This article seeks to address China’s entrenched censorship regime in the constitutionalist dimension of international law. First, the article probes into China’s censorship regime and the way it is linked to the country’s foreign policies. Second, the article explores the tension between China’s national censorship regime and international law. Such tension is rendered sharper than ever in the context of fragmented international law, as exemplified by two UPRs of China and two WTO rulings. Finally, the article advances a constitutionalist premise that eventually China’s self-motivated step into the fragmented domain of international law could boomerang against China’s censorship regime. As the international standards of freedom of expression are evolving into a fundamental right with constitutional status, the functional interrelatedness between different subsystems of international law gives rise to the accountability of state actors, which in turn compels them to comply with universal rules.

Over the last couple of years, international lawyers have hotly debated the correct way to apply Article 31, paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Discussions have focused on the meaning of ‘the parties’. Traditionally this expression has always been interpreted in the stricter sense of all parties to the interpreted treaty. Voices are now raised suggesting a broader interpretation. According to this view, the correct meaning of ‘the parties’ is the two or more parties to a specific dispute. Given that the two interpretations of Article 31, paragraph 3(c) will often be mutually exclusive, international legal literature provokes a review of the possible reasons that give us ground to adopt them. This article provides such a review. It arrives at the conclusion that only the stricter interpretation can be seriously defended as being correct. First, only the stricter interpretation agrees with the clear ordinary meaning of Article 31, paragraph 3(c). Secondly, even assuming that the ordinary meaning of the provision is ambiguous, a strong case can be made in favour of the stricter interpretation using other data of interpretation, such as the context, the object and purpose of the treaty, and the preparatory work.

The Israeli official policy of targeted killing has often been a subject of controversy and criticism. Although still applied by the state of Israel, this cruel practice was recently limited in a courageous decision handed down by the Israeli Supreme Court. The new restrictions on targeted killing represent an important step towards its criminalization. Despite this, the Court's interpretation of the international humanitarian law requirements is still too broad and there is a need for more restrictive safeguards. In addition, the current uncertainties of this field of law, replicated in the decision, exacerbate the problem further. The main difficulty, however, lies in the theoretical assumption that targeted killing is legal. This article proposes instead to view targeted killing as an exception to the presumption of protection of the civilian population. The authors review the recent trends in international humanitarian law in order to assess the impact of the Court's reasoning. Although this landmark case represents an important breakthrough, it will certainly not be the last word on targeted killing.

This article uses the recent judgment of the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia to highlight the potential problems that arise when international courts have to adjudicate on overlapping situations. It describes the dispute between the ICJ and the ICTY on the appropriate legal standard for the attribution of state responsibility, and finds that the ICJ's approach in this case suggests that those keen to minimize the fragmentation of international law between adjudicative bodies should not overlook the need for consistency within those bodies. With regard to fact finding, this article raises serious concerns about the manner in which the ICJ relied on the ICTY's work. The decision of the ICJ not to demand crucial documents from Serbia is discussed and criticized. Based on its approach to fact finding in this case, doubts are raised as to whether the ICJ will ever hold a state responsible for genocide outside the parameters of the prior criminal convictions of individual perpetrators.

This article seeks to examine whether the International Court of Justicehas developed jurisprudence on international humanitarian law and whether this has exerted any influence on the decisions adopted by other international courts and tribunals. In so doing, it revisits the issue of the value ofjudicial decisions under international law. Finally, it reveals that despite the non-operation of the rule of stare decisis in international law, the Court's jurisprudence on international humanitarian law has been a persuasive precedent for other international courts and tribunals.