This article questions the drivers behind the distribution of savings in different capital markets in Portugal between 1550 and 1800. A novel dataset of credit transactions, interest rates and debt service documents a shift in the lenders' investment behaviour. By 1712, one of the leading institutional creditors—the Misericórdias—had ceased to allocate funds to the sovereign debt market. Data reveal that this disinvestment was neither related to the poor performance of debt service nor to the lure of potentially higher returns on private credit. We argue that changes in the rationales for issuing debt justify the drop in the number of institutional investors in the public credit market, and this correlates with the heavy allocation of funds into private lending.

Over the past decade, the most salient changes in macroeconomic conditions in developed economies have included rising government debt and population aging, which are strongly correlated with each other. This paper investigates fiscal multipliers by disentangling the effects of population aging from those of government debt. Our analysis, which uses heterogeneous panel data from 24 OECD economies, shows that while fiscal policy is ineffective for economies with high-debt levels, it is effective for economies with low-debt levels. Furthermore, the estimation results reveal that fiscal policy is ineffective for aged economies, regardless of the level of government debt. However, for nonaged economies, while fiscal policy leads to negative effects on output in times of high debt, its positive effects are more pronounced in times of low debt. Our results suggest that, for the effective implementation of fiscal stimulus policies, policy-based stimulation of employment in the labor market is essential.

This paper weighs possible medium-term responsible policy choices to the extraordinary expansion of government spending in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The paper is divided into two parts. In part 1 of the paper, we look at conventional debt sustainability and question whether conventional rules created during a period of high interest rates and high inflation remain relevant. Current and future conditions support a case for government debt/GDP to remain elevated compared to history, conditional upon limited state interference in the economy to allow appropriate allocation of capital and resources. In part 2, we consider the historical experience of the United Kingdom. History shows the country had several examples of rapid, large-scale expansion of government debt relative to the size of the economy. On each occasion, the elevated level of debt-to-GDP was later reduced by a combination of relatively benign factors, including commitment to low inflation and sound monetary system. This supported the financial probity of the UK government and allowed it to continue to borrow unimpeded.

Following failure of the stimulatory policies post the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting instability of the Euro, national fiscal consolidation with real sanctions for non-compliance has become a key focus of most governments as they address escalating budget deficits and rapidly rising public debt. The problem is that agreement by central governments to adopt national fiscal rules, whether self-imposed or imposed by some supranational institution, leaves unaddressed how such rules and sanctions should be adopted by (or imposed on) sub-central and local governments. To date, the primary focus has been on whether the encouragement given over recent decades to fiscal decentralisation has worsened public debt levels and made national fiscal consolidation by central governments more difficult. This article argues that what is missing from this discussion is attention to the intergovernmental institutional arrangements and how they and their reform are potentially crucial to both national fiscal consolidation and ensuring retention of the benefits of fiscal decentralisation.

The article offers an analysis of the processes of neoliberal transformation, or the transition from ‘real socialism’ to ‘real capitalism’, which took place roughly three decades ago in Central-Eastern Europe, with particular consideration given to Poland. The key to a sociological understanding of capitalist modernisation is the combination of two perspectives present in social sciences: analysis in terms of shock therapy and the prospect of debt. Referring to the concepts of the ‘rent theory of ownership’, the role of foreign debt, creditor–debtor relations and the resulting crisis are submitted to analysis as the key factors of modernisation. Finally, the social, political and cultural consequences of the neoliberal transformation are also considered. These are argued to be growing right-wing populist and authoritarian tendencies.

This paper critically examines the key empirical evidence used to support the fiscal consolidation argument, complemented by a brief assessment of the limitations of the analytical foundation of the growth promoting benefits of the fiscal consolidation thesis. It also reviews the evidence on the debt-growth relationship at some length. It finds that the negative relationship between debt and GDP growth is influenced by outliers or exceptionally high debt-GDP ratios. It also points out that the composition of public debt matters. Additionally, the debt-GDP relationship appears to be non-linear—positive first and turning to negative, but there is considerable variation in the estimated turning or ‘tipping’ point, which is not helpful as a policy guide. Historical evidence does not lend support to the concerns that the current situation is likely to cause rapid upward spiraling of public indebtedness. Finally, the argument that fiscal consolidation is possible without adversely affecting growth is not based on robust empirical evidence. This conclusion is reinforced by a succinct overview of some country-specific experiences (Denmark, Ireland and United States).

The deleterious effect of debt restructuring on banks’ balance sheets and, consequently, on the economy as a whole has been a key policy issue. This paper studies how post-default fiscal policy interacts with this sovereign-bank loop and shape the response of a model economy. Calibration of the model matches characteristics of the Greek economy at the time of the bond exchange. Debt restructuring in place of higher lump-sum taxation or lower nonproductive government spending harms the economy even if no other cost of default is considered. However, the sovereign-debt loop is less costly to the economy than increases in labor or capital taxes to service debt. Even so, if fiscal policy is too responsive, a crowding-out effect inhibits the recovery of capital markets, hence a more conservative fiscal stance is desirable. Thus, how diabolic the post-default sovereign-bank loop is depends to a large extent on the way fiscal policy responds.

