The replication crisis across several disciplines raises challenges for behavioural sciences in general. In this report, we review the lessons for experimental economists of these developments. We present the new research methods and practices which are being proposed to improve the replicability of scientific studies. We discuss how these methods and practices can have a positive impact in experimental economics and the extent to which they should be encouraged.

As its practitioners know well, benefit-cost analysis (BCA) walks a fine line between the positive and normative, between the science of economics and the art of political economy. Missteps threaten to undermine its credibility as a value-free science, while overcaution risks irrelevance to the pressing questions of the day. As BCA adapts to give more weight to distributional concerns, while operating in a more highly charged political environment than ever before, these tensions will only grow. For perspective, I reexamine three prominent episodes in the history of economics where these issues were vigorously debated: (i) The founding of the NBER by Wesley Clair Mitchell, who insisted that the organization eschew all policy recommendations; (ii) the introduction of the modern definition of economics as the study of tradeoffs by Lionel Robbins, who insisted welfare effects could never be aggregated; and (iii) the origins of BCA as a measure of income, which to first-generation practitioners seemed to foreclose the possibility of measuring “intangible” benefits like recreation opportunities, mortality risks, and equity. These episodes, together with critiques of economics from philosophers of science, suggest we are best served by being as transparent as possible about the ways values influence BCA reasoning, without arrogating political decisions into it.

Mainstream economists give the misleading impression that their argument for austerity is purely technical and indeed the most ‘scientific’. The argument developed here is that their reasoning is not, any more than that of their heterodox critics, independent of ideology, power and ethics. The widespread belief in austerity policies as scientifically justified has prevented arguments against austerity gaining more traction; issues of ideology, power and ethics need to be brought to the fore as part of the arguments on both sides. In other words, awareness of the epistemological issues arising from an open-system ontology is critical to understanding the crisis and the policy response, and therefore to challenging that understanding and encouraging a radical policy shift. The critique of austerity policies would therefore be strengthened by a critique of the mainstream’s rhetorical (mis)representation of economic theorising.

A previous study showed that imposing economic restrictions improves the forecasting ability of food demand systems, thus warranting their use even when they are rejected in-sample. This article evaluates whether this result is due to economic restrictions enhancing degrees of freedom or containing nonsample information. Results indicate that restrictions improve forecasting ability even when they are not derived from economic theory, but theoretical restrictions forecast best.

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen est connu à la fois pour sa contribution essentielle à lanalyse économique traditionnelle et pour sa volonté de fonder une approche bioéconomique. En nous appuyant sur la Méthodologie des Programmes de Recherche Scientifique de Lakatos et sur la réconciliation quil propose entre « histoire interne » et « histoire externe » des sciences, nous tentons de réévaluer la tentative de Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen de fonder un nouveau programme de recherche. Nous concluons en montrant léchec de cette tentative.

Smith advanced a particular view of altruism that should prove to be relevant to the modern literature on the subject. It provided the backbone of his critique of three different theories. These three theories have been reincarnated in three modern approaches : Robert Axelrod’s “egoistic”, Gary Becker’s “egocentric”, and George Herbert Mead and Robert Frank’s ”altercentric” views. Axelrod’s approach repeats the failing, which Smith found in Mandeville’s. Becker’s theory echoes the shortcoming, which Smith identified in Hobbes’. Mead/Frank’s view duplicates the fault, which Smith uncovered in the approach of Francis Hutcheson and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment.

L’approche d’Allais repose sur des concepts et postulats qui sont propres à son auteur et qui portent sur (i) le lien entre la mémoire du passé et l’anticipation du futur, (ii) le concept de temps psychologique, (iii) l’analogie entre l’oubli et l’intérêt, (iv) le concept de taux d’intérêt psychologique et ses relations avec les taux d’intérêt du marché, et (v) l’appréciation de la conjoncture économique par les agents. Ces idées ont été articulées entre elles dans le cadre de la théorie Héréditaire et Relativiste, pièce unique de la littérature. Bien que cette théorie n’ait été testée empiriquement que dans le domaine des taux d’intérêt et de la demande de monnaie, elle revêt en fait un caractère très général. Un résultat particulièrement séduisant est que certains phénomènes nous apparaissant comme variables dans le temps physique peuvent être constants dans le temps psychologique.