published online:
    24 August 2023
    Print publication:
    17 August 2023, pp 257-272

  • Summary

    Knowledge-first epistemology gives up the traditional project of defining knowledge in terms of necessary, sufficient, and informative conditions. Rather, the approach gives knowledge itself explanatory primacy within epistemology. This chapter explores two ideas that have been prominent among knowledge-first authors and considers their implications for religious epistemology. The first is to equate one’s evidence with one’s knowledge, or with some relevant subset of one’s knowledge. The second is to reverse the traditional order of explanation between knowledge and justified belief; that is, to explain justification in terms of knowledge rather than the other way around. These ideas, we argue, have interesting implications for a variety of issues in religious epistemology, including the nature of evidence (and defeating evidence) for theism, and the prospects for Public Reason Liberalism.

  • Public reason, non-public reasons, and the accessibility requirement

  • Jason Tyndal
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 49 / Issue 8 / December 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 1062-1082

  • In Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong develops what is perhaps the most comprehensive defense of the consensus model of public reason – a model which incorporates both a public-reasons-only requirement and an accessibility requirement framed in terms of shared evaluative standards. While the consensus model arguably predominates amongst public reason liberals, it is criticized by convergence theorists who reject both the public-reasons-only requirement and the accessibility requirement. In this paper, I argue that while we have good reason to reject Quong’s call for a public-reasons-only requirement, all public reason liberals should endorse at least some shared evaluative standards and, hence, an accessibility requirement.