In May 2024, the European Union adopted the Directive on violence against women and domestic violence, marking the first EU-wide binding legislation to address various forms of sexualized and gendered harm. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the Directive’s provisions on image-based sexual abuse (“IBSA”), encompassing the non-consensual taking, creating, and sharing of intimate materials, as well as threats to distribute them. While acknowledging the aim to harmonize legislation at the Union level, the Article identifies a range of limitations and the failure to fully reflect the diverse experiences of victims. Additionally, the Article evaluates the complementary roles in combating IBSA of the Digital Services Act and the AI Act which impose obligations on online platforms, search engines, and AI developers. Overall, the current EU framework represents a promising but partial approach. If the EU is to comprehensively address IBSA and safeguard victims’ rights, implementation beyond the minimum will be required together with proactive, effective regulation.

Digital platforms and social media have expanded the ways in which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of expression and obtain and diffuse information. At the same time, they have become a principal means for haters to express and spread their hate in ways that would have been unthinkable some years ago. Responsive to the challenge, the EU has progressively developed a broad range of instruments and tools to counter online hate speech. This chapter discusses the key characteristics of the EU arrangements made to fight digital hate speech, shedding light on what is a multi-faceted and daunting regulatory task.

The European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) introduces a new regulatory approach to address the societal harms of online platforms: Systemic risk assessments. While a core component of the DSA, the regulation only outlines the standards and processes governing systemic risk assessments in broad strokes. It remains unclear what these systemic risk assesments will entail in practice. This Article develops a proposal of how systemic risk assessments should be implemented. It situates systemic risk assessments as a critical step toward platform accountability as they address societal harms, while existing approaches, such as remedy mechanisms, only protect user rights. Engaging with intangible harms and regulating speech and public discourse, risk assessments also entail significant challenges. Conventional reference points for content moderation regulation, such as terms and conditions, contractual freedom, fundamental rights and expertise, do not provide practical and legitimate bases to concretize risk assessment obligations. Public actors, such as the European Commission, should refrain from defining substantive standards, too, as they are directly bound by freedom of expression guarantees. Instead, the Article argues, the Commission should foster a procedural framework, a “virtuous loop,” which empowers civil society and allows it to specify and refine the standards governing systemic risks over time. Developing this framework, the Article explains how systemic risk assessment can fix “multistakeholderism,” and “multistakeholderism,” in turn, can help make systemic risk assessments work.

Digital technology brought informational saturation to our lives. In cyberspace, private and business users need help to make valuable pieces of information stand out from the noise of excessive information. With search algorithms, recommender systems, and online advertising, digital platforms specialised in providing relief for this problem. Their technologies arrange digitalised information to make it intelligible and relevant for individuals. But the separation of information from noise did not only become a necessity to comfortably navigate the depths of the web, it also became a commodity. There is a demand for it, a supply, a price, and an exchange on markets which is enabled by private law. The examples of general search, recommender systems, and online advertising illustrate that. At the same time, their commodification can become problematic. This paper argues that in the European Union (EU), the separation of information from noise has become a contested commodity according to M. J. Radin’s framework. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act purposefully limit the influence of the market price mechanism on the design and allocation of the separation technology to protect legal goods like the democratic process, innovation, and privacy.

Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.

The European Union’s new regulatory agenda targeting online platforms such as social media has been presented as a progressive watershed moment after a long period of regulatory restraint. The attempt to construct an internal market lends legal competence to the two centerpieces of this agenda—the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). This Article analyzes the Union’s attempts to govern online platforms as a part of internal market construction. After examining the underlying aims of the internal market, the Article proceeds to analyze how those aims have been operationalized in existing EU electronic commerce law and more recently in the DSA and DMA proposals. The Article argues that the Union regulatory agenda is not particularly transformative. While the DSA and DMA introduce many novel regulatory mechanisms with an equalizing potential, they also remain faithfully committed to the aims and pre-existing mechanisms of internal market construction that have enabled the rise of platform corporations in the first place. Thus, the proposals risk reproducing and legitimizing various inequalities in the European digital economy. The article seeks to connect alternative visions of platforms with the re-imagination of internal market construction.

Over recent decades, several global tech giants have gained enormous power while at the same time generating various disputes with their end-users, local governments, and regulators. We propose that the Jewish concept of covenant can help the above parties, legal scholars, and wider society in addressing this complex legal reality. We present the challenge of disequilibrium between the above four parties against the main points of conflict: the requirement of customer consent; clear contractual provisions upon entry; options for reasonable customer exit; limitations on the platform’s ability to exercise unilateral termination; profile-based discrimination; and liability for mere intermediation. We introduce the biblical concept of covenant, and we review its unfolding in Jewish tradition. Further, we conceptualize three main covenantal principles: (1) responsibility—God and humans are both conceived as moral agents; (2) reciprocity—God as a caring law giver, open to human appeals; and (3) reasonability—divine instruction as initially intelligible. We demonstrate how the latter principle of explainability is exercised in the biblical law narratives and how the story of Balaam stresses the significance of moral agency that cannot hide behind “mere intermediary” claims. In light of this analysis, we revisit the relationship between tech giants and tech users to demonstrate how covenantality offers novel ways to conceptualize the noted conflicts between the parties.

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for the Digital Services Act, which is expected to be adopted before summer 2022. It carries out a regulatory overhaul of the twenty-one-year-old horizontal rules on intermediary liability in the e-Commerce Directive and introduces new due diligence obligations for intermediary services. Our analysis illuminates an important point that has so far received little attention: how would the Digital Services Act’s rules interact with existing sector-specific lex specialis rules? In this article, we look specifically at the intersection of the Digital Services Act with the regime for online content-sharing service providers (OCSSPs) set forth in Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive). At first glance, these regimes do not appear to overlap, as the rules on copyright are lex specialis to the Digital Services Act. A closer look shows a more complex and nuanced picture. Our analysis concludes that the Digital Services Act will apply to OCSSPs insofar as it contains rules that regulate matters not covered by Article 17 CDSM Directive, as well as specific rules on matters where Article 17 leaves a margin of discretion to Member States. This includes, to varying degrees, rules in the Digital Services Act relating to the liability of intermediary providers and to due diligence obligations for online platforms of different sizes. Importantly, we consider that such rules apply even where Article 17 CDSM Directive contains specific (but less precise) regulation on the matter. From a normative perspective, this might be a desirable outcome, to the extent that the Digital Services Act aims to establish “uniform rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected”. Based on our analysis, we suggest a number of clarifications that might help us to achieve that goal.