The British State intervened in the Port of London in 1800. It did so again a hundred years later by appointing a Royal Commission, which provided the basis for eventual reform in 1908. The immediate reason for the Royal Commission was a dock proposal to abolish free entry to docks by river. But the wider context was long-standing, loudly voiced, shipping company grievances about river governance, licensing of lighterage and compulsory pilotage. The Commission’s conclusion that London should have a port authority was generally accepted. However, issues of constitution and compensation bedevilled the Conservative attempt to legislate. In the event, it was a Liberal government, with all-party support, which established the Port of London Authority, effectively nationalising London’s port. In an ironic coda, the port unions soon discovered their new public employer to be a more formidable opponent than their dock company predecessors had ever been.

Why didKeynes an exceedingly well connected young man with his feet very well planted in the English establishment,decide to take the risk of writing such an explosive book like The Economic Consequences of the Peace in 1919? After all, others had their doubts about Versailles; butnone went public;and ifor when theydid,it was certainly not to criticizethe peace settlementor the peacemakersin such a vitriolic fashion. SowhatledKeynes to write a book likeThe Economic Consequences of the Peace? What was his purpose in doing so? Who did he think he was writing it for?Was it his last word on the subjector was it – as Keynes believed at the time – merely the first step in a longer struggle to effectively render the economic parts of the Treaty invalid? Finally, why was the volumethe great success it turned out to be at the time, and whyis it still being debated today by both admirers and critics alike?

analyzes the military progress of the war in Ottoman territory and the diplomatic response. The tide turned with the British capture of Baghdad in March 1917 and the Allied entry into Jerusalem. It resulted in a war strategy that shored up control over the region’s natural resources and its peoples using soldiers and personnel largely from the British Empire.

Was Churchill a military figure who happened to have gone in for politics or was he a civilian politician with a military background? His role in the early stages of the war as first lord of the admiralty did seem to indicate that he was combining military, naval and political leadership in his own person: taking personal command at the siege of Antwerp, adopting a ‘hands-on’ style at the admiralty and blurring the distinctions between land and sea command. The problem with the Dardanelles campaign was the confusion over whether it was to be a purely naval operation or a joint military–naval one, and the blame for this confusion must lie at least in part with Churchill’s 1914 decision to bring Fisher out of retirement. Churchill’s sacking was a sharp reminder of the ultimate authority of the prime minister, while his service on the Western Front reminded him that his heart really lay in Westminster. Ultimately, he experienced the war from an astonishing range of perspectives while operating as a lone figure. The war provided an important apprenticeship for 1940–5, but it also confirmed that he was essentially a civilian politician who happened to have a strong military side.

This chapter explore Churchill’s contribution to the development of the British welfare state from the moment he entered the Cabinet in 1908 to his retirement as prime minister in 1955. It begins by examining the attitudes that shaped Churchill’s approach to social policy – a strong sense of the electoral salience of welfare, a desire to promote personal responsibility and self-help and a paternalistic concern for the ‘left-out millions’ – and then traces how these views shaped his policy and rhetoric from the Edwardian period onwards. It argues that Churchill played an important role in establishing social insurance and the ‘national minimum’ as defining concepts for the British welfare state, though the meaning of these concepts became more conservative over time – a shift which echoed Churchill’s own journey from ‘new Liberal’ firebrand to stalwart Conservative. Though Churchill’s interest in social questions was sporadic by the time he became prime minister, his focus on consumption and employment chimed with the instincts of many other Britons, and helped to shape the distinctive policy settlement which emerged during the 1940s and 1950s.

At the Paris peace conference in 1919, Keynes served as a member of the British delegation. He often represented the Treasury although himself only a temporary civil servant aged thirty-six. But there were equally youthful members of the US delegation with whom he worked closely, initially in support of the position adopted by President Woodrow Wilson in seeking a negotiated peace with Germany. Hence Keynes’s close contact with both Norman Davis and also John Foster Dulles, then a young lawyer. Their task was to define the ‘reparations’ due from Germany under the Armistice agreement – often called the ‘Lansing Note’ after the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, who was Dulles’s uncle.

It has long been a puzzle to reconcile two well-known facts: first that the Economic Consequences became the received version on the left for a contemptuous view of Lloyd George; second, that Keynes came to cooperate so closely with Lloyd George in seeking to revive the Liberal party in the 1920s. Their own relationship had begun during the First World War, when Keynes was first drawn into advising the Treasury on key policy issues from 1914. It was in these years that Keynes benefited from the sponsorship of Edwin Montagu, a key minister in the Liberal government. This chapter shows how much Lloyd George’s initial hostility to Keynes on economic policy was the product of a cultural clash between them; also how this came to be resolved (at least temporarily) when Keynes picked up economic insights from Lloyd George’s untutored intuitions. And the chapter draws on the memoir ‘Dr Melchior’, composed by Keynes for his Bloomsbury friends, to illustrate the way that – almost against his own prejudices – he became captivated by Lloyd George’s intuitive mastery of the political process.

The Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919 and did not officially close until one year later, after Germany formally ratified the Treaty of Versailles, but Wilson, Lloyd George, and the leading foreign dignitaries left for home in late June, as soon as the Germans signed their treaty. The Allies designated ambassadors or under-secretaries to represent them in the conclusion of the treaties for Austria (St. Germain), Bulgaria (Neuilly), Hungary (Trianon), and the Ottoman Empire (Sèvres), the latter two not signed until 1920. As the US secretary of state, Lansing, had feared, Wilson’s direct involvement at the conference reduced him to the level of just another negotiator and his Fourteen Points to mere bargaining chips, most of which were sacrificed in whole or in part to achieve the fourteenth: the creation of the League of Nations. While the provisions regarding Germany (reparations, war guilt, near-disarmament, and loss of territory and colonies) received the most attention, outcomes haunting the world into a second great war (and in some cases, beyond it) included the borders drawn in the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the decision of the conference to disregard the interests of Russia and, to a lesser extent, Italy.

During the last half of the war each of the European powers experienced a serious crisis on its home front. Britain resorted to conscription and suppressed a rebellion in Ireland. In both France and Italy, morale wavered when the army suffered mutiny and defeat. In Germany, the militarization of the home front under the Hindenburg Program coincided with the struggle to feed the civilian population during the “turnip winter.” Meanwhile, the death of Francis Joseph accelerated revolutionary thinking among the nationalities of Austria-Hungary. Amid growing sentiment for peace on the European home fronts, the international socialist movement held a peace conference at Stockholm which attracted more participants than the earlier effort at Zimmerwald but was just as fruitless. In the last half of the war strong civilian leaders emerged to rally the home front in each of the leading European Allies – Lloyd George in Britain, Clemenceau in France, and Orlando in Italy – while in the United States, Wilson’s ideals lent a veneer of unity to a degree of domestic upheaval not seen since the American Civil War. Women’s contributions to the war effort bolstered the cause of women’s suffrage, with Britain granting it in March 1918, to take effect in the first postwar elections.