This chapter explores the interaction between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), as well as international criminal law. It examines how IHRL influences the application and development of IHL and how human rights principles are integrated into international criminal procedures and substantive law. The chapter discusses the mutual reinforcement and potential conflicts between these branches of international law, highlighting the need for a coherent and integrated approach. It also explores the role of international courts and tribunals in applying and interpreting IHRL, IHL, and international criminal law, and the challenges in ensuring compliance and accountability.

Genocide is sometimes called the ’crime of crimes’. The word was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, then declared an international crime by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1948, the Genocide Convention was adopted. As the first human rights treaty of modern times, it constituted a significant intrusion into what had previously been a matter exclusively of domestic concern. This explains the narrow definition of the crime of genocide. It requires proof of an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Only a half century after its adoption did the Genocide Convention take on real significance with inter-State cases being filed at the International Court of Justice and many prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Convention requires that States Parties punish genocide but they are also required to prevent it, even when it takes place outside their own territory. More than 150 States have ratified the Genocide Convention. Genocide is also prohibited under customary international law. It is generally agreed that the duty to punish genocide is a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).

This chapter explores the design of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) permanent premises and the politics of movement on its grounds. Drawing on literature in the field of critical international criminal law, law and architecture, legal design, and feminist courtroom geography, the chapter rethinks how the architecture of this particular international court is in constant conversation with its surroundings and its visitors, and how it is entangled with questions of international (criminal) law’s legitimacy and its appeal to humanity, dignity, truth, and justice. My starting point is the constant tension between inclusion and exclusion already inherently present in the design concept of Schmidt Hammer Lassen Architects, who aimed to design a building that was to be “a landmark that conveys the eminence and authority of the ICC, while at the same time relating on a human scale." By providing a deeper understanding of the politics of design at the ICC’s permanent premises, this chapter aims to contribute to an interdisciplinary conversation on international law’s opportunities, challenges, and possible alternatives.

The Conclusion draws on the findings of the book to analyse the main implications of a reciprocity-based understanding of belligerent reprisals. First, it distinguishes this formalization of belligerent reprisals from earlier theories stressing the law-making function of the measure. Then, it accounts for the continued relevance of belligerent reprisals even at a time when mechanisms monitoring and enforcing compliance with the laws of armed conflict gain momentum. Finally, it explains how a reciprocity-based interpretation of belligerent reprisals would affect follow-up reform of the mechanism – be it in the sense of fine-tuning its regulation, or in the sense of disposing of it altogether.

Chapter 6 describes how terrorism is punishable under international criminal law. This body of international law holds natural persons – individuals – criminally responsible for the perpetration of international crimes. Although views differ among scholars, as the chapter describes, the better view is that individual acts of terrorism that do not fall within the definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide are not directly criminalized by international law. Particular attention is paid to the relevant caselaw of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

This chapter seeks to clarify the criminal responsibility that may be imputable to: (i) programmers of autonomous vehicles for related crimes under national criminal law such as manslaughter and negligent homicide and (ii) programmers of autonomous weapons for related crimes under international criminal law, such as war crimes. The key question is whether programmers could satisfy the actus reus element required for establishing criminal responsibility. The core challenge in answering this question is establishing a causal link between programmers’ conduct and crimes related to autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons. The chapter proposes responsibility for inherent foreseeable risks associated with the use of AVs and AWs on the basis of programmers’ alleged control of the behavior and/or effects of the autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons. Establishing the exercise of meaningful human control by programmers over autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons is crucial to the process of imputing criminal responsibility and bridging a responsibility gap.

This chapter discusses international criminal law (ICL) and distinguishes it from other areas of international law and criminal law. ICL is placed within the general area of international alw and its source doctrine whilst also discussing ICL’s unique nature as an area of criminal law. Critical approaches to ICL are discussed as an increasingly important perspective/approach to shaping debates in ICL.

In this chapter, I introduce the main questions I seek to answer in this book, which are: what gives international courts the authority to punish individuals for international crimes, and under what conditions may courts legitimately exercise that authority? I give an overview of the history of international criminal justice, of my methodological assumptions, and of the arguments I make in the individual chapters.

The present chapter has a two-fold aim. First, it maps the current state of international supervision in the area of international criminal law by looking particularly at the competence of treaty bodies and other non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs), their institutional and operative differences, progressive sophistication, and other developments in recent practice. Secondly, the chapter investigates the features of, and circumstances under which, NCMs established by specific international criminal law instruments are more effective than others in addressing situations of non-compliance and orientating the future actions of States.

The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a game changer in the relationship between conflict resolution and the pursuit of accountability for mass atrocities. No longer must wars end before international criminal justice is pursued. But the ICC’s forays into situations of ongoing hostilities have not been kind to perceptions of the Court’s role in contributing to peace or in-conflict accountability. Twenty years after its creation, there are signs that the ICC is increasingly reluctant to target individuals engaged in ongoing wars. This chapter illustrates how perceptions of the ICC have been undermined by its forays into active conflicts and how this has resulted in an apparent reluctance to pursue active belligerents. Reflecting on the future of justice in conflict, it also examines what the Court can do to ameliorate perceptions of its impacts on peace and how to build stronger cases against alleged perpetrators involved in active wars.

China’s engagement with international criminal law almost dates back to the creation of the body of law when the Tokyo tribunal was first established; China has followed closely the continuous evolution of international criminal law in various contemporary institutional contexts. Since China has involved itself in the making and development of international criminal law, it no longer views the body of law as subject to the same criticism as some of its aspects dating back to the nineteenth century, but it is not willing to take a step beyond its stance of positive engagement and commit fully to the binding force of international criminal law. This chapter aims to understand the evolving relationship of China with international criminal law, from the substantive issues that have influenced the nature of that relationship to date to the factors relating to China’s interactions with this body of law in the years to come. The chapter seeks to explore how China’s dual identities as both a developing country and a rising great power, which represent different kinds of state interests and preferences, give rise to competing concerns in its relationship with international criminal law.