Chapter 1 chronicles how the distractibility of a king, the agency of objects, the desires that cloud judgment, and the memories that haunt the present shape events perhaps even more than ideology. Prior to the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the Duke of Newcastle proposed returning to a Caroline-style theatrical marketplace, but he was outmaneuvered by courtier-playwrights long accustomed to deploying networks of access. Contingency also determined outcomes. The particular circumstances of Charles II’s upbringing certainly benefited William Davenant and Thomas Killigrew, the two successful patentees. Unlike his royal predecessors, the new monarch regarded the commercial theatre as a gift to be bestowed upon persistent clients who would enjoy monopolistic control going forward. No one foresaw, of course, the economic repercussions of that gift, namely, how the transformation of the theatre from a purely commercial to a hybrid enterprise would require substantial support beyond the box office. Additionally, the duopoly so sought by Killigrew and Davenant exerted its own unexpected agencies. As the following chapters explore, its resulting economic and cultural logic galvanized a host of decisions about repertories and performance practices that would prove both innovative and ruinous.

Market structure is the type of overall market we see in different situations. A theoretical starting point in economics is the idea of the perfectly competitive market in which the market itself sets the price, there are uniform goods, and there is mobility of resources. In many markets, there are concentrations of power and there is complexity. We study in depth the price-fixing scandal that unfolded between Christie’s and Sotheby’s auction houses in the 1990s, owing to the duopolistic market structure between the two firms. Substantial litigation ensued with fines and penalties around $512 million. We consider US tests for market concentration and monopolistic power.