The shortcomings and potential dangers of international financial flows for the health and stability of domestic banking systems in developing countries have been copiously discussed over the last decades. While the importance of capital controls and regulation as determining factors has been widely emphasised, the extent to which these policies work in episodes of financial crisis is still a matter of debate. This article examines the relationship between supervisory frameworks and banking fragility in Mexico and Brazil in the wake of the international debt crisis of 1982. It shows that the model of international banking intermediation that evolved out of the stringent capital mobility system in Brazil was considerably less vulnerable to crisis than in Mexico, which had a more lightly regulated regime. These findings provide insights into historical debates about the implications of prudential regulation and capital controls for the development and expansion of foreign finance, and whether the risks underlying international banking are necessarily inherent in the process of financial globalisation.

Recent contributions on ‘financial repression’ and ‘money illusion’ have referred to Maynard Keynes's How to Pay for the War as a supporting document. This article discusses whether Keynes prescribed policies of ‘financial repression’ that were implemented in the United Kingdom, and other countries, following World War II. It seems reasonable that Keynes's writings were instrumental in translating British monetary experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policymakers during and after World War II, including a belief in ‘money illusion’ that suggested the use of inflation for driving down real interest rates of public bonds. If this was the case, How to Pay for the War could indeed provide an important explanation for the why and when of ‘financial repression’. This article argues that How to Pay for the War only partly provided support for a policy of ‘financial repression’, and none for using inflation as a ‘tax gatherer’ to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting Keynes as a source for widespread ‘money illusion’ is also out of line with the historical record.

Between 1800 and 1820, Buenos Aires and the former colonial Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata faced an unprecedented fiscal crisis caused by the revolutionary wars, eventually solved by levying forced loans. This paper considers the unintended institutional consequences of these loans. The novel devices allowed (1) the holders of forced-loan coupons to use these bonds to pay off debts incurred in customs duties and (2) the holders of bills of exchange involved in the provisioning of the military to use these bills to pay part of their forced loans. Starting with the conceptualisation of the institutional order as a complex system, this paper examines the interactions among the circulation of financial paper bills, the financing of war and changes in the position of the merchants' guild and the legal framework for Atlantic trade. It thereby contributes to renewing institutional change approaches in the Spanish-American context.

Interest in the growth of tradeable securities in early modern Britain, especially its relationship to economic development and the funding of government debt, has centered mainly on the borrower – whether it be trading company, industrial enterprise, or the state. This article directs attention to the investor, using Charity Commission Reports for England and Wales that document a dramatic mid-eighteenth-century shift by donors and trustees from investments in real estate and rent charges to perpetual government annuities, mainly 3 percent Consols. The heavy investment in this public debt product is what ultimately prompted the creation of the London Stock Exchange in 1801.

In analyzing this shift, which occurred among the propertied in all regions of the nation, not just the metropolis or among corporate entities and the mercantile community, I consider both what made the annuities increasingly attractive for charitable trusts and the alternatives – real estate and private loans secured by mortgage or other means – more problematic. Legal changes, I argue, played a role in the transformation, especially the Charitable Uses Act of 1736, which made charitable devises of real estate very difficult and probably resulted in reduced investment in human capital and less wealth redistribution. Regions varied, however, in the degree to which they switched from real estate in the latter part of the eighteenth century; they also differed in the extent to which the switch resulted in more gifts of interest-bearing loans as well.

Admittedly, the changes documented in this article concern only one type of depository for assets, charitable trusts. The appeal of these annuities, however, could extend to investments needed for other purposes such as postmortem payments to dependents. Moreover, the fall-off in demand for real estate in trusts correlates with GDP estimates showing a steady decline in income from real assets after 1755 and what some have noted in this period as a puzzle – the lack of an increased rate of return on rents and private loans at a time of robust investment in government debt. Most importantly, though, the transition demonstrates the ability of the government to induce a broad spectrum of the propertied population to invest in securities, if the vehicle they offered had the right characteristics, which were not necessarily highest yield or liquidity without loss in value.

The article deals with Italian inter-war debts against the background of the contentious international issue of war reparations that many Allied nations wanted to link to war debt repayments. Italy, having first achieved an extremely large haircut by restructuring US and UK debts in 1925-6, defaulted in 1934, after the Lausanne conference of 1932 failed to deliver war debt forgiveness. We construct a new series of Italian foreign debt from 1925 to 1934 that is consistent with the unfolding of relevant historical events. Starting in 1926, our values are much lower than the currently available foreign debt series. The reason is that the current series do not take into account the large haircut that Finance Minister Volpi extracted from the London debt accord of 1926. Then, beginning in 1932, the values of our series exceed the currently available series because we date the formal Italian exit of the US war debt to 1934, whereas the current series dates it to 1932, at Lausanne.

