This chapter explores efforts to shape Bahrain’s political field and the ways in which its politically charged geographical location as the ‘epicentre’ of the struggle for supremacy between Riyadh and Tehran shapes these efforts. It explores the struggle for Bahrain’s political field and its social reality which has allowed a range of domestic and regional actors to become involved in the contestation over principles of vision and division, deploying economic, political, and religious capital in the process. Central to this is a number of networks and relationships that shape perceptions and behaviour, along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. As Saudi and Iranian efforts to impose order on the region focused on Bahrain, they intersected with a complex set of intersectional phenomena bringing together tensions between rulers and ruled over social, economic, and political issues, all of which play out in the context of the transnational field.

This chapter focuses on the intersection between Bahrain, Iran, and the British during the interwar years and the influence that contacts with Iran and Iranians had on the process of nation and state building in Bahrain. It analyzes the role of Iran and the role of the Iranian immigrant communities in the evolution of the Bahrain administration and the emergence of Arab nationalist sentiments in Bahrain. It depicts how different elements of the Iranian communities viewed Iran, the Al Khalifa ruling family, and the British. And it explores how the Al Khalifa and different segments of Bahraini society regarded Bahrain residents of Iranian origin and nationality. The analysis is preceded with a background on politics and society in Bahrain with special attention to the growth and characteristics of the Iranian immigrant communities.

The introduction gives and overview of the modern history of Bahrain, highlighting the cyclical bouts of repression the country has experienced. It lays out they key protagonists in the book, most notably the British Political Agency, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Al Khalifa Regime. It argues that the long history of repression in Bahrain makes it an interesting and important case study for analysing why certain repressive methods are used at certain times.

The conclusion sums up some of the main findings of the book, including the revisionist and revelatory insights detailed by the various examinations of new primary sources. It argues that repression has changed form over the past two years, and not been moderated by democratic reform. On the contrary, it makes the cases that in many regards, repression has got worse acrosss many fields, from torture and mass arrests, to the co-optation of new digital technologies for social control purposes.

In the years following World War I, the British Government of India began taking greater interest in internal security challenges in the Gulf. Aside from small detachments of sepoys in Manama and Muscat, Britain did not have forces stationed in the area to prevent plots against rulers or defend against unexpected tribal attacks from the desert. There were very few incentives for Britain to fill this power gap by garrisoning troops, but plenty of disincentives: hostile inhabitants, an unforgiving climate in summer and malaria in winter. In keeping with its hands-off approach, Britain wanted the rulers to secure their own positions by developing militaries. In Muscat, the British actively encouraged the sultan to develop a force that could dominate the land approaches to Muscat. Britain supported the establishment of the Bahrain Levy Corps in 1924 to protect the regent from relatives. In Kuwait, the threat was external: raids by the Ikhwan (religiously inspired tribal fighters) into Kuwaiti territory. In all cases, the British Government of India wanted the local rulers to take greater responsibility for securing their own territories rather than continually seeking British military assistance in a crisis.