The General Introduction presents the research question that underlies the book and the approach used to answer it. It starts by expounding the traditional historical narrative on the prohibition of the use of force and show how it appears to be at odds with 'reality' as it stems from primary historical sources. It explains that the purpose of the book is to investigate this discrepancy and understand of origins of the traditional narrative of indifference. It presents the theoretical framework inspired by mnemohistory that will be used to this end, as well as an argumentative roadmap to the book. Built as a step by step ‘deconstruction’ of the narrative of indifference it starts by analysing how nineteenth-century authors dealt with the use of force. It shows that the vast majority of authors, from all theoretical backgrounds, believed force be ring-fenced by law. The second part turns to practice for the purpose of demonstrating that law played a role to justify resort to force. The third part ambitions to explain where the narrative of indifference comes from: why it has emerged and why it still dominates contemporary scholarship.

Having further evidenced the discrepancy between the modernhistorical narratives on the prohibition of the use of force and historical sources, this chapter is the first of two which attempts to understand the origins and persistence of the narrative of indifference. Using Lévi-Strauss’s work on myths illustrates how this narrative can be considered to find its source in the identity of international law as a discipline. It starts by trying to evidence the ‘core beliefs’ that can be considered to underlie this identity. It argues that central to international law is the belief that law is the sine qua non condition of order and peace. Identifying different iterations of the narrativeofindifference and using tools of linguistic analysis, it shows how this belief structures the narrative of indifference from both a syntagmatic and paradigmatic point of view.

The previous chapter having demonstrated how the narrative of indifference can be traced back to international law’s disciplinary identity, this chapter seeks to understand when and why this historical account emerged and still dominates scholarship. It brings a twofold ‘emotional’ explanation. The first relied on the work of Festinger and argues that ‘indifference’ emerged during the interwar as a narrative remedy for a cognitive dissonance between the belief that international law is a vector of order and the events of World War I. It transformed a failure of international law into a triumph of international law. It allowed the discipline to restore coherence between beliefs and facts and, by the same token, salvage the inside and outside credibility of the discipline. The second explanation highlights how the narrative of indifference can also be read as an expression of ‘exultant relief’ at the culmination of 50 years of pro-arbitration efforts on the part of international lawyers.