Adam Smith promoted free banking—private, competitive, convertible banknotes. He also supported restrictions on banks. We study Smith’s views and the era in which they developed, suggesting his ‘regulations’ were a backstop against banks’ risks to depositors but primarily monetary stability. In modern parlance, Smith supported macroprudential regulations to underpin monetary stability, as did Friedman and Schwartz the US FDIC. We discuss why Smith’s vision for banking went unrealised. Bank regulation became microprudential and ran aground in 2008/2009. The prominence of macroprudential regulation now provides a chance to reorientate regulation to support monetary stability. Early signs are not promising.

This article examines debates over banking regulation in Germany that culminated in the 1934 Reich Banking Law. Existing accounts have traced its origins to the 1931 banking crisis or the 1933 Nazi seizure of power. Yet, rather than the outcome of a single financial or political crisis, banking regulation was the product of longer-term discussions on national security, legal rationale, and financial globalization. Prior to World War I, officials expressed concerns over Germany's dependence on foreign capital, while later efforts to improve liquidity in the banking sector continued in the 1920s. The construction of a regulatory policy thus arose from a series of investigations into how to protect the German economy from foreign crises, thereby reflecting the interdependence of politics and finance.

Recent developments in the international banking system, especially the 2007–9 crisis and subsequent wave of postcrisis regulation, have drawn increasing attention to the structural power of banks and banking systems. States need a functioning financial system to ensure the overall health of their economies, so states must shape policy to protect their financial firms. National financial systems may be dominated either by banks or by capital markets. In states where banks dominate provision of capital, states must shape policy to protect their banks because of their structural importance, independent of any lobbying or other direct action on the part of banks to exercise instrumental power. The entangling of structural and instrumental power means studying differences in structural power requires either careful case-study work or cross-national comparison of responses to a common shock. The implementation of the 2011 Basel III Accords provides just such an opportunity. This article offers a quantitative analysis of a new dataset of implementation of Basel III components in the Basel Committee on Banking Stability member states from 2011 to 2019 and demonstrates the structural power of banks in bank-based systems to accelerate implementation of favorable policies and slow implementation of unfavorable ones.

More than ten years after the financial crisis, the challenges of European banking and of the eurozone highlight that the existence of a European common market in banking is at best partial. Examining how British and French commercial banks and banking associations responded to the plans for a European common market in banking between 1977 and 1992, this article contributes to explaining this partial character, and highlights that this project was primarily political. This challenges the widely held view that large companies tended to push for more integration. This article shows that until the mid-1980s, the banking sector was not necessarily calling for European financial integration in the form of a common market in banking for at least three reasons: they doubted the usefulness of such a move, they feared an increase in regulation, and they focused more on domestic or global matters than on European ones.

This article contributes to our understanding of how and why developing countries would comply with international banking regulatory standards, Basel standards. The article demonstrates the interplay between opportunity structures constituted by transnationalization of public policymaking and domestic institutional setting, and how forces of compliance resonate in the domestic politics of compliance. The empirical findings are based on Turkey's compliance with Basel standards. It relies on fieldwork that involves semi-structured qualitative interviews with senior regulators and bankers, which are complemented with analysis of secondary data. The article shows that a capable and willing regulator could capitalize on the top-down policymaking style which restricts the regulatee's access to international negotiations, and sets the terms at the domestic level. Direct access to international negotiations, resource asymmetry in favor of the regulator, and superior “negotiation knowledge” helped the regulator pacify a critical, skeptical regulatee, and drive the compliance process. The article also shows that the compliance process takes place at three stages: policy formulation at the international level, an “interpretation stage” in between the international and the domestic levels, and finally the domestic policy process.

The global banking system can be shown to be a Complex Adaptive System that exhibits phase transitions from time to time. These phase transitions can result in significant financial losses to the community that we estimate to be much more significant than losses occurring during “business as usual” periods. In this paper, we argue that the significant losses arising from phase transitions in the banking system requires a very different approach to regulation than the current Basel regime, and that there is a need to transition the Basel regime from a Federation of Systems to a System of Systems. We demonstrate that the World Health Organisation’s recent management system for pandemics is ideally suited for management of the global banking system and would have greater potential to control the phase transition losses than the current Basel system.

The modernization of the banking sector, and particularly the big four state owned commercial banks, has a top priority on the Chinese reform agenda. Three of the four state banks found foreign strategic investors as minority shareholders and domestic banks now face more competition from global players since the country's WTO commitments came fully into effect at the end of 2006. A comprehensive approach to reform aims at pushing China's state banks into the league of global leading financial institutions within a few years time. But is this aim feasible despite prevalent state dominance? To shed light on the role and impact of the state in promoting sound risk management practices this paper focuses on the political economy of law implementation. Two main conclusions are drawn: (1) the direction of action is significantly different from reform outcomes due to weak incentives to enforce respective policies and as a consequence non-performing loan accumulation continues; and (2) on a more general level banking regulation in China illustrates that a normative approach based on international best practice is insufficient to address the issue of financial stability in many emerging and developing countries because it neglects the role of the institutional embeddedness of banking reform.

Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from intense conflicts of interest in banking and from the failure of markets to counter incentives for recklessness. The approaches to capital regulation in Basel III and related proposals are based on flawed analyses of the relevant tradeoffs. The flaws in the regulations include dangerously low equity levels, a complex and problematic system of risk weights that exacerbates systemic risk and adds distortions, and unnecessary reliance on poor equity substitutes. The underlying problem is a breakdown of governance and lack of accountability to the public throughout the system, including policymakers and economists.

The governance of finance is replete with challenges as evidenced by the frequent financial crises that have accompanied the growth and development of financial markets. Every crisis can be taken as a symptom of governance failure. The immediate reaction tends to be an attempt to fix the problems that gave rise to the most recent crisis. By definition, such a regulatory approach lags behind actual developments on the financial marketplace, thereby inadvertently sowing the seeds for the next governance failure. A similar lag effect can be observed in current attempts to repair the governance of global finance. This paper argues that reform proposals currently under discussion fail to take into account important changes in the organisation of global financial relations between financial intermediaries, their home governments and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). They challenge the basic principles that inform conventional regulatory regimes: a clear distinction between public vs. private; regulation vs. firm-level governance; and stakeholding vs. supervision. The paper discusses alternative modes of governance that have emerged during the crisis and are complementing for, if not substituting, more conventional forms of governance.

The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.

This paper examines the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping-generations model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorporate macroeconomic risks into their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter bankruptcy with probability one. A major cause for this default is that risk premia of a competitive banking system may become too small if the capital base is low.