The period from the 1950s to the late 1970s saw an almost uniform decline of cash-to-GDP ratios in industrial countries. A closer look at the German payment system suggests that the factor causing such a change was a shift towards cashless wage payments. In this period, in Germany, the branch network of banks expanded significantly and at the end of the period almost all economically active individuals had a current account. This change was triggered by rising wages and income. Rising wages increased the burden of weekly wage payments in cash, and rising income made the average earner more attractive for banks. Moreover, regulation and deregulation, by triggering both price and non-price competition, may also have played a role. Technological change was not an independent driver. In the 1950s, the number of giro accounts per German adult was comparable to the current situation in many developing countries. Yet, I argue that the German post-war experience does not provide a blueprint for most of these countries.

The performance of local tax offices of Norway is studied over a three-year period applying Data Envelopment Efficiency analysis and a Malmquist productivity index. The estimates are bias-corrected using a bootstrap approach recently developed for DEA models. The results show that bias correction and the construction of confidence intervals give a quite different picture without bootstrapping. A set of best practice offices is identified for future work on finding explanations for good performance. The productivity development of individual offices is classified into the four categories: productivity improving cost increase, productivity improving cost savings, productivity decreasing cost savings and productivity decreasing cost increase.

Do cost considerations justify the current structure of production of extension services in which one or more providers exists in virtually all of the contiguous U.S. states? Provision of extension services has sizable cost implications for the host institutions. Yet, to our knowledge, there has been virtually no analysis of the impact of extension on higher education costs. Using academic year 1995–1996 data, we estimate a multiproduct cost function for 1,445 public institutions of higher education in the United States, including 65 that provide extension services. We find evidence of significant economies of scale with respect to the provision of extension services but no evidence of significant economies of scope between the provision of extension and the production of research, undergraduate education, or graduate education.