This chapter seeks to uncover the origins of New Thinking, with its focus on peaceful coexistence between the East and the West, disarmament, and non-intervention. It argues that while Gorbachev's predecessors sought recognition for the USSR's greatness in the third world, Gorbachev was generally uninterested in maintaining Moscow's reputation as a revolutionary leader. He recognized the Soviet Union's need for reform and aimed to reshape global politics in a way that would allow Moscow to maintain international leadership without overspending on foreign adventures. With the conclusion of the 1987 INF Treaty, Gorbachev demonstrated that disarmament could save money, lessen the dangers of war, and raise Moscow's global standing. However, disentangling from foreign commitments, especially in Afghanistan, proved more complicated. It took a long time to end the conflict in Afghanistan as Gorbachev weighed the moral liability of continued war against considerations of prestige and credibility.

This chapter recounts Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision for the post-Cold War world order, focusing in particular on the disarmament negotiations and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The chapter argues that Gorbachev’s foreign policy was underpinned by the ambition to recapture moral leadership in the world (which, for the Soviet leader, was closely linked to the legitimacy of the Soviet project, and indeed to his own political legitimacy). This ambition was clearly discernible in his approach to disarmament. The vision of a nuclear-free world (as presented by the General Secretary in 1986) was instrumental to the broader agenda of global leadership, which, Gorbachev felt, the Soviet Union had long abandoned. The same agenda animated his approach to the war in Afghanistan: Leaving Afghanistan was important for moral reasons, as a practical manifestation of the new spirit Gorbachev purported to represent. The exit was delayed, however, when the Soviet leader realized that quitting the war carried its own implications for Moscow’s global standing, and, in particular, undercut Soviet credibility in the third world. By recentering the Cold War endgame on Gorbachev’s global ambitions, the paper seeks to contextualize the General Secretary’s approach to foreign policy within the broader tradition of Soviet political leadership during and after the Cold War.