This chapter introduces the book's main theoretical argument: that armed groups are dependent on popular support and accordingly strive to obtain and maintain it, efforts which shape insurgents’ repertoire of contention. It outlines the concept of the 'constituency' (Malthaner 2011) which serves as a relational framework to understand the dynamic relations between insurgent groups and their supporters. It further develops the concept by more explicitly developing its spatial dimensions. It argues for a more nuanced understanding of insurgent movements use of space and how it shapes interactions with their supporters. It embeds this theoretical approach in the broader literatures concerned with insurgent groups’ relations with civilians, ranging from counterinsurgency and social movements to rebel governance. It argues that the paradigm of territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006) is too reductive and cannot account for patterns of support for insurgents in areas they do not control. It also addresses the critical role of the state in shaping insurgent behaviour and how state–insurgent interactions are reciprocally formative. It proceeds to look at issues of insurgent governance, recruitment and civilian agency.

The final chapter summarises the book's argument that insurgent groups’ ability to maintain popular support and legitimacy is a key dimension of their success or failure. It shows that the PKK, notwithstanding its ever decreasing military capacity, has proven resilient because of the strength of its relationship with its supportive constituency. It proceeds to assess the strength of the argument, explaining the challenges in demonstrating causality in the field of conflict studies. It further assesses whether the book's framework could possibly explain the evolution of the movement in the period after the timeframe of this book. It briefly gives an overview of changes in the PKK since Öcalan’s capture in 1999, including its dramatic ideological transformation, reconfigured structures, the growth of an affiliated Kurdish civil society, the strength of Kurdish political parties and their relationship with the PKK. It also looks at the PKK’s role in Syria and how its experiences there have shaped the conflict in Turkey.

Chapter 1 lays out the main argument of the book, asserting that insurgent groups’ dependence on their support networks ensures that to a certain extent they are obliged to respect their supportive constituencies’ ideological preferences and normative expectations. Relationships between armed groups and their constituencies are not stable and change over time as conflicts develop, ensuring that insurgent groups can also lose popular support. This chapter argues that this important dimension of insurgency is sometimes overlooked in favour of structural, ideological or resource-oriented analyses of conflict. It specifies how the book uses (or not) specific terminology and concepts like terrorism and Kurdistan. The chapter proceeds to discuss the difficulties in working with data in research on insurgencies. It argues that all forms of data – quantitative and qualitative – have inconsistencies and it backs the call for greater data transparency in conflict studies. It elaborates on some of the specific challenges related to data reliability on the conflict in Turkey. It describes the interview process, discusses the representativeness of the interview sample and the challenges of fieldwork. It finishes by outlining the structure of the book.

In Chapter 1, we saw that ‘negotiation is a process by which two parties with differences’ come together to resolve them. Up until now, we have kept the idea of ‘two parties’ quite simple, and for the most part considered what happens between two negotiators, one on each side. However, we have also seen that negotiations are ‘messy’. The core process of negotiation outlined in Chapter 4 is made more complex when the negotiators are acting on behalf of others. Few negotiate solely on their own account – two business development teams negotiating over a potential joint venture represent their respective companies, as does an IT manager negotiating to acquire a new system for their company. A union official negotiating a new enterprise agreement represents the membership. Members of a delegation to the local council seeking a change in the parking regulations represent their neighbours up and down their street. When the CEO of Air Berlin negotiated over lunch, then shook hands with the CEO of Airbus on a US$7 billion deal to supply aircraft, each executive had complete authority but was at the same time representing their company and all their employees (Newhouse 2000, p. 40). Similarly, with regard to ‘Brexit’, British Prime Ministers David Cameron and later Theresa May had a series of meetings with each of the European leaders over Britain’s departure from the European Union. The countries’ leaders on either side of the table would be using their personal authority to make progress but at the same time be fully conscious of the need to represent their nation’s political viewpoint. In these situations, negotiators can find themselves acting as a bridge, spanning the two sides and forming a channel of communication and accommodation. When the negotiators are not able to broker a deal this may be due more to the pressure on them than to their poor negotiating.