This chapter examines the rapid mobilization and almost complete militarization of the German economy long before Goebbels called for total war, and even before Albert Speer arrived on the economic scene to engage in the mythification that long has surrounded studies of Germany’s economic war effort. Just as the insufficiency of the nation’s resources made achieving Hitler’s territorial aspirations ultimately impossible, that insufficiency drove production efforts that increasingly alienated executives but also induced them to participate in crazed and costly schemes to save themselves and their firms.

By the time Walther Gerlach took over the uranium project in late 1943, it was clear that Germany could not build atomic bombs before the end of the war, which was now going very badly for Germany. Work continued under Paul Harteck on isotope separation and heavy water production. Small but steady improvements were made with the centrifuges, but only very small samples with low levels of uranium 235 enrichment were ever achieved. Heavy water production failed, despite great efforts. The work on model nuclear reactors continued, culminating in a final experiment using a lattice of uranium cubes immersed in heavy water. This came close but fell short of achieving a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction. During this period the scientists were focused first and foremost on the survival of themselves and their families. Both Gerlach and Werner Heisenberg sought to facilitate this by continuing to suggest to powerful members of the Nazi elite that their research might lead to an unexpected breakthrough and win the war.

When the war slowed down in the winter of 1942-1942, the uranium research was evaluated with the result that it became clear that atomic bombs could not be made in Germany in time to influence the outcome of the war. The project was transferred from Army Ordnance to the Reich Research Council, the institution responsible for mobilizing civilian research for the war effort. The scientists, who were now threatened with the loss of their exemptions from frontline service, began to “sell” their research. Although they did not promise to deliver atomic bombs, they did emphasize the tremendous power of such weapons and warned that the Americans, who had much greater resources, were apparently working on this. In the meantime a model nuclear reactor experiment had produced a neutron increase, which was interpreted as proof in principle that a nuclear reactor could be built. Several influential figures responsible for armament production now took a keen interest in uranium research and the powerful Minister of Armaments Albert Speer decided to generously support the project.