We use different incentive schemes to study truth-telling in a die-roll task when people are asked to reveal the number rolled privately. We find no significant evidence of cheating when there are no financial incentives associated with the reports, but do find evidence of such when the reports determine financial gains or losses (in different treatments). We find no evidence of loss aversion in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end of the session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings, we find evidence of less cheating, particularly in the loss setting; in fact, there is no significant difference in behavior between the non-incentivized case and the loss setting with money manipulation. We interpret our findings in terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust and beliefs in the gain and the loss frames.

In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in which the responder learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response. Of the twenty-nine existing comparisons, sixteen find no difference, while four do find differences, and nine comparisons find mixed evidence. We also find some indications about the underlying determinants of when the two methods lead to different responses. For example, it appears that levels of punishment are substantially lower with the strategy method. In addition, it also appears that difference across these elicitation methods are more likely when people make fewer contingent choices. Finally, in no case do we find that a treatment effect found with the strategy method is not observed with the direct-response method.

In experimental economics there is a norm against using deception. But precisely what constitutes deception is unclear. While there is a consensus view that providing false information is not permitted, there are also “gray areas” with respect to practices that omit information or are misleading without an explicit lie being told. In this paper, we report the results of a large survey among experimental economists and students concerning various specific gray areas. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity across respondent choices. The data indicate a perception that costs and benefits matter, so that such practices might in fact be appropriate when the topic is important and there is no other way to gather data. Compared to researchers, students have different attitudes about some of the methods in the specific scenarios that we ask about. Few students express awareness of the no-deception policy at their schools. We also briefly discuss some potential alternatives to “gray-area” deception, primarily based on suggestions offered by respondents.

The compromise effect arises when being close to the “middle” of a choice set makes an option more appealing. The compromise effect poses conceptual and practical problems for economic research: by influencing choices, it can bias researchers’ inferences about preference parameters. To study this bias, we conduct an experiment with 550 participants who made choices over lotteries from multiple price lists (MPLs). Following prior work, we manipulate the compromise effect to influence choices by varying the middle options of each MPL. We then estimate risk preferences using a discrete-choice model without a compromise effect embedded in the model. As anticipated, the resulting risk preference parameter estimates are not robust, changing as the compromise effect is manipulated. To disentangle risk preference parameters from the compromise effect and to measure the strength of the compromise effect, we augment our discrete-choice model with additional parameters that represent a rising penalty for expressing an indifference point further from the middle of the ordered MPL. Using this method, we estimate an economically significant magnitude for the compromise effect and generate robust estimates of risk preference parameters that are no longer sensitive to compromise-effect manipulations.

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.

We examine elicitation effects in a multi-stage bargaining experiment with escalating stakes conducted under direct-response and strategy-method elicitation. We find a significantly greater incidence of decisions leading to bargaining failure under direct responses. In addition, the predictive power of alternative risk attitude measures differs between the elicitation methods. Potential sources of the effects and resulting implications are discussed.

Managers of greenhouses, nurseries, and landscape contractors participated in five focus group discussions on labor-related risks. Managers conceptualize labor risks along the human resource management process: (1) recruitment and selection, (2) training and development, (3) performance evaluation and discipline, (4) careers and relationships, and (5) compensation packages. In addition, they identified (6) immigrant employees and (7) labor laws and regulations as sources of risk. They recognized a large number of risk-increasing attributes, but also a number of mediating strategies to reduce these risks.

Job satisfaction is likely the most studied work-related attitude and isassumed to influence a variety of behaviors. This study analyzes the jobsatisfaction of agricultural employees using Herzberg's theory, which isbroadly employed in management. Fourteen horticultural businessesparticipated in case studies of labor-management practices. Fifteennonsupervisory employee interviews were analyzed regarding job satisfaction.Components of job satisfaction relevant to horticultural employees werefamily-business values, achievement, recognition, work itself, involvement,personal life, interpersonal relationships, job security, supervision,working conditions, organization, safety, compensation, and information.While support for Herzberg's theory is weak, it is useful for classifyingemployees' attitudes.

Human resource management in agriculture and associated risks are under-researched topics. To identify the sources of human resource management risks confronting dairy farms, gain insights into how dairy farmers perceive the impacts of these risks, and identify control strategies, four focus group discussions were held with dairy farm managers. Managers' perceptions served to develop a framework for the analysis of human resource management risks in agriculture and derive recommendations for reducing these risks. Results of this study have been used to tailor educational programs for farmers and suggest strategies for future research.

Historically, managers in livestock production have focused on production management; however, as operations have grown they have spent more time managing employees. Increased time spent overseeing employees brings additional risks and challenges, and, hence, a greater need for human resource management (HRM) skills. This study investigated HRM practices in pork production and analyzed their risk attributes through six focus group discussions with managers. Results were compared to existing data from four dairy focus groups and to other research. The results have been used to develop and adapt educational workshops for managers in pork production.

En reformulant la théorie de la valeur, Jevons et Walras sont confrontés au problème suivant : sur quel schéma algébrique fonder l'homogénéisation des biens? Chaque auteur a sa méthode. L'étude de cette divergence apporte un éclairage nouveau sur les positions de chacun. Elle permet surtout d'envisager une démarche analytique reconstructive à partir des portées et des limites des systèmes jévonien et walrasien.