I compare pre-tax and post-tax wealth levels and trends after netting out implicit taxes on tax-deferred assets and accrued capital gains. The analysis covers 1983–2016 for net worth (NW) and augmented wealth (AW), which includes pension and Social Security wealth. Netting out implicit taxes substantially reduces growth in mean and median NW and AW. However, the upward trajectory in NW and AW inequality is basically unchanged from using post-tax values. I also introduce bequest wealth, the value of the estate including death benefits. It is notably more equal than NW and has grown faster over time.

This paper investigates the effects of estate taxation when firms cannot directly observe worker skill levels. Imperfect labor market signaling gives rise to an information externality that causes workers to free-ride off of others’ human capital acquisition. Inherited wealth exacerbates the information externality because risk averse workers with larger inheritances exert less effort to acquire skills. By reducing these inheritances, an estate tax induces greater skill acquisition effort and increases the number of skilled workers. In a quantitative model with employer learning and capital accumulation, the optimal estate tax is significantly above zero, increases wages and output, and benefits a large majority of households.