This paper investigates the nexus between per capita income convergence and political institutions within the Eurozone. Employing data spanning the years 2002–2019, the research initially identifies multiple convergence clusters and subsequently examines the relationship between the creation of these clusters and different aspects of political institutions. The findings reveal that there are multiple steady states in the Eurozone, and their formation is notably influenced by political institutions alongside other conventional economic determinants derived from the Solow model. Furthermore, the study underscores that improvements in regulatory quality, as well as in aspects such as democracy, government effectiveness, and corruption control, positively impact income convergence across all member countries. These findings carry significant policy implications.

This scoping paper addresses the role of financial institutions in empowering the British Industrial Revolution. Prominent economic historians have argued that investment was largely funded out of savings or profits, or by borrowing from family or friends: hence financial institutions played a minor role. But this claim sits uneasily with later evidence from other countries that effective financial institutions have mattered a great deal for economic development. How can this mismatch be explained? Despite numerous technological innovations, from 1760 to 1820 industrial growth was surprisingly low. Could the underdevelopment of financial institutions have held back growth? There is relatively little data to help evaluate this hypothesis. More research is required on the historical development of institutions that enabled finance to be raised. This would include the use of property as collateral. This paper sketches the evolution of British financial institutions before 1820 and makes suggestions for further empirical research. Research in this direction should enhance our understanding of the British Industrial Revolution and of the preconditions of economic development in other countries.

Global trade in the 21st century is characterised by complex value chains. Successful exporters usually rely on quality imports, and exported goods cross borders many times before reaching their final consumer. This poses challenges to economic measurement as well as policymaking because it becomes difficult to characterise the true interdependencies between countries. Currently, estimates of the share of imports from a trade partner destined for re-exports, and the share used in the domestic economy, are crude at best. We develop a novel approach to estimate these shares. Instead of assigning imports for re-exports proportionally across all source countries, we consider the origin of imports for each trader who re-exports goods. The method is illustrated for the Netherlands, a major re-exporter. We find that non-European member states export 10 billion euros of commodities to the Netherlands that are destined for re-export to the United Kingdom. We also find that the goods trade deficit between the Netherlands and the United States is drastically reduced when taking re-export flows into account.

This article analyses the evolution of nutritional inequality in Spain among cohorts born between 1840 and 1964. With male height data (N = 358,253), the secular trend of biological well-being and intergenerational anthropometric inequalities are studied based on the coefficient of variation, height percentiles and socioeconomic categories (students, literate non-students and illiterate). The results reveal that the nutritional inequalities were very large in the mid-19th century. Anthropometric inequalities diminished among those born between 1880 and 1919 and increased again, although only moderately, from the cohorts of the 1920s. From the 1930s there was a cycle of sustained increase in height. Despite nutritional improvement, the data suggest that nutritional inequalities increased during the Franco regime, affecting the low-income population segments particularly.

On average, UK productivity performance in the decades leading up to the financial crisis was quite disappointing. Joining the EU was not to blame. Indeed, EU membership, which was an integral part of the Thatcher reform programme, had a significant positive impact. Over the long run, UK supply-side policies have been badly designed in various different ways. These design faults have not been the result of constraints imposed by EU membership but rather the consequence of domestic government failure. There is no reason to think that EU exit will lead, either directly or indirectly, to improvements in UK productivity outcomes.

The British people voted for Brexit for a variety of reasons. A literature is emerging that seeks to explain the outcome using the increasing amount of aggregate and individual data being generated. Less often considered is the impact those factors that shaped the referendum outcome might continue to exert on the debate about the UK's future relationship with the EU. We argue that they will continue to weigh on political debates. The continued resonance of the Leave message militates against anything but what has come to be known as a ‘hard Brexit’.

How much influence does the UK have in Europe? How has this changed? We argue that the UK has tended to view its relationship with the EU in transactional terms, and that this has led to a dominant understanding framed in terms of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits.’ However, thinking more broadly gives a more nuanced picture of British influence. Thus, we approach this question from two directions: examining the historical record of the UK's role in the development of the EU and the single market; and looking at the ways in which British politicians and officials exert influence in the current political structure. We argue that although the UK has generally had a good track record of success, this has often been threatened by domestic political difficulties – as the current referendum debate shows.

OECD projections for European countries imply that the crisis will have no long-term effect on trend growth. An historical perspective says this is too optimistic. Not only is the legacy of public debt and its requirement for fiscal consolidation unfavourable but the experience of the 1930s suggests that much needed supply-side reforms are now less probable – indeed policy may well become less growth friendly. Whereas the 1940s saw the Bretton Woods agreement and the Marshall Plan pave the way for the ‘Golden Age’, it is unlikely that anything similar will rescue Europe this time around.

What policies and institutions are needed to sustain long-run growth in the UK? We describe an optimistic story of the UK economy over the past 30 years. From the late 1970s, the UK reversed a century of relative decline in terms of per capita GDP with our main counterparts in the US, France and Germany. A key factor behind this improvement was an array of policy changes including an expansion of higher education and greater competition in product and labour markets. However, major weaknesses with respect to long-run investment in human capital, infrastructure and innovation remain. These are hampered by problems of short-termism and policy risk. We propose a series of radical reforms to address these problems: such as more flexibility in schooling with a new focus on disadvantage; a new architecture for national infrastructure decisions and more competition in banking.

The freedom of movement of persons is one of the core tenets of the European Union. Immigration however is often seen as a cause for concern amongst native workers, as rising labour supply may threaten jobs and create downward pressure on wages. National politicians are increasingly under pressure to guard against it — in times of recession particularly. Despite this, there is evidence that highly-skilled migrant labour has the potential to raise competitiveness significantly and in theory this may feed into productivity. In this paper, we explore first the composition of inward migration to the EU and within the EU, concentrating specifically on the role of the highly-skilled and the extent to which migrants are overqualified within their jobs. We then analyse whether migrant workers affect productivity at the sectoral level. We find under-utilisation of skilled foreign labour and there is little evidence in general to suggest that migrants have raised productivity which may in part be attributable to over-qualification. However, we find robust evidence that migrants — particularly highly-skilled migrants — play a positive role in productivity developments in industries which are classified as ‘skill intensive’.

Since joining the European Union in 1986, the performance of the Spanish economy has been quite remarkable, acting as a good example for new entrants of what can be accomplished in twenty years. Its ability to generate employment has been astonishing. Departing from an environment of very high unemployment (close to 25 per cent), Spain has become the country of destination most preferred by immigrants. However, it has also had a scant productivity performance. The main burden on productivity growth lies with the construction sector and almost all private service sectors with the unique exception of the financial sector. Most likely, over the next years, the continuity of the Spanish success will require a reversal of the sources of growth, shifting from labour creation to improvements in multifactor productivity.