This response gives me the opportunity to clarify, extend, and complement several aspects of my conceptual and historical argument in The Currency of Politics. I do so primarily by situating my account more explicitly within debates over European monetary politics, by expanding on my use of history, and by articulating what differentiates my concern with the political theory of money and the politics of depoliticisation from complementary accounts. In doing so I elaborate on the ways in which engagement with the thought of John Maynard Keynes helped to structure my approach. While there are important limits to the politics of money under contemporary capitalism, these limits are not fixed economic ones but are better seen as political limits of monetary politics that nonetheless leave considerable space for articulating alternative demands for more democratic forms of money. This framing allows me to extend my argument in order to address contemporary struggles over credit policy, monetary reform, and climate change in Europe. I thus end with a set of critical reflections on the constitutional status of money in the European project and beyond.

Eurozone economies were the most adversely affected by the Global Financial Crisis, with forecast macroeconomic outcomes still highly uncertain. This article argues first that the Eurozone policy framework can be viewed as neo-liberalism overlaid with policy constraints associated with a mis-specified Optimum Currency Area. We are critical of this framework since it is incompatible with the policy sovereignty that is experienced, if not utilised, by sovereign economies such as the USA, UK and Australia. Second, recent and proposed policy reforms which generally lie within the constraints of the Eurozone framework are examined. We conclude that these policies are piecemeal and fail to restore policy sovereignty, which ultimately requires that member countries exit the Eurozone. Key issues associated with such an exit are briefly discussed.

Inflation rates and their convergence within Euro area have been a major concern, since well before the advent of the single currency. Inflation differentials are a normal phenomenon in any monetary union and even in long-established monetary unions. The aim of this research is to examine the main factors of inflation differentials in the Euro-zone for the period 1999–2018. Our empirical estimates appear to suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the positive output gap typically leads to an increase of about 20 basis points in the inflation rate of EMU countries. We also find three structural breaks, in 2004, 2008 and in 2010. Since the monetary policy of the European Central Bank is geared at maintaining low and stable inflation, the productivity growth should be increased, and the real effective exchange rates should be decreased and become more homogeneous among EMU. Therefore, countries’ inflation differentials may become less persistent.

The article explores the understandings of democracy underlying the judgment and its implications for the democratization of Europe. I read the judgement, critically, as impediment and, constructively, as impetus for the democratization of money and society. Firstly, I recount how the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) through the construction of a “right to democracy” and the concepts of “ultra vires act” and “integration responsibility” asserted its jurisdiction over the limits of European integration. The court’s reasoning prompts me to understand the judgment not as a defense of democracy, but rather as an instance of upholding a “rule of law” that impedes the democratization of society. Secondly, I turn to the pronouncements on the demarcation of monetary from economic competences by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the FCC. I explain what I hold to be the weaknesses in the FCC’s critique of the CJEU from a doctrinal perspective. I then propose to read the PSPP judgment constructively as introducing a procedural requirement that may democratize monetary policy. Thirdly, I situate my reading of the judgment in the larger debate on the democratization of society and, more specifically, money.

Why did the transnational synchronization of wage inflations fail during the first 10 years of the euro? We analyze data from 1999 to 2008 for 12 euro members and estimate increases of nominal unit labor costs both in the overall economy and in manufacturing as dependent variables. While our analysis confirms that differences in economic growth shaped the inflation of labor costs, we add a political-institutional argument to the debate and argue that the designs of the wage regimes had an additional, independent impact. In coordinated labor regimes, increases in nominal unit labor costs tended to fall below the European Central Bank’s inflation target, while in uncoordinated labor regimes, the respective increases tended to exceed the European inflation target. Due to the stickiness of wage-bargaining institutions, the lack of the capacity to synchronize inflation is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future.

We investigate the effects of monetary policy shocks in the new European Union (EU) member states the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. In contrast to existing studies, we explicitly account for external developments in European Monetary Union (EMU) countries and in other acceding countries. We do so by using factor-augmented vector autoregressive models that employ information from nonstationary factor time series. One set of VAR models includes factors obtained from a large cross section of time series from EMU countries, whereas another set includes factors obtained from other acceding countries. We find that including EMU factors does change impulse response patterns in some but not all acceding countries. In contrast, including factors from other acceding countries leads to substantial changes in impulse responses and to economically more plausible results. Overall, our analysis highlights that taking external economic developments properly into account is crucial for the analysis of monetary policy in the new EU member states.