The recent European debt crisis has renewed interest as to why debtor countries honour their foreign debts and subscribe to respectively burdensome rescheduling conditions. While the cost of defaulting in a domestic financial system has been recognised as a main motive for repayment, the factors that cause sovereign states to refrain from debt repudiation are not fully understood. This article investigates the reasons behind the repayment decision and weak negotiating position of the Mexican government following the 1982 debt crisis. It shows that leading commercial banks had considerable amounts of external loans in their books, and that Mexican policymakers lacked the foreign exchange access they needed to secure the stability of the domestic banking system. The high exposure of domestic banks to Mexican debt and their heightened dependence on foreign capital worked as mechanisms that allowed international creditors to enforce their claims and deterred Mexico from declaring a unilateral default.

This paper shows empirical evidence and theory consistent with the US government using debt optimally to adjust the federal budget to news about long-term growth. First, using historical forecasts from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) since 1984, I find that government purchases and deficits are positively correlated with expectations about long-term productivity, real gross domestic product, and tax revenue growth, whereas tax receipts are negatively correlated. A structural vector autoregression estimated with US quarterly data in 1955–2015 identifies permanent and transitory productivity shocks and points to “trend” shocks as the source of these correlations. Second, I present an open economy real business-cycle model with stochastic productivity trend and optimal public purchases and taxes. Calibrating the model to the US economy, the Ramsey planners' allocation yields moments aligned with those observed in the data.

Taxation is accepted as a fact of modern life, despite recurring political conflict over the nature and direction of fiscal policies. Most financiers regard obligations issued by the state as a safe investment option. Neither taxation nor state obligations were taken for granted during much of the history of public finance, however, at least not before the early 1800s. The ‘tax state’ developed in fits and starts, driven by the exigencies of warfare, which provided the main rationale for raising state income. Although wartime fiscal innovations eventually facilitated the rise of an efficient military state, the options available for implementing such improvements and preferences for specific fiscal or financial instruments varied greatly across early modern states. Focusing on the ‘long’ eighteenth century, this introduction presents a framework for assessing these differences and introduces the other articles in this special issue.

Based on an extensive survey of French primary sources and a discussion of the recent literature on fiscal policy in France and Europe during Louis XIV's wars, this article revisits the rationale behind the first experiment with paper money undertaken by finance minister Michel Chamillart, comparing it to other belligerents’ strategies, in particular England's, to adjust their monetary regime to the challenges of funding long wars of attrition. The article shows how concerns about economic activity, coinage and the need to finance the war deficit led to a series of debasements of the French currency, the establishment of a bank in the form of a Caisse des emprunts and the introduction of mint bills, which became legal tender and caused the first experience of fiat money inflation in history. Whereas Chamillart's personal shortcomings have been recently suggested as the cause of Louis XIV's humbling in the War of the Spanish Succession, I argue on the contrary that the introduction of paper money in 1704 was key to the capacity of France to sustain its military effort, but that a succession of military defeats against a more powerful coalition led to inflation. I also argue that the introduction of paper money saved the Caisse des emprunts and its bonds which helped sustain the war effort up until the peace. By situating the use of paper money within the broader question of the exercise of power in the absolute monarchy, this article examines the formation of fiscal policy, paying attention to the ways in which government sought advice from experts. It concludes by calling for further studies on policy- and decision-making under Louis XIV.

This paper focusses on the financial relations between the banking sector and the Treasury in Modern Spain. Tax systems have been insufficient, generating a chronic budget deficit. This drove to irresponsible public debt management, being the State a serial defaulter until 1987. This prevented the budget deficits could be financed by sovereign debt issued on the stock exchanges, and forced the state to resort to banks (public and private). The new series of public debt banks portfolios evolution is explained by their pursuit of returns and by changes in banking regulation and financial repression, which favoured the banking status quo. The paper analyses the causes of banking regulation, derived from the public borrowing policy and also from the banking lobbying strategy. It examines the consequences of the deadly banking-state embrace which brought about the interconnection between fiscal and banking crises.

A previously unknown pricing anomaly existed for a few years in the late 1840s in the British government bond market, in which the larger and more liquid of two very large bonds was underpriced. None of the published mechanisms explains this phenomenon. It may be related to another pricing anomaly that existed for much of the nineteenth century in which terminable annuities were significantly underpriced relative to so-called ‘perpetual’ annuities that dominated the government bond market. The reasons for these mispricings seem to lie in the early Victorian culture, since the basic economic incentives as well as laws and institutions were essentially the familiar modern ones. This provides new perspectives on the origins and nature of modern corporate capitalism.

British government bonds formed the deepest, most liquid and most transparent financial market of the nineteenth century. This article shows that those bonds had long periods, extending over decades, of anomalous behavior, in which Consols, the largest and best known of these instruments, were noticeably overpriced relative to equivalent securities which offered the same interest rate and the same guarantee of payment. This finding and similar ones for other comparable pairs of British gilts appear to provide the most extreme counterexamples documented so far to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and to the Law of One Price, and point the way to further investigations on the origins and nature of the modern economy.