Lord Bingham noted that the Common Law was not an isolated island, and that English law had always shown a receptiveness to ‘the experience and learning of others’. Brexit might appear to have set back that optimism. However, British relations with continental Europe are deep and historical. British lawyers played a very strong role in the creation and founding of the European Convention on Human Rights, so ECHR rights (now incorporated in the Human Rights Act) are not alien, foreign devices. Furthermore, Britain was not forced into EEC membership, but joined voluntarily, persisting after its first two applications were rejected by General de Gaulle, because it perceived that it would be socially and economically enriched by such membership – a perception that turned out to be accurate. EU membership also provided an external support system for UK devolution, facilitating common approaches within the UK and conciliation between the UK and Ireland. The EU and ECHR provided external guarantees and entrenchment of human rights, many of which are now at risk post-Brexit.

If West Germany had one unique asset, it was the bedrock stability of its currency, the Deutsche Mark. Chapter 4 introduces the principal defenders of German stability – the economy and finance ministries, the Bundesbank, and the Council of Economic Experts. In fall 1965, Chancellor Erhard identified the maintenance of price stability as the foundation of German policy – with enormous repercussions for foreign relations. In 1965-66, development aid programs, restitution to Israel, and offset purchases from the United States would all be scaled back in order to keep Bonn’s budget balanced and avoid stimulating inflation. German monetary experts worked closely with U.S. officials to uphold the Bretton Woods monetary system; but Lyndon Johnson was furious that Erhard had broken his offset pledges, particularly since West Germany remained reluctant to send personnel to Vietnam. In spring 1966, Erhard’s cabinet tried to unthaw relations with the USSR by issuing a “peace note” calling for mutual renunciation-of-force declarations; but the Soviet bloc rejected the approach as inadequate. When West Germany slipped into recession, Erhard’s coalition collapsed in failure.

World War II memories constitute the backdrop of Chapter 3. The Auschwitz Trials presented a daily reminder of German crimes; and a stretch of 20-year anniversaries from D-Day to V-E Day provided numerous occasions to invoke the “politics of the past” in putting pressure on Erhard’s Germany. The USSR, Britain, and France all aimed to forestall the MLF project, blocking West German access to nuclear weapons. France also won significant concessions on EEC agricultural policy from Bonn, thanks to de Gaulle’s ability to mobilize “Gaullists” in the CDU/CSU against the chancellor. In the face of intense Israeli pressure, Erhard’s panicky decisionmaking created a Middle East debacle in spring 1965; Bonn canceled its tank deliveries but established diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, prompting ten Arab states to break relations. West German leaders felt increasingly isolated. Even U.S. opinion wearied of West German rigidity, particularly when German cabinet ministers seemed to contest the territorial status quo in Poland or Czechoslovakia. Real interest in promoting German unity was waning among all of Bonn’s allies; Bonn was at an impasse.