Anchoring has been shown to influence numeric judgments in various domains, including preferential judgment tasks. Whereas many studies and a recent Many Labs project have shown robust effects in classic anchoring tasks, studies of anchoring effects on preferential judgments have had inconsistent results. In this paper, we investigate the replicability and robustness of anchoring on willingness-to-pay, which is a widely used measure for consumer preference. We employ a combination of approaches, aggregating data from previous studies and also contributing additional replication studies designed to reconcile inconsistent previous results. We examine the effect of differing experimental procedures used in prior studies, and test whether publication bias could contribute to the inconsistent findings. We find that different experimental procedures used in previous studies do not explain the divergent results, and that anchoring effects are generally robust to differences in procedures, participant populations, and experimental settings.

Anchoring effects, the assimilation of numerical estimates to previously considered standards, are highly robust. Two studies examined whether mood and expertise jointly moderate the magnitude of anchoring. Previous research has demonstrated that happy mood induces judges to process information in a less thorough manner than sad mood, which means that happy judges tend to be more susceptible to unwanted influences. However, this may not be true for anchoring effects. Because anchoring results from an elaborate process of selective knowledge activation, more thorough processing should lead to more anchoring; as a result, sad judges should show stronger anchoring effects than happy judges and happy judges may even remain uninfluenced by the given anchors. Because information processing of experts may be relatively independent of their mood, however, mood may influence anchoring only in non-experts. Results of two studies on legal decision-making (Study 1) and numeric estimates (Study 2) are consistent with these expectations. These findings suggest that, at least for non-experts, positive mood may eliminate the otherwise robust anchoring effect.

Empirical literature provided convincing evidence that explicit (i.e., legislated) inflation targets anchor expectations. I propose a novel game theoretic framework with generalized timing that allows us to formally capture this beneficial anchoring effect. Using the framework I identify several factors that influence whether and how strongly expectations are anchored, namely (i) the public's cost of decision making, (ii) the public's inflation aversion, (iii) the slope of the Phillips curve, (iv) the magnitude of supply shocks, (v) the degree of central bank conservatism, and under many (but not all) circumstances, (vi) the explicitness of the inflation target.