The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of skill mismatch on labour turnover, unemployment, and informality, in the case of Colombia. We study Colombia because it is a developing country with one of the highest levels of unemployment and informality in Latin America, along with very restrictive institutions, such as the minimum wage. We found that skill mismatch can explain the high turnover of workers in the Colombian labour market, evident in the increase in hirings and also in separations. Additionally, we find a positive significant effect of skill mismatch on the levels of informality, but no significant effect on unemployment. This evidence remains even once we consider the role of labour market institutions such as minimum wage and non-wage labour costs.

This paper presents the results of research, which highlights the situation during the pandemic in sectors characterised by low wages and a high turnover of workers. The empirical basis is formed by company case studies in the meat industry, postal services, and mask production in Germany and Austria. This paper discusses the significance of different locations (at and beyond the workplace) and forms (‘exit’ and ‘voice’) of labour unrest in sectors of the economy that are characterised by a predominance of the use of migrant labour. It questions how conflicts over migrant labour have been articulated and possibly changed in the pandemic, and what factors may have contributed not only to an upsurge but also to the containment, regulation, and repression, of labour unrest.

This study investigates the impact of the massive and unexpected influx of Syrian refugees on the job vacancy rates (JVRs) and job-finding rates (JFRs) in Turkey between 2009–2015 and 2009–2018. We employed the instrumental variable approach to address potential endogeneity issues. While we found no significant causal impact of the Syrian refugees on JVR, they decreased JFR between 2009 and 2018. A reduction in JFR indicates that the Beveridge Curve shifted inwards, thereby raising matching efficiency and facilitating an improvement in labour market conditions. Furthermore, our research indicated differences in coefficients and significance in JVR and JFR across occupations, as well as different effects in these areas between the short and long term. However, the results demonstrate that the rapid and unexpected influx of Syrian refugees alleviated JVR and JFR in most of the occupation groups.

This paper examines inter-industry patterns of the employment of older workers over the last 20 years to understand where employment opportunities have grown the most. The underlying premise is that firms strategically align their age mix depending on production function and labor cost parameters. The industries that had the largest increases in the percentage of older workers were those that had the broadest pension coverage and those that made the greatest use of high-tech capital. There also is evidence in 2001–07 that the percentage of older workers increased more in the industries most exposed to increased Chinese imports.

This article empirically investigates two propositions normally advanced to explain employment stagnation in the organised sector of the Indian labour market namely, rigid labour laws regulating the ‘hiring and firing’ of workers (along with factory closures) and militant trade union activity boosting workers’ bargaining power. It is claimed that labour laws arrest employment creation by making the labour adjustment process difficult. Additionally, it is claimed that workers’ increased bargaining power raises the effective cost of labour, hindering employment creation. This article critically examines both these claims. First, it questions whether labour laws can be held responsible as an explanation for employment stagnation in the organised sector as a whole, since a close reading of the Indian legislation reveals that labour laws apply in less than 35% of aggregate employment in the organised sector in India. Next, it investigates whether employment stagnation in those industry segments where labour laws apply – namely, organised manufacturing – is due to restrictions on ‘hiring and firing’. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis. Finally, it analyses the trend in workers’ bargaining power through various indicators, and finds such power to be unambiguously declining. Thus, the study finds no empirical support for the two conventional arguments put forward to explain employment stagnation in the organised sector of the Indian labour market.

An impediment to Malaysia’s drive for knowledge economy status is thought to be a very high rate of labour mobility — overseas, to Singapore, and inter-firm — by knowledge workers, particularly engineers. While a strong external labour market may be a sign of economic dynamism, very high turnover rates may indicate a failure of the sort of organisational attachment among professionals that is needed to foster organisational learning. Moreover a ‘brain drain’ from the country of Malaysian-educated engineers remains an ongoing concern. Although this phenomenon is popularly attributed to the ‘job-hopping’ propensities of young Malaysians, it is argued here that firms, through their human resource management (HRM) practices, have an important role to play in encouraging stronger rates of knowledge worker retention. The article reports on research findings indicating varying levels of organisational commitment by a sample of Malaysian engineers. It examines possible links between high turnover and HRM approaches that afford employees few other forms of voice than exiting the firm. Evidence is provided that employee participation in decision-making, particularly relating to training and development, and the perceived fairness of performance appraisal practices, contribute to feelings of perceived organisational support (POS), and that this sense of support influences engineers’ commitment and thus turnover intentions.

The subjective experience of employment insecurity may be more contradictory than discourses of ‘fragmentation’ and ‘flexploitation’ suggest. For young people seeking careers in creative occupations, the expectation of insecure employment conditions has become normalised. This may be the combined effect of intergenerational changes in the youth labour market generally, and the nature of employment in creative industries at all career stages. The article draws from 80 life history interviews conducted in Western Sydney, Australia, a region with high concentrations of unemployment and low socio-economic status. Their perspectives problematise the common assumption that young creative workers seek to resist insecure patterns of work or long for the stable jobs of the past. Partly, they have accepted the injunction for ‘vocational restlessness’ in their industries. Both in their ‘day jobs’ and in their attempts to get into their chosen part of the creative industry, they feel that not staying in one position too long can be both liberating and adaptive. Union campaigns highlighting the perils of insecurity are unlikely to resonate with them.

