This paper tests the insiders’ dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders’ dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Stigler, 1950; Kamien and Zang, 1990, 1993). The experimental data provides support for the insiders’ dilemma, and thereby for endogenous rather than exogenous merger theory. More surprisingly, our data suggests that fairness (or relative performance) considerations also make profitable mergers difficult. Mergers that should occur in equilibrium do not, since they require an unequal split of surplus.

Efficiencies of Agricultural Credit Associations of the US Farm Credit System are measured quarterly from 2005 through 2020. A slacks-based measure based on the directional distance function is used with non-performing loans included as an undesirable output. This permitted efficiency scores to be measured by type of defined input or output. Generally, most Associations were highly efficient, but there was deterioration in mean efficiency over the years 2008–2018, a period of financial difficulties in the US agriculture. Efficiencies of Associations that merged or consolidated were tracked before and after these activities. Mergers and consolidations often led to increased efficiencies.

From the 1970s to the 1990s there was a revolution in international financial markets, which combined the processes of financialisation and globalisation. Deregulation and financial innovation were the two underlying forces that facilitated this transformation. At the same time, distinctive national characteristics of banking structures and cultures influenced the way that financial globalisation affected the geographic distribution of financial activity. This article addresses these seismic shifts through three perspectives: changes in regulation and the geographic pattern of international banking activity, reform of the main stock markets in New York and London and the rise of financial conglomerates. It identifies complementarity as well as competition among international financial centres.

Despite its importance as a financial centre, the historical literature dedicated to the Swiss financial industry remains scarce. Analyses focusing on cantons and cities of the country are even more limited in number. This is unfortunate and is, in all likelihood, linked to the reluctance of financial institutions to share information in a country where banking secrecy has been at the core of the past success of these institutions. Despite this willingness to share as little as possible, some archival funds have gradually become available, most notably after businesses went bankrupt, changed hands, or simply disappeared. The present article relies on these sources to analyse the evolution of the Geneva stock exchange during the interwar period, which saw a gradual decline of its activity. Independent brokers strived to keep their oligopoly over banks. At the same time, Swiss German banks tried to penetrate the canton-controlled marketplace by using their federal rights and strength to become unavoidable actors. They could ultimately help local bankers gain direct access to the Geneva stock exchange, obliterating the power of brokers who were left with no other choice than to appeal to the Canton of Geneva to defend their position.

The objective is to identify significant determinants of performance for food processing firms over the 1992 to 2003 time period, focusing particularly on the issue of family control. Variables measuring firm effects such as asset size, governance, income distribution, and risk are used to explain return on equity. This study builds upon previous research by including a measure of income distribution in the food processing industry. Governance variables are found to be significant determinants of return on equity. The results found no evidence of agency problems in family-controlled firms during this time period.

Are laws that protect minority investors a necessary condition for the development of stock markets? This paper attempts to answer this question using data on the origins of the corporate sector in Chile to construct an empirical analysis of the contractual provisions included in charters of corporations in the 19th century. Our findings indicate that, even though corporate law at the time was silent with respect to governance rules and investor protection, a significant number of corporations were created and their shares traded. The empirical analysis of the corporate charters reveals that these contracts frequently included provisions favourable to outside investors and the use of these provisions is consistent with the predictions of a simple agency model.

This article examines the influence of equity ownership structure (stock market listing and identity of shareholders) on human resource management practices. The empirical analysis uses the 2004-2005 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (REPONSE survey), based on a sample of 2930 establishments with 20 employees or more, representative of the French private sector. Our findings confirm the importance of listing and, to a lesser extent, of the identity of shareholders as determinants of human resource management practices, considering temporary work arrangements (agency work, fixed-term contracts and sub-contracting), pay policy (wage levels and use of variable pay) and training expenditures.