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The euro crisis has brought about remarkable changes in the economic governance of the European Union (EU) and consequently in the ways the executives can be held to account. By focusing on the interactions between national parliament and government in Poland, the fifth-largest EU member state by population, this chapter discusses debates concerning the EU annual cycle of fiscal and economic surveillance - the European Semester, related in particular to its most important element – the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The goal of this paper is to assess how parliamentary scrutiny affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The positions of Members of Parliament (MPs) towards CSRs and connected arguments expressed in parliamentary discussions are explained by applying an analytical framework of justification and contestation as two basic forms of accountability. On accountability dimension, most questions, which were asked by both majority and opposition MPs, fall within the justification category in which the demands for explanation or information from the representatives from two ministries responsible for finance and development were made. On the efficiency dimension, one can hardly see any link at all as the scrutiny of the CSRs has a limited impact on their implementation.
An aging population in modern societies has put stress on public pension systems. To prevent social security deficits from increasing to unbounded levels of public debt we focus on two policies: reducing the generosity of pension benefits, determined by the government, and postponing the effective retirement age, chosen by employees. An atomistic employee would disregard the effect of his retirement decision on the public debt and would retire as soon as possible. Conversely, an ideal farsighted agency considering all current and future employees would postpone retirement, thereby alleviating the pressure on public debt and allowing a more generous long-run pension. The government may design a proper incentive strategy to induce myopic atomistic decision makers to act nonmyopically. This strategy is a two-part incentive with nonlinear dependence on the stock of public debt. It is credible if deceiving employees slightly adjust their retirement-age decisions to increments in the public debt.
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