Chapter 4 explains the anti-dumping investigation procedures of the US and EU and their differences. China represents a special case for other members with its socialist market economy and growing impact in the global political arena. Within the scope of this research, China needs to be evaluated in detail as (1) nearly one-quarter of all anti-dumping measures were taken against China, (2) Chinese exporters complain about the anti-dumping investigations both at the domestic level and the WTO DSM, (3) the attitude towards Chinese exporters eventually turns into general policies applicable to the other WTO members as the ADA is silent on some procedural issues. Thus, Chapter 4 describes the anti-dumping procedures of the US and EU and the position of China. These different procedural rules form a connection with the notion of hidden trade protectionism and anti-dumping.

The authors of this chapter argue that the Chinese legislator has infused a dose of trust and predictability into its leniency programme. The trust was necessary because not all enforcement agencies in China, of which the National Development and Reform Commission is most often singled out, applied due process during their investigation. Furthermore, predictability was required because the existing leniency programmes, one for price-related cartels and one for non-price-related cartels, gave too much discretion to the enforcement agencies. As a result of the lack of due process or predictability, the outcomes of investigations were uncertain. This chapter will show that, by reconfiguring the enforcement structure, both elements are addressed. There is one condition for the new leniency programme to be more effective. The new enforcement agency, the State Administration for Market Regulation, which has elaborated the new leniency programme, should ensure transparency in its decision making.