This chapter considers whether and how the All-Affected Principle (AAP) ought to be extended to large-scale, Western-based INGOs such as Oxfam and Care. These INGOs are frequently criticized for being undemocratic. Would more compliance with the AAP make them more democratic? I consider two possible ways of extending the APP to INGOs. The AAP’s “inclusive face” analogizes INGOs to governments and suggests that they should be more inclusive. It thus offers only a limited basis for critique. The AAP’s “exclusive face” points out that INGOs are unaffected, and tells us that they should therefore be excluded. The AAP’s exclusive face therefore offers a more radical basis for critiquing INGOs than its inclusive face. However, even the AAP’s exclusive face has serious limitations in the context of INGOs. This is because INGOs face the involvement/influence dilemma: they can be involved in addressing social problems or they can avoid undue influence, but it is difficult for them to do both simultaneously. I therefore turn to three organizations that directly and intentionally address this dilemma: SURJ, Thousand Currents, and the Solidaire Network. I show that these organizations reinterpret the AAP in ways that are relevant to, and generative for, other similarly-situated entities, such as INGOs.

This chapter introduces the main argument of this book that global sovereign power is constituted by public/private hybridity in Lived Sovereignty, while sovereign authority is recognized as indivisibly public in Idealized Sovereignty. Public/private hybridity takes on different characteristics of contractual, institutional, and shadow forms based on the formalization and publicization of relations. In relation to hybrid sovereignty, the lived realities of different types of public/private hybridity are in tension with the idealized imperatives of determining what is public versus private.

This chapter argues that Amnesty International’s chief sovereign accomplishment in Lived Sovereignty is organizing a global human rights polity from disparate transnational publics. However, shadow relations between Amnesty and governments related to funding, country access, and negotiating reforms in its first two decades threatened to derail the moral purity that undergirds the protection of human rights in Idealized Sovereignty. Successfully navigating shadow hybridity has thus been a central yet understudied feature of Amnesty. The historical analysis contextualizes the difficult choices Amnesty made to become the world’s leading INGO. Amnesty thus helps us see that hybrid relations endure even when the stakes are very high, exemplifying the pervasiveness of hybrid sovereignty in global politics.

Chapter 4 focuses on the variety of governors in areas of limited statehood. State and non-state, local, national, transnational, as well as international actors are motivated to engage in governance in areas of limited statehood if certain conditions are present. Moreover, we find the entire range of modes of governance, from hierarchical steering including the use of force to inclusive, participatory, and deliberative governance. We start with external state governance, including international and regional organizations, development agencies, and foreign governments. We then turn to the non-state sector, starting with (I)NGOs and multi-stakeholder partnerships. A very different type of actor are (multinational) companies who are usually not inclined to become governors to begin with. In contrast, “traditional” authorities, such as tribal chiefs and community leaders as well as non-state justice institutions tend to be among the most important indigenous governors in many areas of limited statehood. A rather unlikely group of governors are violent non-state actors such as rebel groups or warlords.

Chapter 6 investigates human rights, the rule of law, as well as participatory institutions. Democratic governance is possible, even if state capacities to enforce rules and decisions are weak or absent. We start by addressing the human rights problematique in areas of limited statehood. Strengthening state capacity might do human rights and the rule of law more harm than good, resulting in autocratic and repressive statehood. We explore the effectiveness of regional organizations (RO) and of (I)NGOs and non-state justice institutions to provide fair and transparent access to justice as a crucial component of the rule of law. They can accomplish these goals, the more their institutional design enables deliberative negotiations through fair and transparent procedures. The remainder of the chapter discusses the effectiveness of companies and rebel groups to engage in human rights and democratic governance. It is one thing to expect from companies to comply with human rights norms. It is quite different to ask them to promote human rights and the rule of law beyond their premises. Rebel groups are more likely to provide effective human rights and inclusive governance, particularly if they require international and domestic legitimacy and if they are faced with trust-based communities.