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Chapter 2 begins by detailing how the escalation of violence in northern Mali in 2012 became a security concern for regional, continental, and international actors by focusing on the spatial semantics ‘Sahelistan’ and ‘territorial integrity’. From the basis of this somewhat shared spatial semantics, the potential intervening actors engaged each other in a struggle over who would be the most suitable based on different understandings of ‘subsidiarity’. In so doing, each tried to prove their capability to intervene, projecting their power through this concrete deployment to Mali within wider African military politics. After months of negotiations, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed amidst plans for a re-hatting to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in mid-2013. This foregrounds the story about the marginalization of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and later of the African Union from steering military deployment in the region. This experience for (West) African decision-makers having their Malian ‘neighbours’ saved by ‘strangers’ has impacted subsequent debates on who is responsible for security in the Sahel, who is seen as legitimate intervener, and who is best equipped to take military action.
Intra-African cooperation is multifaceted. This chapter will show that with reference to bilateral contacts between states – or often between leaders – that are sometimes close and at others less so and with reference to intergovernmental organizations that are sometimes close and at others less so. At the continental level, those organizations include the Organization of African Unity and its successor organization, the African Union, as well as regional economic communities like the Economic Community of West African States or the Southern African Development Community. The chapter also investigates the drivers and obstacles for political and economic cooperation and integration and shows how leaders benefit from the status quo.
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