Some regulations do not only reduce human deaths, injuries, and illnesses; they also protect nonhuman animals. Regulatory Impact Analyses, required by prevailing executive orders, usually do not disclose or explore benefits or costs with respect to nonhuman animals, even when those benefits or costs are significant. This is an inexcusable gap. If a regulation prevents dogs, horses, or cats from being killed or hurt, the benefits should be specified and quantified. This proposition holds even if those benefits are in some sense incidental to the main goal of the regulation. At the same time, turning the relevant benefits into monetary equivalents raises serious challenges, akin to those raised by the valuation of statistical children.

The Black Sea is an enclosed sea surrounded by six coastal countries, of which Bulgaria and Romania are EU Member States. The Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution was ratified in 1994 by all coastal countries. This Convention is the only European regional sea convention to which the EU is not a Party. While Romania and Bulgaria are in favor of EU accession to the Convention, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine thus far have blocked accession. In this paper, we develop a negotiation model with endogenous enforcement and exogenous fraud to analyze the different positions of groups of coastal countries relative to EU accession to the Convention. Our model contributes to defining a proposal that the EU could make to the opposing states such that they accept the EU as a Party to the Convention. In that context we investigate also whether Romania and Bulgaria might be better off delegating their decision power to the EU, rather than retaining their individual voting rights.

Using the case of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in white-tailed deer, we estimated hunters’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for testing their game and determined how their perception of disease risk, trust, and confidence in wildlife agency affected hunter participation in ongoing disease surveillance. The average WTP for testing was $23.75 per deer, and it was positively related to trust and confidence in the wildlife agency and the perception of risk about deer populations in the declining area and the pathogen spreading to other areas. These findings imply that implementing active outreach programs can improve hunter participation in user-paid systems for CWD surveillance.

Individuals often deem market transactions in sex, human organs and surrogacy, among others, repugnant. Repugnance norms can be explained by appealing to social-status concerns. We study an exchange economy in which agents abhor consumption dominance: one’s social status is compromised if one consumes less of every good than someone else does. Dominance may be forestalled by partitioning goods into submarkets and then invoking the repugnance norms that proscribe trade across these submarkets. Dominance may also be forestalled if individuals strategically ‘overconsume’ some goods, interpreted as emergent status goods. When equilibria are multiple, there is scope for welfare-enhancing policies that coordinate on status goods.

In recent years, ‘environmental economics’ has provided the dominant logic underpinning policies for ‘sustainable development’ in the form of government managed price-based and rights-based mechanisms. The advocacy of property rights in environmental management is taken further in the libertarian ‘free market’ approach and this ‘privatisation’ perspective is reflected in the growing use of property rights instruments in climate change policy. This article examines the efficacy of using economic instruments in the environmental context where ‘market ecology’ promotes the commodification of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ and their management by market forces. It argues that the pricing of ‘nature’ or its useful properties is a crude abstraction that implies ecological values can be alienated, but this is incompatible with the material and relational qualities of such values. The limits of this conceptualisation are further demonstrated through an examination of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a price and property rights instrument which enables private project developers in developing countries to produce carbon credits in order to offset greenhouse gas pollution in developed countries. The evident negative social and environmental effects flowing from implementation of the CDM reinforce the limitations of economic logic in the environmental context.

We present a multiregional endogenous growth model in which forward-looking agents choose their regions to live in, in addition to consumption and capital accumulation paths. The spatial distribution of economic activity is determined by the interplay between production spillover effects and urban congestion effects. We characterize the global stability of the spatial equilibrium states in terms of economic primitives such as agents’ time preference and intra- and interregional spillovers. We also study how macroeconomic variables at the stable equilibrium state behave according to the structure of the spillover network.

