This chapter details the basic structure of sanctions and export control regimes, and describes the sanctions programs that were in place or developed within the last ten years. It briefly discusses the most comprehensive sanctions regimes, including those imposed by the U.S. against Iran, Cuba, Syria, and North Korea. This section focuses in particular on the structure of sanctions regulations before 2022 applicable to Russia. These sanctions were more limited in nature, but were enacted with increasing frequency and scope in the immediate years before the invasion, responding to a growing list of threats from within Russia related to cyber attacks, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea.

When war broke out in 1914, both sides initiated elaborate efforts to shift the world economy to a war footing. The war divided trade partners and exposed dependence on imports of strategic materials, prompting efforts to exploit enemies’ commercial vulnerabilities through the tools of blockade and submarine warfare. As the belligerents struggled to secure their supply lines, they also began to devise new legal and institutional safeguards to ensure permanent access to strategic materials in peacetime. Lucien Coquet, Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Bernhard Harms, and Richard Riedl participated in the operation of the war economy and helped initiate planning for the future transition from war to peace. Their stories show how the experience of economic warfare was framed by the trade institutions and information networks inherited from the belle époque.

This chapter argues that the conflict at sea was an important and frequently overlooked part of the Napoleonic Wars. Focusing primarily on the Royal Navy and French maritime forces, but also mentioning the navies of Spain, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and United States, it outlines the manifold ways in which maritime warfare shaped wider events on land, and helped determine the conflict’s final outcome. It demonstrates that French attempts to invade Britain were successfully rebuffed by the Royal Navy, ensuring that Britain remained in the conflict. The chapter then offers a more modern take on the commonly misunderstood Battle of Trafalgar, arguing that it was far from decisive and did little to change the course of the war. The naval conflict continued in earnest after 1805, and the war of trade became all-consuming, particularly after the inception of ‘Napoleon’s Continental system’. Here the navy offered a stubborn resistance to the French Emperor’s objectives, helping to encourage illicit trade with the European continent while also expanding Britain’s empire and mercantilist reach elsewhere in the globe. Finally, it demonstrates that maritime support was crucial to the land war, not least Wellington’s Peninsula campaign.

The maritime aspects of the wars of the French Revolution and Empire were asymmetric, between a British seapower empire of oceanic connectivity and a French dominated European system that focussed on territorial control and economic restriction. The inclusive British political system privileged naval strength, the defence of trade, and sea control. This position was based on battle fleet dominance, which remained undefeated across two decades. British identity became ever more closely linked to naval success as Nelson, the Nile and Trafalgar added new names to national culture. This sustained long-term funding for major infrastructure projects, new ships, and high levels of skilled manpower. Superior ships and men enabled the Royal Navy to defeat naval rivals, and attacks on commercial shipping by national warships and privateers. Naval dominance sustained a hard-line economic war that broke the Russian economy, and seriously damaged that of France, while the City of London and the British economy more generally continued to support the national war effort through extensive capital loans, and private measures, such as those of Lloyds Patriotic Fund. Seapower could not defeat Napoleon, it supported a grand alliance that would achieve that aim. By 1815 Britain had become a global seapower empire of unrivalled wealth and influence.

This chapter deals with the internal situation and the home front during the first two years of the war. It analyses Germany’s economic situation, the question of blockade, foodstuff, shortages and internal unity, as well as war finance. It concludes that Germany could cope, during the first half of the war, with the enormous challenges of the war.

World War I dramatically transformed Germans’ subject position regardless of whether or not they participated in the war or supported Imperial Germany. In addition to exposing Imperial Germany’s dependence on commodities from abroad for its industry and its residents’ well-being, it witnessed a kind of economic warfare that was just as unprecedented as the military conflict that took place in Europe.Around the globe, the Allied powers targetedGermans—citizens of Imperial German as well as ethnic Germans who were not that.That led to internments and confiscations; but the Allies applied pressure outside their territories as well. Latin America, in particular, became a site of extreme pressure as first the British and then the United States used the war to increase their economic and political power in the region at the expense of the German networks that had long competed against them.Facing a shared set of challenges actually served to bind many of these disparate German communities in the Americas together even as they radically reduced the size of many German communities in other European states and the colonial territories.

Chapter 3 examines the international law attempts to regulate the financial aspects of war economies, in particular through UN sanctions. The chapter examines UN sanctions, in particular assets freezes and commodity sanctions, counterterrorism financing, attempts by the Council to police natural resource extraction in war zones, and efforts to create standards governing the regulation of commodity chains from conflict zones.

Part I outlines the international law applicable to economic activity both for the war and in the war zone. It begins by briefly outlining the difference between premodern and modern international law norms governing the acquisition of labour and property in war. The two sets of norms were radically different. As systems of warfare in Europe changed from premodern plunder-based warfare to modern industrial-based warfare, international law overturned and replaced norms regulating plunder and the taking of slaves, with norms that sought to protect labour and property from appropriation and exploitation in war.

This chapter analyzes the forces pulling Germany into war in 1914 and how both the international republic of letters and the integrated world economy were shattered by it and the crippling blockade imposed by Britain. It also explores the work done by Hermann Schumacher, Max Sering, and Gustav Schmoller to rationalize wartime raw materials and the food supply, as well as their activity advocating for unrestricted submarine warfare. Despite strong prewar ties between Germany and the United States and active efforts to court American public opinion by Bernhard Dernburg in New York, the “war of words” was won easily by the Entente. The decision for unrestricted submarine warfare is set in the context of the failure of dreadnought deterrence and the tightening blockade, which had rendered much of the High Seas Fleet impotent and led to the loss of Germany's overseas colonies and bases.A growing rift emerged by 1916 between populist forces unleashed by Alfred Tirpitz and the “submarine professors,” on the one hand, and the Kaiser and government of Bethmann Hollweg, on the other, which now also included Karl Helfferich as Treasury Secretary.