The ICC was meant to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes, thus contributing to their prevention. But twenty years after its establishment, its “theory of change” remains unclear, and few studies focus on its impact on the ground. To assess the Court’s impact, it is necessary to define the assumptions underlying its establishment. While deterrence is one such assumption, to date the evidence that the ICC effectively deters crimes is lacking. Other assumptions can be found in the Rome Statute itself, or in the expressed intentions of the Assembly of States Parties or senior officials of the Court. Lessons can also be drawn from impact studies of other international criminal tribunals. These sources indicate that the ICC should play an expressive function by engaging in norm projection. The chapter identifies four intended effects of the Rome Statute and ICC, including systemic effect on domestic legal systems; transformative effect on peace processes; reparative effect on victims; and demonstration effect, relating to its expressive function among affected communities. These four effects form an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC.

Chapter 7 discusses the societal impact of Court on the affected communities, known as demonstration effect. Different elements are important to “demonstration effect,” including (1) whether the Court is perceived as impartial in a specific context, (2) whether the ICC’s interventions are perceived as relevant and responsive to local communities and their justice struggles, (3) whether the Court is viewed as a legitimate justice institution, and (4) whether it is perceived as independent. Relying on qualitative data, the chapter seeks identify trends in perceptions in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. The chapter concludes that the Court suffers from negative perceptions in all four countries. In Uganda and Libya, its failure to prosecute actors from different sides contributes to an impression that it is not impartial. In Afghanistan or Libya, it is perceived as Western-influenced and not independent. In different contexts including Afghanistan, Uganda, and Colombia, it was perceived as an external imposition, and not aligned with local justice priorities arising from many decades of conflict. The architecture of the Court, with limited capacity to conduct preliminary examinations to better contextualize its interventions, limited field offices and little outreach, hinders effectively addressing these negative perceptions.