A reason given by the United Nations for recommending a partition of Palestine was that Jewish statehood had been endorsed by the League of Nations. The rationale was that the League of Nations had endorsed the commitment by Britain to promote a Jewish national home, and that Jewish national home meant a Jewish state. Britain wrote up a document for its governance of Palestine that included the fostering of a Jewish national home. Britain sought approval from the Council of the League of Nations for that document. The Council did approve the document. Britain took that approval as an endorsement of a Jewish national home. The Council, however, was not given an opportunity to influence the content of the document. As a result, the commitment for a Jewish national home was that of Britain alone. Britain denied that Jewish national home meant a Jewish state. The Palestine Mandate recited that the Balfour Declaration was endorsed by Britain’s allies, but the Allies did not do so.

Britain took the territory of Palestine from the Turkish Empire and decided to stay when World War I ended, in the face of opposition from the population. Once in control, Britain began to promote immigration of Jews on the basis of its commitment to foster the development of a Jewish national home. Britain ultimately had to pronounce this policy a failure and asked the United Nations to recommend a solution for the governance of Palestine. The General Assembly suggested dividing Palestine, leading to hostilities. The General Assembly then backtracked on partition and worked on a possible trusteeship for Palestine that would function under the United Nations for a limited time while a permanent solution was negotiated. That plan was under consideration when Britain withdrew its forces and a council declared a Jewish state. During the hostilities, which continued until the end of 1948, most of Palestine’s Arab population fled, dramatically altering the demography of the country.

The Palestine Mandate was argued to have been a document with legal force on the basis that the Council of the League of Nations voted to approve it. The Palestine Mandate lacked such a status, it was argued in response. The Palestine Mandate was not concluded as a treaty. It was not registered with the League as a treaty. It does not appear in League records that give treaties to which League members are party. Britain’s A. J. Balfour told the Council that the Palestine Mandate would have legal force once Turkey ceded sovereignty to the World War I Allies. Turkey never did so. When a peace treaty with Turkey was finalized, Turkey renounced sovereignty in favor of Palestine, not in favor of the Allies. When Britain explained its status in Palestine to the Permanent Court of International Justice, its counsel wrote that, as result of Turkey’s refusal to renounce sovereignty to the Allies, Britain acquired no legal status. He said that Britain’s standing in Palestine was that of belligerent occupant as result of having taken Palestine by force of arms. He did not mention any rights of Britain that might have come from the League of Nations.

This chapter looks at the effects of World War I on Palestine and the Zionist movement. During the war, the entente powers viewed Ottoman territories as spoils of war, although they differed on who would get what. This was because the secret treaties they signed with each other and pledges to others were mutually contradictory and/or ambiguous. One pledge, the Balfour Declaration, promised the Zionist movement a home for the Jewish people in Palestine, thereby giving political Zionism the victory it needed to ensure the survival of the movement. After the war, the entente met to decide the future of Ottoman territory and came up with the “mandates system,” which created a new political form comparable to a temporary colony. Britain received the mandate for Palestine. The Jewish community there cooperated with the British and established structures compatible with the mandate. The indigenous community rejected both the Balfour Declaration and the mandate. As a result, it lacked the structures that might have prevented the nakba (catastrophe) of 1948.