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50 years after President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China, the Taiwan issue remains the most difficult and potentially most explosive dispute between the United States and China. At the core is the concept of “one China.” While Beijing insists that the “one China principle” with the People's Republic of China (PRC) representing all of China is the foundation of US-China relations, Washington emphasizes its “one China policy” that treats Taiwan as a separate entity from the PRC. Meanwhile, Taipei, under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party, has asserted that Taiwan is already independent and the two sides across the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other. Tensions have reached a record high in the Taiwan Strait and all three parties involved demonstrate intentions to change the status quo. To restore stability and avoid war in the Taiwan Strait, all three parties should provide reassurance to reestablish confidence and refrain from taking unilateral actions to further damage the delicate status quo.
The International Political Science Association (IPSA) is a unique case against the common perception that Beijing has the upper hand when the two regimes by the Taiwan Strait contest to join international (non-governmental) organisations. Beijing relentlessly pushes international organisations to acknowledge the One China principle; Taipei also relentlessly denies this principle while it seeks to join. In the 1980s, Chinese and Taiwanese political scientists, representing their own regimes, applied Track II diplomacy to compete over membership of this organisation. IPSA membership mattered to both regimes and their political scientists. After many years of Track II competition, The Chinese Association of Political Science in Taipei became a “collective” member without compromising on how to name itself in April 1989. As a result, Beijing's counterpart withdrew from the IPSA. This situation has now persisted for over thirty years. The IPSA case not only challenges the current understanding of Cross-Strait relations but also throws light on the theoretical understanding of Track II diplomacy.
Scholars frequently distinguish between “hard” and “soft” forms of judicial review: “hard” review gives courts the final say on constitutional questions, while “soft” review attempts to strike a balance between judicial and legislative supremacy by giving the legislature the ability to override or set aside what the courts have done. By itself, however, the hard/soft distinction captures neither the degree of finality nor the ultimate impact of judicial review. On the one hand, even in systems of nominally hard review, the government usually retains the ability to effectively override the courts via constitutional amendment. On the other hand, a small but growing number of courts – the Taiwanese Constitutional Court among them – have claimed the power to invalidate constitutional amendments as unconstitutional. Using Taiwan as illustration, this chapter highlights three factors that must be considered in evaluating the extent to which courts have the last word on constitutional matters. First is the formal legal effect of the decision (for example, whether a decision has suspended effect or is valid inter partes rather than erga omnes). Second is the ease with which judicial decisions can be formally overridden or set aside (as in the form of legislative override or constitutional amendment). Third is the extent to which judicial decisions require cooperation and implementation by other institutions of government in order to have practical effect.
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