The chapter deals with the Third OHL and its ideas, differing views of civilian and military leadership of how to continue and end the war.

Ther chapter analyses the German leadership in the moment of military defeat in autumn 1918 and the decision to ask for an armistice.

This chapter analyses the German offensives in 1918 and Ludendorff’s plan. It states that there was no clear alternative discussed in the time. It shows how the attack was prepared, what its objectives and intentions were, and describes the five following large attacks and their strategic failure, despite their tactical successes.

Many of the war’s leading generals rose or fell during 1916. Germany refocused on the west, where Falkenhayn, chief of the high command since the initial defeat at the Marne, attacked at Verdun, seeking a bloodletting that would drive France from the war. The French persevered through ten months, during which generals Pétain and Nivelle eclipsed Joffre, who lost his post as commander late in the year. In the summer Haig’s British and Imperial forces, with French support, attacked the Germans at the Somme, where in September tanks first saw action. The battle there ended in a draw but also ensured the French a draw at Verdun. Meanwhile, on the Italian front, Conrad von Hötzendorf launched an Austro-Hungarian offensive from the Tyrol. This attack, like the German effort at Verdun, used troops pulled from the east, allowing a summer Russian offensive under Brusilov to break the weakened front. The Germans returned troops to seal the breach, but the debacle forced Falkenhayn to relinquish the high command to Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Amid the crisis the Central Powers made William II their supreme commander, sealing Austria-Hungary’s subordination to Germany. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire joined them late in the year in crushing Romania shortly after it joined the Allies.