Why was “Japanese collectivism” established as the symbolic image of Japanese culture although it is unreal? The notion of “Japanese collectivism” was formed in the West about 140 years ago. A Westerner who highly valued individualism and believed that Japan is opposite to the West visited Japan and published a book in which he claimed that Japanese lack individuality. His view was widely accepted by Westerners who also highly valued individualism. Under the influence of this prevailing view, American anthropologist Ruth Benedict studied Japan for one year as a member of the U.S. government during World War II. During the American occupation of Japan, she published her study as a book in which she delineated Japanese culture as a collectivistic one. Her book was widely read by the personnel of the U.S. government and Occupation Army as a guide on how to deal with the Japanese. The prestige of Americans during the occupation period made Japanese accept “Japanese collectivism” as the basic nature of Japanese culture. Once established, the notion of “Japanese collectivism” was sustained by various cognitive biases such as confirmation bias and belief perseverance.

Australian higher command in the Korean War is not just a matter of esoteric interest. Rather, from the time of the First World War, higher command arrangements have been a crucial element during most of Australia’s military commitments. They have been both a means by which the Australian Government has exercised its sovereignty and an expression of the degree to which Australia has been able to have that sovereignty recognised. The command arrangements in the Korean War were to have ramifications that have continued through to the present. This chapter discusses those higher command arrangements and then focuses on Brigadier John Wilton’s command of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade.

In October 1941 the new Australian Labor government led by John Curtin recalled General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in the Middle East, to Australia for discussions. Since he had arrived in the Middle East some sixteen months earlier, Blamey’s forces had fought in North Africa, Greece, Syria and at the siege of Tobruk. So he was well aware of the seriousness of the war against Germany and Italy.

It is critical to understand how to use military force to achieve the political aim sought. This requires conducting a rational assessment of the situation, developing a strategy or plan for getting there, and determining the means required for fulfilling the plan and achieving the political aim. Critically, one of the worst failures of previous limited war is thinking that the forces must be “limited” because the political objective is. This is a fallacy. One can use overwhelming force in a war fought for a limited political aim. One should – at the least –

The first thing we have to do is fix how we think about limited war. To do this we have to repair how we think about all wars. The basis of our approach is to start with the political aim. This is established by the policymakers. The political and military leaders should then develop a grand strategy for fighting the war, meaning using all of the elements of national power in pursuit of the objective. Military strategy is an important part of this and is supported by operations, which then dictate battles and tactical responses. We must also be careful to avoid jargon and unclear terms such as “total war” because these are based upon undefinable concepts, such as the means used. Existing ideas on limited war are also of little use and must be replaced because they are built upon a Cold War situation that no longer exists, based upon poor and inconsistent definitions, and take as their archetypal case study the Korean War, which is misunderstood by those who write about it. The most prominent limited war writers also assume a form of rationality on the part of opponents that logically cannot be expected.

Beginning with Harry Truman and the Korean War, America’s so-called “first limited war,” too often US leaders have refused to admit that the US is at war, been unclear about what they want, and failed to seek victory. Helping drive this is broken ideas about limited war that intertwine all US thinking about war and poisoned the US ability to fight any war. We need a clear foundation for critically analyzing our wars. The only thing that provides this is the political aim. Do we seek regime change, or something less than this? Anything less is a limited political aim. Our definitions of and ideas about limited war are generally based upon the military means used, something too subjective to provide a basis for analysis. You must understand the aim to understand the nature of the war. If you don’t understand the nature of the war, it is hard to figure out how to win it. Cold War works on limited war also taught us to not seek victory, which injured the US ability to do just this. If you aren’t trying to win the war, you aren’t trying to end it. This leaves us with “forever wars.”