Media freedom is often curtailed in the wake of terrorist attacks. In this chapter, we ask whether constitutional provisions that are intended – directly or indirectly – to protect media freedom affect the degree to which press freedom is curtailed after terrorist incidents. We find that neither provisions explicitly protecting media freedom nor provisions that might protect media freedom indirectly (such as those guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary) mitigate the post-terror curtailment of press freedom.

Civil and political rights emerged out of fundamental rights conceptions protecting life, integrity, liberty and opinion of a person against an overbearing state. Rights such as the right to life and freedom from ill-treatment may also be at risk from other sources, namely non-state actors in the domestic and other spheres, which have taken on a growing importance in the wake of states’ withdrawal from public functions. While international human rights standards have been developed to provide adequate protection in these circumstances, their implementation requires certain structures without which it is unlikely that core civil and political rights can be effectively protected. There are deep-seated structural factors that can, and have, undermined the effective protection of rights in all systems. Social exclusion, inequality and discrimination in particular are prone to significantly increase vulnerability, as evident in the higher likelihood of persons from certain ethnic or class or national backgrounds being subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, ill-treatment and other violations. Against this background this chapter identifies the normative content of the right to life, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (other ill-treatment), the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and qualified rights, particularly freedom of expression, and examines the challenge of ensuring their effective protection.

Some degree of hypocritical conformity is necessary, Spinoza argues, for a political society to function. Individuals cannot be free to do whatever they like, even if their conscience conflicts with the law. Yet Spinoza also recognizes that hypocritical conformity has its own pernicious repercussions, specifically the corrosion of civic trust. Spinoza’s conscientious speech warns that conformity corrodes the social trust that undergirds politics since individuals are not able to confidently assess the sincerity of their citizens. Spinoza aims to reconcile this tension by distinguishing speech from action. Dissenters must conform to the law, even if it conflicts with their conscience, but they should be able to express their conscience freely in speech.

John Milton argues that liberty of conscience requires the freedom to express one’s innermost commitments to others, specifically in speech and writing. Hypocritical conformity robs individuals of crucial opportunities to foster political capacities of citizenship, specifically the skill of independent judgment. Milton hints at an intuition that other early modern figures will later foreground – that hypocritical conformity to the state religion hardens dissenters and makes them incapable of being judicious political citizens. If individuals live in a political society that does not afford them liberty of conscience, they will slowly lose the capability to exercise their conscience over time. This freedom requires a robust view of freedom and agency in the public sphere, since it implies far more than an inward freedom of conviction. Conscience must be cultivated independently of political and ecclesiastical authorities and requires confrontation with other individuals in the public sphere, implying the open exchange of ideas and the freedom to express one’s ideas publicly in writing or speech. Milton insists that the circulation of ideas in print allows for an extended opportunity for individuals to exercise their conscience, as the written word persists over time longer than speech, which dissipates in the immediate moment, only to be recounted by witnesses. Liberty of conscience is so crucial to Milton’s understanding of freedom that he describes it as the highest liberty above all liberties, even justifying other political freedoms.

In this chapter, we offer a number of recommendations for those who are in a position to do something technically, structurally, and legally or otherwise to minimize the risk of psychological harm that comes with the public’s use of social media and other online sites, especially their engagement with graphic or other upsetting digital material. We outline the policy implications of what we’ve learned from more than three years of desk research and original interviews that we have conducted with dozens of people, ranging from technologists to psychologists to content moderators to human rights investigators and beyond. We first spotlight the competing interests that underscore social media companies and governments’ policy deliberations with regard to content moderation. Next, we lay out our suggestions for companies, governments, and individuals with regard to how to improve the experiences of both content moderators and everyday social media users. We close with suggestions for creating a more “pro-social” online environment, one that not only better mitigates the risks of psychological harm but potentially encourages greater connection, resulting in wellness and even flourishing.

This chapter explores the emergence of a distinct right to artistic freedom in international human rights law. It starts with an exploration of the input of constitutional traditions, as well as State practice and arguments brought by delegates during the drafting process of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to freedom of creativity. It further provides an exhaustive examination of the legal instruments protecting freedom of enjoyment of the arts as an individual right, as well as its collective dimension. In particular, the chapter adopts a twofold approach to artistic freedom, viewed both as a component of freedom of expression (the ‘free speech’ approach) under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as a cultural right under article 15 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Finally, the chapter thoroughly explores the scope and institutional protection of artistic freedom in the practice of international and regional human rights bodies (including but not limited to the European Court of Human RIgths), as well as the UN Specialized Agency for Science Education and Culture (UNESCO).

Generally, where the US prioritises freedom of expression as enshrined in the First Amendment to the US Constitution, the EU favours the right to privacy. The freedom to impart and receive information is an important component of freedom of expression. The right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) as articulated by the Court of Justice of the EU in its 2014 Google Spain judgment, whereby search engines must delist certain results upon requests from EU data subjects, and its subsequent implementation, show transatlantic divides over the right to freedom of expression vis-à-vis data privacy rights. In an attempt to combine fundamental rights concerns, permissive principles of jurisdiction, and questions of connection and reason, the research suggests a way for the EU to exercise jurisdiction regarding the right to erasure that will lessen transatlantic conflicts. Specifically, delisting should not be limited to EU country-specific websites that can easily be circumvented by going to a non-EU version of the same site, but nor should it be implemented globally, thereby subjecting the whole world to EU law. This approach can be applied in future situations where US and EU values, interests and laws on data protection and the freedom of expression collide.

This chapter explores the concept of ‘art’ from the perspective of law, art history and aesthetics. Drawing on examples from the visual arts, it discusses the concept of ‘art’ in light of Plato’s philosophical ideas, Weitz’s argument about art as an ‘open concept’, Danto’s philosophical investigations and the ‘institutional theory’ of the art. It further draws upon various areas of international law, including cultural heritage law and intellectual property law, in order to demonstrate that a precise definition of ‘art’ is not offered at present in any international instrument. The chapter further examines the legal challenges arising from the ‘non-definition’ of the concept of ‘art’, questioning the validity of the argument of artistic freedom as an exception to rules of general application. Last, the chapter details the need for legal protection against abuses and potential dismissal of artworks as ‘non-art’, in instances where the qualification ‘art’ (and consequently the question of artistic merit) plays the role of a ‘defence’ against attempts to interfere with freedom of speech.

The topic of this study might appear puzzling to creative artists and art worlds,1 namely painters, musicians, dancers, film-makers, playwriters, composers, all those who make artworks or work with artists, museum staff, art faculty, gallerists, collectors, art buyers and art lovers. What does international law have to do with art? And why is there a need to write a legal monograph on a topic that is self-evident? From the perspective of the aforementioned stakeholders, arts are and should remain free. Freedom is a vital condition for the realization of the creative process.

This chapter discusses the right to freedom to expression and to freedom of information as it is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, other Council of Europe instruments, in EU law and in international instruments. Attention is also paid to topics such as hate speech, defamation, press freedom and access to government information. In the final section, a short comparison between the different instruments is made