During the 1970s, Iran’s relationships across Africa developed, both in terms of the number of ambassadors accredited to African countries, and in terms of the volume of trade and extent of political dialogue. At the beginning of the decade, Iran had diplomatic relations with just five countries in the whole of Africa – Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – but by the middle of the 1970s it had established formal ties with over thirty-five nations. This chapter investigates the nature of Iran’s diplomacy in Africa and why it was so successful during the 1970s. It questions why the shah was appealing to the independent states of Africa, and what strategies the regime employed to project an image of the shah as the leader of a country that had historically been an important global power and a civilising force in the world, and which aspired to continue to influence world affairs in a positive way. At the same time, after the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the shah sought to expand Iran’s sphere of influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood towards the Indian Ocean.

In his search for allies who would help him challenge Nasserism and other radical movements, the shah found a companion in the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie I. This chapter investigates the early years of this relationship and some of the issues that prompted the two sides to cooperate – including common security concerns in the Red Sea, threats to the global monarchical institution, and the challenges that decolonisation presented to conservative regimes in the Global South. Ethiopia provided Iran with its first ally in sub-Saharan Africa, but it was not until the Summit Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in 1963 that Iran began seriously to consider its future role in Africa. Several emissaries from Africa had already visited Iran, for example from Nigeria and Cameroon, and in 1964, a report was published by the Imperial Court on the opportunities Africa could present to Iran. Subsequently, the decision was taken to deepen ties with the continent as a matter of urgency. Because Addis Ababa was the de facto diplomatic capital of Africa, it was perceived as a bridge to the rest of Africa.

This essay was published in October 1935, the same month Italy invaded independent Ethiopia and met little resistance from other members of the League of Nations. It reviews the conjoined evolution of racism and imperialism from the beginning of the modern era, until the First World War brought about a “revolution of thought in regard to race relations,” and “a new distribution of world power” appeared likely. The invasion of Ethiopia by Mussolini’s Italy will likely succeed despite weak efforts at mediation by the League of Nations. The invasion demonstrates the ongoing dangers for world peace of European imperial rivalry and portends similar expansion by Hitler’s Germany. The essay predicts that the “whole colored world,” seeing that neither Christianity nor international institutions restrain European states in their imperial exploitation, will soon come to the realization that their only hope lies in their solidarity against “race hate” and their willingness to resort to force to resist European exploitation. The gains achieved by Gandhi’s remarkable nonviolent resistance were modest; Italy’s success would destroy Indians’ tenuous faith in “the justice of white Europe.” Italy’s actions confirm that “Economic exploitation based on the excuse of race prejudice is the program of the white world.”