In the Introduction, we define a coup d’état as the unconstitutional replacement of the incumbent executive by military officers or civilians supported by the armed forces, an act that is often accompanied by the suspension of civil guarantees and liberties as well as the nullification of legislative power. We then provide an overview of the economic underpinnings of twentieth-century Latin America and describe the main characteristics of the Cold War in the subcontinent (from the role of the US to the impact of Cuba’s integration into the socialist bloc, from the changing role of the military as an institution to the Doctrine of National Security). We examine the role of the Catholic Church, one of the key actors during this period, in political stability. We close by offering two possible ways to read this book, taking advantage of the comparative framework that its structure offers. Our collective goal in this volume is to explain the end of an era – the Cold War – that conditioned the subcontinent’s transition to democratic regimes, regardless of whether subsequent governments have slanted neoliberal or neo-populist.

Of all the cases studied in this book, the 1972 coup d’état in Honduras is the one we know the least about. General Oswaldo López Arellano, the military general who led the coup, implemented a reformist agenda, the boldest in Central America – and, indeed, among the most progressive in Latin America. Given that his previous coup ended a Honduran experiment with social democracy, this shift away from repression and toward land reform and developmentalism is puzzling. To understand the political choices that led to this coup and its reformist character, this chapter chronologically reconstructs both the conjunctures in which the military could have overthrown the sitting president but did not, and the crucial months leading up to December 4, 1972, when López Arellano did overthrow President Ernesto Cruz. Hondurans anticipated the coup, but they did not know whether it would be, as one editorial writer noted at the time, “from the Left or the Right.” That it ended up being from the Left was not at all foretold by structural conditions – for similar conditions prevailed in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua – and had everything to do with the political decision to address the problems faced by a landless peasantry.

Like several of its regional counterparts, Brazil’s 1964 coup attacked a reformist government that threatened the interests of an entrenched elite. To fully understand this attack, we must examine those interests and perceived threats to them, particularly in the realms of culture, religion, and morality. The coup not only fit into international Cold War maneuvering; it also conformed to a decades-long trajectory of moralism-as-countersubversion. Brazil’s coup plotters defined their enemies in terms that were vague, circumscribed by traditionalism, and culturally determined. There was, that is, a determinative tension between the “modernizing conservatism” of the regime and anti-modern forces that helped create it. To putschists and hard-liners, many of whom did not share the developmentalism attributed to the regime’s modernizers, the coup and dictatorship should aim to restore Brazil to a mythic, moralistic, Christian, anti-communist, and hierarchical past. As a result, moralism itself became one of the outstanding characteristics of the regime – and the rise of powerful, often extreme Evangelical conservatism (outsized in Brazil today) grew into the regime’s lasting legacy. Brazil’s towering Evangelical Right, an indomitable hallmark of its twenty-first-century politics, thus owes much to the conspiracy that brought dictatorship to Brazil in 1964.

Over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence of authoritarianism around the globe. The recent wave of autocratization – the declining quality of institutions for clean elections, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly – stalled the global spread of democratic ideas and principles. A related global trend is the unprecedented frequency, scope, and size of anti-government protests. Women play a vital role in pro-democracy movements and revolutions. Yet, women’s engagement in contentious politics often appears to be invisible in the public discourse. This chapter presents a typology of women’s participation in a revolution. In addition, this chapter provides background information about the Revolution of Dignity and its participants, identifies the main trends in gender inequality in Ukrainian society, and describes data sources.

Conclusions: I summarize some of the shortcomings of current international legal regimes for dealing adequately with grand corruption, summarize some promising avenues for doing so; evaluate the proposal to create an International Anti-Corruption Court, tackle some of the admitted shortcomings of my approach and note the convergence of current anti-corruption struggles with other social movements.

This chapter investigates the logics of punishment that animate the AKP’s new securitisation technologies. Examining the different yet recurrent tools with which academics in Turkey have been historically expulsed from educational institutions, the public sphere, and the political body, I develop a nuanced understanding of the interconnected yet changing forms of punishment directed at academics as knowledge producers from the early Republican period to the first two and a half decades of the twenty-first century. In keeping with the literature on changing regimes of punishment, I conclude that the logic for penalising those targeted has shifted from compensation in the early Republican era to a securitised logic of retribution (following the 1980 coup), to a cruel form of retributive securitisation in the form of subjection to civic death in post-2016 Turkey.