This article addresses the unresolved question of whether recent technological change causes job instability in a non-western context. China is now the world’s largest user of industrial robots. A Lewis turning point has been predicted, involving a transition from a plentiful supply of rural low-cost workers to a labour shortage economy in which rising labour costs drive labour-technology substitution. The routine-biased technological change hypothesis suggests that technology-induced routinisation in job task content has a profound impact on employment structure. This study captures the extent of routinisation of jobs in the transitional context of China and examines the incidence and impact of routinisation on labour turnover in the labour market. Using rotating panel data from the China Labour-force Dynamics Survey 2012, 2014 and 2016, this study, based on individual information with regard to flexibility in work schedules and degree of autonomy in workload and task content on the job, follows a recently developed measure to construct a routine intensity index and indicates a division into three routine intensity groups. The empirical findings show that the probability of job mobility is significantly increased with the magnitude of routine task intensity, suggesting that the process of technology-induced routinisation is strongly associated with labour turnover.

Following the covid-induced lockdowns, many commented on the role the German model of Kurzarbeit could play in reducing unemployment. Other countries emulated the model. Looking at the experiences of Germany, the UK, Sweden and the USA, the article analyses the strengths and weaknesses of short-time working (STW) schemes. It asks whether STW has been well designed to have optimal short and longer run impact. It is quite effective as a short-term palliative, but in longer downturns, its weaknesses come to the fore. It is by no means clear that the UK needs a permanent replacement for the furlough.

Income drops permanently after an involuntary job displacement, but it has never been clear what happens to long run wealth in the USA. Upon displacement, wealth falls 14% relative to workers of the same age and similar education from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Their wealth is still 18% lower 12 years after the event. A standard life cycle model calibrated to US data with permanent decreases in income after displacement behaves differently than these findings. The agents in the model also experience a large drop in wealth but they recover. The biggest culprit for these differences is small and statistically insignificant changes to consumption in the PSID whereas agents in the model decrease their consumption considerably. Extending the model to include habit formation reconciles some of these differences by generating similar long run effects on wealth. This allows for the examination of wealth at death through the lens of the model.

This paper builds upon Bartelsman, Lopez-Garcia, and Presidente (2018) and provides empirical evidence on the cyclical features of labour reallocation in a sample of European Union (EU) countries over the Great Recession and the slow recovery. The analysis makes use of cross-country micro-aggregated data on firm dynamics and productivity from release 6 of the ECB CompNet database. While productivity-enhancing reallocation generally is counter-cyclical, with a stronger effect providing a silver lining in downturns, it was weaker during the Great Recession in the EU, but reverted back to more normal patters in the most recent years.

We investigated labor force and health outcomes in cities experiencing fiscal difficulties to assess how those difficulties might impact their employees. We matched 23 cities with bond downgrades and 31 cities with stable bond ratings to sampling units in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Starting the year before the downgrade and for the four subsequent years, the rate of separation from local public employment fell in the cities with downgrades relative to the comparison group. Self-reported health may have worsened, but there were no statistically significant effects on health care use or spending.

In England, teacher shortages have worsened in recent years and one contributor is the declining rates of retention among newly qualified teachers (NQTs). We employ a method developed in the health-statistics literature to identify schools that both recruit an unusually high level of NQTs and lose an unusually high level of NQTs from the profession. We show that this small group of schools, which are likely characterised by poor working conditions, are responsible for a disproportionately large amount of attrition from the teaching profession. This has a material effect on overall teacher shortages and comes at a high cost to taxpayers. Policy solutions, including improving the flow of information to NQTs to help them avoid such schools, are discussed

Private sector employment rose by over a million in the past three years. Commentators often interpret this number – which is a net figure – as ‘job creation’. But how many jobs really are created each year, and conversely how many are lost? How has this changed with the downturn and what does it imply for the recovery?

This article uses findings from business and workplace-level data to map i) job creation and destruction over recent years, ii) its components in accounting terms, iii) the relative contribution by firms of different size and age, and iv) the reallocation of resource between firms and to workplaces within firms. There are four main points:

1. a) Job churn far outweighs net change. Before the downturn, an average of 4.0 million jobs were created each year and a slightly smaller number lost (3.7m), resulting in a net increase of about 300,000 per year.

2. b) Most job creation (over 70 per cent) is within existing firms; but within that, over a third comes from the creation of new workplaces set up within those firms.

3. c) The net reduction in jobs in 2008–11 was not, in contrast to earlier recessions, due to higher rates of job loss; instead it reflects a sustained period of lower job creation in new workplaces, especially in SMEs (figure 1). This is consistent with ongoing credit constraints hitting SMEs particularly hard, as discussed in Armstrong et al. (2013), or could simply be in line with lack of confidence to invest at this time.

4. d) Looking at the years 2008–11 individually, the downturn begins with reduced levels of entry, followed by a peak of job destruction in 2009 in line with reduced aggregate demand, and then a continuation of low levels of entry of new SMEs, and lower levels of destruction too (figure 2).

In this article, we present an analysis of the institutional evolution of firing in Spain. We explain how a certain path-dependence has been created by historical accidents and how this is the mechanism behind the current system of a costly employment at will. The incentives of firms, workers and governments to sustain such a system are also discussed. We show the main inefficiencies of the system: a substantial increase in severance pay, a distorted use of the legal framework, and limitations to give a rapid answer to a big negative shock. Finally, we discuss how the unemployment benefits reform of 2002 can be understood as the culmination of Spain's policy of costly employment at will.