Globalization, accountability, and technology are changing important aspects of global governance. While coercion, enforcement, and material sanctions have often taken pride of place as major movers of interstate relations, scholars and policy agents alike have come to appreciate the multifaceted nature of power exerted more subtly and gradually.

The proliferation of global performance indicators (GPIs) is one example of such power. They contain ideas and worldviews, and they attempt to “regulate” through non-coercive but nonetheless powerful means. They do not merely measure qualities and practices in order to understand or inform, they pressure their targets to perform and conform. In wielding such tools, a diverse set of actors insert themselves in the governing process, in some cases even shifting policy parameters. When promulgated by authoritative actors, GPIs can name and categorize information in new ways and have what anthropologists like Merry and others have referred to as “knowledge effects,” or the ability to influence how people think about socially legitimate or best practice. Their proliferation and evolution define and contest what is worth knowing, measuring and achieving.

In recent decades, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private firms, and even states have begun to regularly package and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, to extend the authority of the creator, and – most importantly – to invoke recurrent comparison that stimulates governments’ concerns for their own and their country’s reputation. Their public and ongoing ratings and rankings of states are particularly adept at capturing attention not only at elite policy levels but also among other domestic and transnational actors. GPIs thus raise new questions for research on politics and governance globally. What are the social and political effects of this form of information on discourse, policies, and behavior? What types of actors can effectively wield GPIs and on what types of issues? In this introduction, we define GPIs, describe their rise, and theorize and discuss these questions in light of the findings of the chapters’ contributions.

Recent studies on Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) reveal the distinct power that non-state actors can accrue and exercise in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the small UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors’ behavior with respect to their transparency – the quality and kind of information they publicly disclose. To investigate the ATI’s effect, we construct an original panel dataset of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006–2013) to test whether, and which, donors alter their behavior in response to inclusion in the ATI. To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we use qualitative research, including over 150 key informant interviews conducted between 2010 and 2017. Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which the ATI influences powerful aid donors. Moreover, our mixed methods evidence reveals how this happens. Consistent with Kelley and Simmons’ central argument that Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via direct effects on elites: the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure.

The World Bank has successfully marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable influence over business regulations worldwide. This success is notable given that the Bank has no explicit mandate over regulatory policy and that questions linger about EDB accuracy and the policy trade-offs a high ranking requires. First, this chapter shows that the EDB has a dominating market share among business climate indicators. Second, it uses media analyses and observational data to show that EDB has motivated state regulatory shifts. States respond to being publicly ranked and some restructure bureaucracies accordingly. Third, it explores plausible influence channels for the EDB ranking. It uses an experiment involving US portfolio managers to build on existing economics research and examine whether the rankings influence investor sentiment within the experiment. It also uses a case study of India’s multiyear interagency effort to rise in the EDB rankings to show how politicians see the ranking as affecting domestic politics, altering investor sentiment, and engaging bureaucratic reputation. Overall, a wide variety of evidence converges to illustrate the pressures through which the World Bank has used state rankings to achieve its vision of regulatory reform.