Drawing insights from legislative, electoral and welfare studies, the article investigates whether and to what extent electoral competition affects incumbent politicians’ overpromising of social welfare benefits. For this, Taiwan is chosen as the case and the article examines the fate of elite-level social welfare legislative proposals in the period between 1992 and 2016. Findings drawn from quantitative bill sponsorship patterns demonstrate that political elites tend to propose failure-prone social welfare bills during election periods. Moreover, this tendency grew even more clearly in tandem with the rising levels of electoral democracy. The article argues that the overpromising of social welfare benefits is likely due to cognitive biases on the voter side allowing politicians to make promises without necessarily facing the negative consequences of under-delivery. The article contributes to the comparative welfare state literature by adding much-needed nuance to the existing debates on the relationship between democratic deepening, electoral competition, and the development of welfare politics.

Promising somewhat more than anyone expects to be delivered remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This persistence is explained by systematic overpromising being predictable and, up to a point, productive. I characterize this regime and its consequences and provide an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. Overpromising by governments or Parties can be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and varies with socio-economic determinants that characterize the group regime. Thus targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to reveal the rationally-expected outcomes and individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted rather than the agreed targets.