The chapter provides a detailed account of Moshe Dayan’s pivotal role in the peace process with Egypt. The chapter begins by discussing Dayan’s belief in a significant settlement between Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, despite facing public backlash and political isolation. The chapter then delves into the key events that led to Dayan’s involvement in the peace process, including the War of Attrition, the separation of forces agreements, and the Camp David Accords. It provides insights into Dayan’s interactions with key figures such as President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and how his negotiations ultimately led to the interim arrangement reached by the Rabin government in 1975. The chapter also explores Dayan’s views on the Palestinian issue and the future of the West Bank, as well as his role in Israel’s nuclear program and the policy of ambiguity. Overall, the chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of Dayan’s contributions to the peace process with Egypt, highlighting his strategic thinking, political acumen, and willingness to take risks for the sake of peace

Politics are back in force and impacting people lives like never before. This is the time of the reawakening of the Palestinian national movement and the making of the mini-empire of Israel. The whole Palestine is now under Israel’s control. A false peace process will begin would lead to nowhere, and the Israeli military establishment and political leadership destroyed the PLO presence in Lebanon, and the resistance moved into the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The two decades from 1969 marked the tightening of Israel–US strategic ties. With the Cold War becoming more and more predominant in the America view of the Arab–Israeli conflict, American presidents, from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, justified the tightening strategic relations between the two nations in the role Israel would ostensibly play in the defence of the Middle East against Soviet expansion. It did not really matter that Israel would not play that role; for Israel, the idealism that was prevalent in the relations between the two nations was not solid enough, and Israeli leaders gladly recited the Cold War rhetoric in their communication with American officials. Visually, the Arab–Israel conflict played a significant role in the conduct of the relations between the two countries, from the attempts to deal with the consequences of the 1967 June War to the 1982 Lebanon War. These, though, were only a minor irritation in what became deeper and closer ties, encompassing economic and industrial ties, the deepening of cultural connections and intensification of strategic cooperation, mainly in intelligence sharing and development of technologies.