Chapter 4 introduces the readers to the specific political parties within each case study and considers the extent to which the fourteen items of “good citizenship” are already partisan, that is, before introducing democratic threats. We observe consistent patterns of partisan citizenship, even when controlling for demographic factors that might explain citizenship preferences. That is, supporters of left parties value protesting and solidarity-oriented beliefs like helping others; supporters of right parties strongly support allegiant items of belonging, from obeying laws to items of national belonging. In majoritarian systems (the US and UK), these patterns are strong and systematic. However, a crucial observation underlies these differences: there are sufficient overlaps between the left and right when it comes to liberal democratic beliefs and behavioral items of good citizenship. This “holding of the center” is critical. It suggests a strong base of agreement for preserving national unity and sufficient overlaps for establishing common goals despite polarization in everyday politics.

Chapter 8 treats the decades between 1790 and 1830, focusing on the formation of the first two party systems and the parties’ different views of the American people and the Union. Excerpts from Alexander Hamilton and Fisher Ames illustrate the Federalists’ support of strong central government and of a strong executive, while selections from Thomas Jefferson and John Taylor represent the Republicans’ advocacy for state and individual rights. In turn, letters and speeches from Martin Van Buren, Andrew Jackson, and Enos Throop offer insights into the formation of the Democratic Party and their populist, horizontal understanding of the people, while excerpts from the Daniel Webster’s Speeches on Foot’s Resolution represent the Whig’s classical republican view of government. Extending the traditional narrative of the two-party system(s), the chapter also includes excerpts from the party platforms of the Anti-Masonic Party and the Native American Party, also known as the Know Nothings.

The Prologue begins with brief accounts of the revolutions of 1848, first in France, then in Europe. This is followed by a substantial overview of the book, emphasizing its dual focus on the experience of nine writers from 1848 to 1852 and analysis of the texts in which each writer attempted to take the measure of the revolution and its aftermath. The rest of the Prologue provides comment on features of French political culture (1815–1848) that are important for an understanding of 1848. Themes include: the continuing weight of the memory of the first French Revolution; the emergence of political groups defined by their relation to conflicts and factions of 1789–1794; the development of working-class organization and protest; the emergence of republican and socialist movements; the influence of the press; the economic and social roots of the February Revolution. A substantial discussion of French rural society in the 1830s and 1840s emphasizes the plight of the peasant smallholder, which was poorly understood by the republicans who took power in February. We conclude with a discussion of the agricultural, then financial, crisis of 1846/47 which resulted in a loss of confidence in the July Monarchy on the part of the elites.

When I was writing The Moral Arc, I found my life-long libertarianism challenged on so many fronts that I began to reconsider my politics and to look for a new label, one that better described what I came to believe was the right balance between Left and Right, between liberalism and conservatism. I believe I may have found it in classical liberalism, a defense of which follows in this essay, originally published in the online magazine Quillette.

William H. Williams’ slave jail, the Yellow House, garnered a great deal of controversy as the abolitionist movement gained momentum. Abolitionists decried the slave coffles that marched through the District of Columbia, yet from the mid–1830s to mid–1840s, the "gag rule" stymied debate over the antislavery petitions submitted to Congress. Shortly before the presidential election of 1844, Thomas Williams flew a flag of the Democratic Polk/Dallas ticket above the Yellow House. The banner ignited a newspaper war in the nation’s capital, as the Democratic organ, the Washington Globe, claimed the move a clever Whig ruse to smear the Democratic Party with the odium of slavery. Washington’s Whig mouthpiece, the National Intelligencer, made the much simpler argument that Thomas Williams flew the Polk/Dallas flag because the slave dealer was, in fact, a Democrat.

How politically powerful is business in American politics? Does the political power of business distort the quality of democratic representation? This chapter reviews the literature on these vital questions, discussing selected studies in political science, sociology, history, and other fields. It finds that assessments of business influence in American politics have varied considerably over time, but it also observes there has been a broad turn in recent scholarship toward the notion that business is “more equal” than other groups in the American political system. A small but growing number of studies—especially studies focusing on politics in our time—has begun to provide credible evidence of business influence. We have also seen the introduction of some exciting new ideas about the ways that business influence, economic inequality, and political representation may be theoretically connected. But definitive conclusions remain elusive. We do not really know whether business is disproportionately powerful and how business influence affects the performance of American democracy. The chapter concludes with some suggestions about the kind of studies that are needed going forward.

Today’s parties are hollow parties, neither organizationally robust beyond their roles raising money nor meaningfully felt as a real, tangible presence in the lives of voters or in the work of engaged activists. The parties have become tarred with elements of polarization that the public most dislikes—from the screaming antagonism to the grubby money chase. More than any positive affinity or party spirit, fear and loathing of the other side fuels parties and structures politics for most voters. Party identification drives American politics—but party loyalty, in the older sense of the term, has atrophied. Even the activists who do so much to shape modern politics typically labor outside of the parties, drawn to ideologically tinged “para-party” groups such as MoveOn.org on the left or the Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity on the right. The parties offer clear choices but get no credit. Our new Party Period features a nationalized clash of ideology and interests but parties that are weakly legitimized and hollowed out.