Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

2 results

  • 5 - Being Good at Being Bad: Plato’s Hippias Minor

  • Edited by David Ebrey, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Richard Kraut, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Companion to Plato
    Published online:
    21 July 2022
    Print publication:
    04 August 2022, pp 146-172

  • Summary

    In the Hippias Minor, Socrates argues that the expert in a given domain is the one in a position to voluntarily violate the rules of that domain. For example, the expert archer can ensure that her arrows miss the target, whereas the novice archer might accidentally hit the target she’s trying to miss. Socrates claims, shockingly, that this point holds for justice as well: it is the expert in justice who will have the power to deliberately act unjustly. Though some accuse Socrates of drawing this conclusion on the basis of uncritical reliance on the craft analogy, I argue that in fact Socrates is identifying common ground between a variety of forms of practical normativity. In any activity that can be assessable as going well or badly, those who intentionally flout the norm, by erring on purpose, are better at it than those who unintentially flub the norm, by erring accidentally. Socrates’ argument places powerrather than the exercise of powerat the heart of ethics. The Hippias Minor shows why Socratic ethics is an ethics of virtue, rather than an ethics of virtue activation.

  • 4 - The tyranny of the Pisistratidae

  • from PART II - THE GREEK STATES
  • Edited by John Boardman, N. G. L. Hammond, D. M. Lewis, M. Ostwald
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Ancient History
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    24 November 1988, pp 287-302

  • Summary

    Pisistratus died in spring 527, but tyranny survived at Athens until 510. Pisistratus left three legitimate sons, Hippias, Hipparchus and Thessalus. Pisistratus' notion of tyranny had certainly included efforts to reach friendly relations with atleast some noble families and there is one clear case of his having recalled an exile, Cimon, towards the end of his life. For his sons' relationships with the nobles, little material existed until the publication in 1939 of a fragment of the archon-list for the first years of their rule, which has thrown valuable light on their use of the eponymous archonship for control and conciliation. When Pisistratus first came to power, Attica had been a country in which the local power of the great dynasts had been all-important. Athens itself had been not much more than the largest centre of population and the seat of some of the more important generally accepted cults.