This article looks at the development of the concept of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It contends that the ICTR’s interpretation of crimes against humanity is generally seen by international lawyers as a commendable, but unsurprising, step in the historical development of this category. In much the same way, the ICTR’s historical account is considered to be a standard attempt by a war crimes court to relate a liberal history of crimes against humanity in a way that upholds civilized values. Yet, although the historical and legal work of the ICTR appear unexceptional, this article will argue that they do demonstrate a particular conceptual approach towards warfare, history, humanity, and the nature of international law. Moreover, this is a conceptual approach that is quite different to that taken by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The article suggests that these differences, and the invisibility of the change, are due to the ICTR’s reliance on familiar narrative tropes. These narratives were established through poststructuralist theory but could be expressed in a variety of more or (often) less theoretical forms. By exploring the influence of these narratives on the Tribunal, it is possible to examine some of the ways in which conceptual change is facilitated and knowledge is created in international law. In particular, it shows how theories that are often considered marginal to international law have had a significant impact on some of the central provisions of international humanitarian law.

The International Criminal Courts Round-Up reports on the most interesting judgements and decisions rendered by international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals during the reporting period. In addition, important developments within the various organs of the courts are highlighted, such as the appointment of new judges and significant amendments to the procedural rules of the courts. The Round-Up presently covers issues concerning the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

The Rwandan genocide remains one of the most horrific atrocities of the twentieth century, resulting in the death of an estimated 500–800,000 human beings, massacred over a 100-day period. In the fourteen years since the genocide, attempts at justice and reconciliation in Rwanda have involved a delicate interplay between national legal systems and the international legal order. This article examines three fora in which Rwandans have been tried for involvement in the genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rwandan courts including Gacaca tribunals, and French attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction. Using Rwanda as a case study, the article illustrates the issues, concerns, and difficulties that arise when multiple jurisdictions assert a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of serious atrocity crimes. Beginning with a discussion of the political context, this article considers what the competing narratives and litigation in various fora have meant for the project of international and transnational criminal justice. Cases involving the commission of atrocities pose unique challenges for the international legal order. As the normative structure of international criminal law has arguably been strengthened, political constraints increasingly come to the fore. As illustrated by Rwanda, universal jurisdiction or other bases of jurisdiction may remain necessary vehicles for justice and reconciliation, or, at the very least, they may serve as a catalyst for change in Rwanda itself.

Witness proofing – or witness preparation – has been common practice at the ad hoc criminal tribunals but was prohibited in the first trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) (the Lubanga case). The ad hocs have robustly defended the practice, claiming that it assists the efficient presentation of evidence and enhances the truth-finding process. This article examines the way in which the ad hocs have allowed the process to become an integral feature of their procedural regimes without sufficient examination of these apparent merits. The ad hocs appear to have accepted that prohibiting the parties from rehearsing, practising, and coaching evidence was in the interests of justice, but yet – in the uncritical acceptance of the benefits of proofing – have sanctioned practices which are impossible to distinguish. The Lubanga case represented a welcome attempt by the ICC to examine proofing and its attendant risks and, for the reasons outlined in the article, the chambers arrived somewhere close to the right decision.

This article examines the analytical framework and key arguments used by K. Ambos to conclude that witness proofing is neither a legally permissible nor necessary useful practice before the ICC in his reply to ‘Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence’. Contrary to Ambos, the article argues that witness proofing cannot be both acceptable at the UN international criminal tribunals and per se inappropriate at the ICC, given the ICC's procedural regime allowing for trials to be conducted in a form almost identical to those of the UN tribunals. A related argument is that the practice of witness proofing is not prohibited in the law governing the ICC, even if not provided for. Further arguments conclude that reliance upon spontaneity of a witness in court as a guarantee of reliability is misplaced, that the merits of national practices are irrelevant to the overall analysis, and that international judges are competent to manage the negligible risks associated with witness proofing.

The International Criminal Courts Round-Up reports on the most interesting judgements and decisions rendered by international(ized) criminal courts and tribunals during the reporting period. In addition, important developments within the various organs of the courts are highlighted, such as the appointment of new judges and significant amendments to the procedural rules of the courts. The Round-Up presently covers issues concerning the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

According to the ICTR, Emmanuel Bagambiki is an innocent man. The trial chamber and the Appeals Chamber have each unanimously acquitted the former Prefect of Cyangugu of crimes relating to Rwanda's horrific 1994 genocide. And on 19 July 2007 Bagambiki was reunited with his wife in children in Belgium, having been granted asylum a few days earlier. It is tempting to conclude that justice has been done in Bagambiki's case. That conclusion, however, would be too facile: Bagambiki was acquitted in February 2006, nearly 18 months before his family reunion. In the interim he lived in a safe house in Arusha paid for by the United Nations, wanted by Rwanda for trial on related charges and unable to convince Belgium that he posed no danger to its peace and security. Bagambiki, moreover, is one of the lucky ones: the nightmare of being free but having nowhere to go continues for two of his acquitted roommates in the safe house, Andre Ntagerura and Andre Rwamakuba, Rwanda's Minister of Transport and former Minister of Education respectively. Bagambiki's ordeal and Rwamakuba and Ntagerura's ongoing plight illustrate one of the basic problems facing international criminal tribunals: what to do with the acquitted. An acquitted defendant normally has two options: return to his country of origin, or find a third country that will grant him asylum. Both options, however, have been problematic for defendants acquitted by the ICTR and are likely to prove equally problematic for defendants who may be acquitted in the future by the ICC. This short essay explains why – and identifies what the international community should do about it.

Witness proofing – or preparation – is an adjunct of the adversarial criminal trial process. It is also a common practice at the UN international criminal tribunals, where it has been repeatedly challenged, analysed, and endorsed. Recently, a trial chamber at the ICC prohibited the prosecutor from proofing witnesses, seemingly calling upon the institution, at an early stage, to break with the established practice of proofing at the UN international criminal tribunals. This article examines witness proofing in international criminal procedure with the aim of describing and weighing its relative merits, and arguing that proofing – as practised at the UN international criminal tribunals – appears to be a better modality for enhancing the efficiency, integrity, and legitimacy of the truth-seeking function of international criminal trials than does prohibiting the practice.

The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR provide for the review of final judgments upon the discovery of a ‘new fact’ that could have affected the judgments. The Appeals Chambers of the two Tribunals interpret the term ‘new fact’ to mean new information related to a matter that was not at issue during the original trial, as opposed to simply meaning new information of a factual nature. The article argues that this interpretation of ‘new fact’ creates a risk that review will be denied on formalistic grounds even in situations where principles of justice would make review plainly warranted. The article proposes several ways in which the Appeals Chambers could alter their case law to ensure against such injustice. Finally, the article considers the implications of this issue for other international criminal tribunals.