We employ a novel approach for analyzing the effects of relative consumption and relative wealth preferences on economic growth. In the pertinent literature, these effects are usually assessed by examining the dependence of the growth rate on the two parameters of the utility function that seem to measure the strength of the relative consumption and the relative wealth motives. Applying our fundamental factor approach, we identify specifications in which the traditional approach yields incorrect qualitative conclusions. The problematic specifications have the common unpleasant property that the parameter that seems to determine the strength of the relative consumption motive actually also affects the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of absolute consumption (and the strength of the relative wealth motive). Since the standard approach is unaware of the additional effect(s), it attributes the total change in the growth rate incorrectly to the change in the strength of the relative consumption motive.

Can smart containment policies crowd out private efforts at social distancing? We analyse this question from the perspective of network formation theory. We focus in particular on the role of externalities in social distancing choices. We also look at how these choices are affected by factors such as the agents’ risk perception, the speed of the policy intervention, the structure of the underlying network and the presence of strategic complementarities. We argue that crowding out is a problem when the probability that an outbreak may spread undetected is relatively high (either because testing is too infrequent or because tests are highly inaccurate). This is also the case where the choice of relaxing social distancing generates the largest negative externalities. Simulations on a real-world network suggest that crowding out is more likely to occur when, in the absence of interventions, face-to-face contacts are perceived to carry relatively high risk.

The idea of assessing the costs and benefits of public and private projects is not new to Europe, dating back to studies at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees (Paris) in the XIX century. Later on, in the last century, Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) in its current form has been more extensively used in the United States than in Europe. In the last two decades, however, there has been a rapid increase in its use in a number of European countries and at the European Union (EU) level. European governments often undertake tasks that would be done by private companies in the United States, such as the provision of transport, energy, water and waste management, health services, etc. In the United States the focus of BCA has often been regulatory impact analysis, rather than public project evaluation. One might, therefore, expect that Europeans might approach some things differently from their American counterparts and that new insights might result from these efforts. The articles in this symposium, taken from the recent European Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis (SBCA) conference in Toulouse, illustrate some of these differences and some converging themes.

With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.

Policy discourse surrounding Britain’s unusually well-resourced private schools surrounds their charitable status and their relationship with low social mobility, but informative evidence is scarce. We present estimates of the extent to which private and external benefits at age 25 are associated with attendance at private school in England in the 21st century. We find a weekly wage premium of 17 percent, and a 12 percentage point lower chance of downward social mobility. By contrast, private schooling is not significantly associated with participation in local voluntary groups, unpaid voluntary work, or charitable giving and fundraising; this finding casts doubt on claims that private schools deliver ‘public benefit’ in this way.

The European Union’s regulation for chemical safety (REACH) addresses the registration, evaluation, assessment, and consequent authorization (or restriction) of chemicals which are potentially harmful for both public health and the environment. The current study aims at ascertaining the costs and benefits of the REACH framework for the Austrian economy under major uncertainties, and draws on a wide range of databases on public and workplace health, chemical accidents in households, and the potential environmental impacts of harmful chemicals.

The uncertainties in the REACH system assessments of the effects of chemicals on health lie not only in the insufficiency of scientific evidence but also in the economic evaluation of effects on health, especially in regard to the value of statistical life (VSL), and the economic value of diseases attributed to chemicals.

This benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of the REACH system in Austria therefore takes into account these manifold uncertainties by designing a conservative baseline scenario and by varying all determinants in comprehensive sensitivity analyses. Projected over a period of about 30 years, this paper provides evidence that the REACH system most probably leads to net benefits for the Austrian economy (benefit-cost ratio of about 10.6) even though many benefits are still highly uncertain or unknown.

In this paper we review the benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) made to support applications for authorisations under the EU’s REACH Regulation on hazardous chemicals. Experiences from over 100 cases suggest that there are a number of informational and methodological challenges to overcome in these BCAs. In particular, we find that many REACH applicants have had problems explaining the societal relevance of the regulatory impacts expected to affect them and other market actors. Adapting the framework for regulatory impact assessment proposed by Dudley et al. [(2017). Consumer’s Guide to Regulatory Impact Analysis: Ten Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 8, 187–204], we discuss these impacts from a welfare economics perspective and make suggestions on how to improve current practices in BCA applied to chemicals risk management. From this discussion we then distill a number of topics that deserve more attention in applied BCAs under the REACH Regulation.

Regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) weigh the benefits of regulations against the burdens they impose and are invaluable tools for informing decision makers. We offer 10 tips for nonspecialist policymakers and interested stakeholders who will be reading RIAs as consumers.

1. 1. Core problem: Determine whether the RIA identifies the core problem (compelling public need) the regulation is intended to address.

2. 2. Alternatives: Look for an objective, policy-neutral evaluation of the relative merits of reasonable alternatives.

3. 3. Baseline: Check whether the RIA presents a reasonable “counterfactual” against which benefits and costs are measured.

4. 4. Increments: Evaluate whether totals and averages obscure relevant distinctions and trade-offs.

5. 5. Uncertainty: Recognize that all estimates involve uncertainty, and ask what effect key assumptions, data, and models have on those estimates.

6. 6. Transparency: Look for transparency and objectivity of analytical inputs.

7. 7. Benefits: Examine how projected benefits relate to stated objectives.

8. 8. Costs: Understand what costs are included.

9. 9. Distribution: Consider how benefits and costs are distributed.

10. 10. Symmetrical treatment: Ensure that benefits and costs are presented symmetrically.

Applying benefit-cost analysis in the White House regulatory oversight process served as a basic mission of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) during its seven-year lifespan (1974–1981). This paper reviews that CWPS experience, which involved filing comments in over 300 proceedings at more than 25 federal regulatory agencies. The paper draws on those CWPS public comments (filings), identifying persistent and pervasive deficiencies in the economic analysis regulators then and now often use as support for new regulation. CWPS filings fostered greater acceptance of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decisions; such analysis is now required by executive order.

Many small town professional clubs operate on the border of viability and threats to their survival are often real. But their activities may generate benefits that they are unable to capture in ticket sales; for example they provide a focus of interest even for some residents who do not attend the stadium. The paper presents results from applying contingent valuation methodology in two towns with clubs in the bottom-tier of English professional football. Collective willingness-to-pay for the survival of the clubs through taxation proved to be significant relative to the revenues the clubs were able to generate through ticket sales. There appears therefore to be a case for local governments to consider intervention in some circumstances where a club's survival is in question.

“Multifunctionality” emphasizes the benefit externality properties of nonfood products that coincide with agricultural commodity production, some of which also have public-good properties. However, determining the willingness to pay for local benefit externalities is seen as necessary but daunting. This paper pursues the idea that the valuation process might first start by estimating the incentives required to supply various levels of a benefit externality. With the use of carbon sequestration through the adoption of no-till cultivation as an example of a multifunctional benefit externality, mathematical programming is used to derive representative price schedules. The implication for incentive prices are examined in light of risk aversion.

Policy analysis is complicated by the myriad of benefits and costs generatedby the use of natural resources. This study develops three benefits thatmust be considered in the granting of a consumptive use permit for waterfiled by Adena Springs Ranch, east of Ocala, Florida. This ranch is hopingto expand into grass-fat beef; but to do so, it needs additional water forirrigation. Specifically, our analysis considers the potential gain from theranch, the potential negative effect on existing permit holders andenvironmental uses of water, and the possible positive value generated bythe increased surface flow for other recreational users in eastern MarionCounty.

We investigate positional effects in a vertically differentiated duopoly, evaluated against the first best. Positional concerns distort the allocation of consumers across varieties, as well as the average quality. If the external effect is sufficiently relevant, the resulting welfare loss is increasing in the extent of the externality itself. The beneficial effect of regulation through a minimum quality standard is analysed.

In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition the effects of individual pricing decisions on the aggregate price index are neglected. This paper studies the implications of this approximation in terms of the efficiency of macroeconomic equilibria. We show that allowing for the price-index effect, makes the degree of inefficiency positively correlated with the number of agents; it also reduces the scope for New Keynesian outcomes, such as price rigidity and multiple equilibria.