Airway management is at the forefront for combat medics dealing with battlefield trauma. For military service members, compromised airways are the second leading cause of potentially survivable death on the battlefield, accounting for one in ten preventable combat deaths. Effective suction is a critical component of airway clearance. However, currently available devices are too heavy and bulky to be carried by combat medics and are insufficiently powered. The industry has not responded to the need, with companies continuing to produce models using 1970s technology. A literature review was completed with the assistance of a librarian. The databases searched included: Biomedical Research Database (BRD), Computer Retrieval of Information of Scientific Projects (CRISP), Federal Research in Progress (FEDRIP), Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Pub Med/Medline, and OVID. Additionally, a Google Scholar search was performed to identify nonstandard sources. After screening, a total of 40 articles were used. There were no randomized controlled trials or other high-quality evidence that addressed the issues; there was limited peer-reviewed literature on the use, effectiveness, adverse effects, and safety of suction for use in combat casualty care. A review of the available literature revealed no standards, either proposed, validated, or accepted, for the safety or avoidance of adverse effects for portable suction device use in combat casualty care. Similarly, there are no accepted standards to guide the safe use and anticipated adverse effects of suction for use in prehospital combat or emergency care. Nevertheless, there are meaningful data that can be extracted from the few studies available combined with non-clinical studies, narrative reviews and case reports, and expert opinions.

Objectives: Suicidal ideation (SI) is highly prevalent in Iraq/Afghanistan-era veterans with a history of mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI), and multiple mTBIs impart even greater risk for poorer neuropsychological functioning and suicidality. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that may confer increased risk of suicidality in this population. Thus, we examined relationships between neuropsychological functioning and suicidality and specifically whether lifetime mTBI burden would moderate relationships between cognitive functioning and suicidal ideation. Methods: Iraq/Afghanistan-era Veterans with a history of mTBI seeking outpatient services (N = 282) completed a clinical neuropsychological assessment and psychiatric and postconcussive symptom questionnaires. Results: Individuals who endorsed SI reported more severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and postconcussive symptoms and exhibited significantly worse memory performance compared to those who denied SI. Furthermore, mTBI burden interacted with both attention/processing speed and memory, such that poorer performance in these domains was associated with greater likelihood of SI in individuals with a history of three or more mTBIs. The pattern of results remained consistent when controlling for PTSD, depression, and postconcussive symptoms. Conclusions: Slowed processing speed and/or memory difficulties may make it challenging to access and use past experiences to solve current problems and imagine future outcomes, leading to increases in hopelessness and SI in veterans with three or more mTBIs. Results have the potential to better inform treatment decisions for veterans with history of multiple mTBIs. (JINS, 2019, 25, 79–89)

This study explored whether remote blast-related MTBI and/or current Axis I psychopathology contribute to neuropsychological outcomes among OEF/OIF veterans with varied combat histories. OEF/OIF veterans underwent structured interviews to evaluate history of blast-related MTBI and psychopathology and were assigned to MTBI (n = 18), Axis I (n = 24), Co-morbid MTBI/Axis I (n = 34), or post-deployment control (n = 28) groups. A main effect for Axis I diagnosis on overall neuropsychological performance was identified (F(3,100) = 4.81; p = .004), with large effect sizes noted for the Axis I only (d = .98) and Co-morbid MTBI/Axis I (d = .95) groups relative to the control group. The latter groups demonstrated primary limitations on measures of learning/memory and processing speed. The MTBI only group demonstrated performances that were not significantly different from the remaining three groups. These findings suggest that a remote history of blast-related MTBI does not contribute to objective cognitive impairment in the late stage of injury. Impairments, when present, are subtle and most likely attributable to PTSD and other psychological conditions. Implications for clinical neuropsychologists and future research are discussed. (JINS, 2012, 18, 1–11)

Scholarly literature has generally considered the phenomenon of pro-democratic interventions from the perspective of state-sovereignty, the prohibition of the use of force, and the principle of non-intervention. A human rights approach has remained underexposed to date, even though new manifestations of pro-democratic intervention seem to conflict with the right to self-determination of the local population. The main purpose of this article is to explore the (in)compatibility of the right to political self-determination on the one hand, and new appearances of alleged pro-democratic intervention on the other, thereby using Operation Iraqi Freedom as a test case. The case of Iraq will demonstrate how processes of political transition as part of 'pro-democratic' interventions can endanger observance of the core meaning of the right to political self-determination. More generally, it will be argued that a fundamental tension exists between both concepts.

Taha Yaseen Ramadan was a long-time ally of Saddam Hussein and Vice-President of Iraq at the time of the United States-led invasion in 2003; he was captured by American forces in 2004 and, in 2005-2006, tried before the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), alongside Saddam Hussein. The Trial Chamber hearing the case found Taha Yaseen guilty of, inter alia, the crime against humanity of wilful killing; he was handed a sentence of life imprisonment in November 2006. This sentence was appealed by the IHT Prosecutor; the IHT Appellate Chamber responded several days later with an order that the Trial Chamber award Taha Yaseen a capital sentence. The process of re-sentencing, which ultimately led to the execution of Taha Yaseen in March 2007, was, like many other key phases of the trial of Saddam Hussein and Taha Yaseen, undermined by Iraqi political interference emanating, in the main, from the office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The fairness of the proceedings against Taha Yaseen and his co-accused was further undermined throughout by the near total ignorance of the those involved in the case (i.e., the Iraqi Judges, Prosecutors and Defence counsel) of the substantive law that they were meant to be applying, in particular, International Criminal Law, which had been received into Iraqi law almost verbatim in 2004 from the Statute of the International Criminal Court. This combination of professional ignorance and political interference gave rise to a travesty of justice that cannot be reversed, that is, the execution of a man who was manifestly not guilty of the crime for which he was hanged.

Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions were first used operationally by US and British coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Since that time, concerns have been raised in various quarters regarding the possible adverse effects DU may have on human health and the environment. In particular, it has been suggested that the reported ‘explosion of childhood cancer in southern Iraq’ and so-called Gulf War and Balkans Syndromes may be attributable to combat uses of DU in the Middle East and, more recently, in Bosnia in the mid 1990s. Such concerns, however, appear not to have impeded either the proliferation or continued use of DU munitions, such as in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. It is thought that, in addition to the US and the UK, a growing number of other countries have DU munitions in their arsenals.