Chapter 5 examines debates around the drafting of India’s independent constitution between 1946 and 1950. It focuses on a group of socialist thinkers who criticized the nationalist commitment to parliamentary government.

This chapter explores and interprets the long revolution of the 1860s (1862–1875): a ‘context-breaking liberal moment’ that featured a revolution, a Constituent Assembly, a change of dynasty, a new constitutional system and a crisis over defining the scope of parliamentary jurisdiction. During and after this moment political institutions were reconfigured and the monarchy was put on a new institutional footing. In short, the way of ‘doing’ politics was radically transformed. By paying due attention to ideas as drivers of political change and to the role of the jurists in forming these ideas, the chapter demonstrates that what ultimately made this crisis a legitimacy crisis – and indeed, gave the revolution its language – was the way in which the king’s rule increasingly came to be seen as a de facto usurpation of power that had unsettled the balance of the constitution and was breaking the contract with the nation. In other words, the critics of the monarchy were essentially building on the moderate liberal ideas that had developed in the preceding years.

Between 1996 and the adoption of the new constitution under President Rafael Correa in 2006, Ecuador saw an unprecedented level of domestic instability. As the head of the Alianza Pais movement, President Correa pitched himself as an anti-establishment figure who needed to convene a constituent assembly for the “Citizen’s Revolution” to be a success. Correa’s crusade against the establishment had far-reaching consequences on Ecuador’s constitution-making process. Correa was often forced to play “hardball” with his opponents on the right and used popular mobilization to bolster his cause. The role of the people in the constitution-making process led to important gains for the indigenous community and the environment. However, the centrality of Correa’s views often hampered the effectiveness of the process as he sometimes stood at odds with his coalition or started fights with the media, such as on the issue of natural resources and the environment. The constitution-making and reform process in Ecuador was distinct from the “Pink-Tide” happening in the rest of Latin America and was typified by Ecuador’s particular conditions and recent history.

Nepal’s constitution-making process took several years and two constituent assemblies to achieve. It was the result of a series of crises and transformations, including a "People’s War" and mass mobilization in the southern part of the country.The iterated set of negotiations led eventually to the adoption of a new kind of federalism, desginated as "Proportionate Inclusive Federalism" to provide a new basis for the state going forward.

The process of drafting Tunisia’s post revolution constitution began in February 2012 and endedtwo years later in February 2014, when the final vote by the Constituent Assembly took place. The two year process was characterized by multiple crises and interruptions.Despite this extremely difficult and rocky post-revolutionary context, in which the counterrevolutionary forces sought to destabilize the country, Tunisians were able to overcome the crisis. However, despite characterizations of the outside observers about the success of the process, counterrevolutionaries ended up derailing the country’s democratic and popular gains. This chapter provides a blow-by-blow account of the process.

This chapter provides a systematic analysis of the failure of popular constitution making in Turkey. Based on the literature and case studies, the chapter begins with elaborating theoretical premises of inclusive and democratic constitution making. Operationalizing the theoretical benchmarks established, the chapter shows that past constitution-making processes in Turkey have not even satisfied minimal conditions of popular constitution making, that is, direct and free election of a constituent assembly through all citizens. Against this background, it is indeed surprising that the 2011–2013 process was designed to meet maximum conditions of popular constitution making ‘e.g., election of MPs as constitution makers, public consultation before and after drafting’. Analyzing the 2011–2013 process, the chapter elaborates that constitution making did not live up to the promise of an inclusive and democratic process. It explains the reasons for failure and demonstrates that parties were unable to overcome deep disagreements over contested issues ‘e.g., state–religion relations, citizenship, government system’.