Synthetic controls (SCs) are widely used to estimate the causal effect of a treatment. However, they do not account for the different speeds at which units respond to changes. Reactions may be inelastic or “sticky” and thus slower due to varying regulatory, institutional, or political environments. We show that these different reaction speeds can lead to biased estimates of causal effects. We therefore introduce a dynamic SC approach that accommodates varying speeds in time series, resulting in improved SC estimates. We apply our method to re-estimate the effects of terrorism on income (Abadie and Gardeazabal [2003, American Economic Review 93, 113–132]), tobacco laws on consumption (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller [2010, Journal of the American Statistical Association 105, 493–505]), and German reunification on GDP (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller [2015, American Journal of Political Science 59, 495–510]). We also assess the method’s performance using Monte Carlo simulations. We find that it reduces errors in the estimates of true treatment effects by up to 70% compared to traditional SCs, improving our ability to make robust inferences. An open-source R package, dsc, is made available for easy implementation.

Spatial econometric models allow for interactions among cross-sectional units through spatial weight matrices. This paper parameterizes each spatial weight matrix in the widely used spatial Durbin model with a different instead of one common distance decay parameter, using negative exponential and inverse distance matrices. We propose a joint estimation approach of the decay and response parameters, and we investigate its performance in a Monte Carlo simulation experiment. We also present the results of an empirical application on military expenditures. Indirect effects in particular appear to be sensitive to different parameterizations.

The rise of populism concerns many political scientists and practitioners, yet the detection of its underlying language remains fragmentary. This paper aims to provide a reliable, valid, and scalable approach to measure populist rhetoric. For that purpose, we created an annotated dataset based on parliamentary speeches of the German Bundestag (2013–2021). Following the ideational definition of populism, we label moralizing references to “the virtuous people” or “the corrupt elite” as core dimensions of populist language. To identify, in addition, how the thin ideology of populism is “thickened,” we annotate how populist statements are attached to left-wing or right-wing host ideologies. We then train a transformer-based model (PopBERT) as a multilabel classifier to detect and quantify each dimension. A battery of validation checks reveals that the model has a strong predictive accuracy, provides high qualitative face validity, matches party rankings of expert surveys, and detects out-of-sample text snippets correctly. PopBERT enables dynamic analyses of how German-speaking politicians and parties use populist language as a strategic device. Furthermore, the annotator-level data may also be applied in cross-domain applications or to develop related classifiers.

We develop a new class of spatial voting models for binary preference data that can accommodate both monotonic and non-monotonic response functions, and are more flexible than alternative “unfolding” models previously introduced in the literature. We then use these models to estimate revealed preferences for legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives and justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. The results from these applications indicate that the new models provide superior complexity-adjusted performance to various alternatives and that the additional flexibility leads to preferences’ estimates that more closely match the perceived ideological positions of legislators and justices.

How does candidate order on the ballot affect voting behavior when voters rank candidates? I extend the analysis of ballot order effects to electoral systems with ordinal ballots, where voters rank candidates, including ranked-choice voting (RCV). First, I discuss two types of ballot order effects, including “position effects”—voters vote for specific candidates because of their ballot positions—and “pattern ranking”—voters rank candidates geometrically given their grid-style ballots. Next, I discuss experimental designs for identifying and estimating these effects based on ballot order randomization. Moreover, I illustrate the proposed methods by using survey and natural experiments based on mayoral and congressional RCV elections in 2022. I find that while voters seem less susceptible to specific ballot positions, ballot design can still impact voters’ ranking behavior via pattern ranking. This work has several implications for ballot design, survey research, and ranking data analysis. First, it shows that pattern ranking may affect electoral outcomes in RCV and other systems even when ballot order is fully randomized. Consequently, it may be worth considering an alternative solution to ballot order effects, which does not solely depend on randomization or rotation. Second, similar effects may impact any survey research using ranking questions. Future research must investigate the statistical consequences of pattern ranking for survey research. Finally, ranking data allow researchers to study diverse quantities of interest while targeting many different substantive questions. However, this flexibility also implies that analyzing ranking data can be prone to arbitrary analysis.