This chapter investigates the securitisation logic of control animating the AKP’s new securitisation technologies by enumerating the impact of four relevant factors on society: authoritarian lateral surveillance; centralised digital politics; shared contingency governance; and extra-legal and religious over-reach into domestic life. By focusing on these four factors in each section, I argue that under the sway of an authoritarian politics of securitisation, the AKP government combines the technologies of lateral surveillance and centralised digital politics to transgress the principle of individual criminal responsibility in favour of ‘shared responsibility’, a familial ‘sharing in the referent object of securitisation,’ and participation in the maintenance of security. I further suggest that this new development marks a shift away from state of emergency rule to an authoritarian securitisation in which Turkey uses peer-to-peer surveillance pervasively and invasively in the service of state protection.

This chapter reviews how the logic of biosecuritisation animates the AKP’s new securitisation technologies. It indexes the government’s attempts to reach deep into the population’s domestic life, families, and bodies to target women, LGBTQ+, and disabled people for biosecuritisation. The first section unpacks the theoretical dimension of biosecuritisation. In the next section, the focus is on biosecuritisation as a logic of authoritarian securitisation. The third section unpacks the gendered insecuritisation of women and the exertion of biopolitical control over their bodies and reproductive lives. The next section then turns to biosecuritisation of the already marginalised LGBTQ+ community, and their criminalisation as ‘deviant’. The last section describes the potentially catastrophic consequences of the biosecuritisation of disabled people. I argue that the biosecuritisation of the purges works to further insecuritise and exclude the already marginalised sub-groups of women, members of LGBTQ+ community, and people with disabilities by trapping them in the vicious circle of biosecuritisation.

This book examines how new AKP authoritarian securitisation practices shape and reshape the daily lives of people purged by emergency decree. The Introduction defines key concepts such as authoritarianism, securitisation, and civic death, as well as describes the methodology. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach that combines empirical ethnographic and historical research with theoretical and philosophical perspectives on the political, the book highlights the new forms of citizenship deprivation, security, and punishment that have emerged under the AKP. It argues that new methods of securitisation are designed to reduce those targeted for civic death, a type of disposable citizen who is denied the opportunity to reclaim their social, economic, and political rights even after they have been acquitted or the state of emergency has been lifted.

The Conclusion argues that, taken together, the AKP’s combined authoritarian securitisation state is predicated on five authoritarian securitisation logics:1) repressive protection of the state; 2) cruel retributive punishment; 3) centralised and mass lateral control; 4) self-regulation through informalised rule of law; and 5) biosecuritisation as a doubled form of civic death. I then examine present-day global empirics concerning the global system of securitisation to argue that the differences between democratic and authoritarian governance are increasingly more of degree than kind. Asking the question of what next, I look briefly at signs of democratic optimism visible in Turkish citizen’s capacity for resilience and innovative resistance.

Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule, Turkey has become an autocratic regime. The Turkish case raises questions about how international organizations tasked with upholding the rule of law can not only permit illiberal states to violate rule-of-law norms but also themselves undermine those principles. Conceptually, the rule-of-law/rule-by-law spectrum fails to account for authoritarian contexts. If the rule of law constitutes one end of the analytical spectrum, the other end is lawless rule, not rule by law, and the dual state lies somewhere in between. This chapter analyzes the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Erdoğan’s resort to the law to consolidate his power (rule by law) and his utter disregard of legal rules in repressing democratic dissent and engaging in state violence (lawlessness). The analysis goes beyond ECtHR judgments to examine inadmissibility decisions and strike-out rulings.

The extant literature on the liberal commons takes as granted secure property rights, freedom of association, and the rule of law, all of which have been the exception rather than the rule throughout human history, and therefore fails to explore the origin of the liberal commons (from an illiberal regime). Authoritarianism poses a fundamental challenge to, but also an opportunity to explore the origin of, the liberal commons. This chapter defines the authoritarian commons by examining the tension between authoritarianism and the liberal commons both theoretically and in the specific context of neighborhood governance in urban China.