In 1845, the conviction of Thomas Hall for bigamy was reported as an example of the unequal way in which the law operated, with great play being made of the steps that Hall could have taken to free himself from his first wife by a divorce, were it not for the cost involved. Since then, virtually every account of nineteenth-century bigamy or divorce has included some version of the judge's apparently ‘brilliantly sarcastic’ speech.

But what the judge was reported as saying at the time differs in a number of crucial particulars from what later commentators have reported him as saying. Later accounts have played up the misconduct of the first wife, inflated the cost of obtaining a divorce, and exaggerated the poverty and lowly status of Hall, while playing down the sentence he received and ignoring his deception of his second wife.

This paper traces the evolution of the account over time, and identifies the timing of the various changes that were made. It illustrates how history is used – by politicians, reformers, and scholars – to support both a particular view of the past and to bolster claims as to how the law should change for the future.

In this paper, we set out what it means to offer a ‘biography’ of a law, illustrating the discussion through the example of the Abortion Act (1967), an important statute that has regulated a highly controversial field of practice for five decades. Biography is taken as a useful shorthand for an approach which requires simultaneous attention to continuity and change in the historical study of a law's life. It takes seriously the insight that written norms are rooted in the past, enshrining a certain set of historically contingent values and practices, yet that – as linguistic structures that can impact on the world only through acts of interpretation – they are simultaneously constantly evolving. It acknowledges the complex, ongoing co-constitution of law and the contexts within which it operates, recognising that understanding how law works requires historical, empirical study. Finally, it suggests that consideration of a law can offer a unique window through which to explore these broader contexts.

Categorising something as a business judgment can provide directors with a powerful shield from accountability. It has been said that the courts in England and Wales defer to directors’ business judgments and directors’ decisions are protected from review in other jurisdictions by a business judgment rule. Yet what a business judgment is has never been addressed, and so precisely what is being protected, and why, is unclear. This paper analyses case law in England and Wales and key Australian and US cases to answer this question. It argues that the courts use the term judgment in two senses: an ability, and a decision sense, and that business judgment in both senses can be linked to Knight's concept of entrepreneurial judgment, and directors’ wealth creation function. Conversely, decisions that are linked to directors’ corporate governance function and are less easy to categorise as entrepreneurial are less likely to be viewed as business judgments.

This paper revisits the English common law rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in personam. It seeks to demonstrate that, mainly due to the narrow conception of the foreign courts’ ‘international jurisdictional competence’, the operation of this aspect of the English conflict-of-laws rules gives rise to problematic outcomes. Subsequently, the paper proceeds to identify and evaluate three of the main doctrinal models which have been proposed in response to these shortcomings. It is contended that, despite their virtues, ultimately, none of these models provides the desirable basis for recasting the law. The paper's main contribution is, therefore, to advance an alternative approach for the reformulation of the recognition and enforcement regime at common law. In this regard, it is argued that the foreign courts’ international jurisdictional competence should be defined more broadly as to include the jurisdictional ‘gateways’, presently codified within CPR Practice Direction 6B para 3.1.

We show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the accountability of directors to shareholders. The shareholders’ statutory right to remove the directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be traced back to these developments.

While the concept of the ‘relational contract’ has been invoked in the courts with greater visibility and regularity in recent years, the doctrinal import of relational contract theory remains for the most part unclear to contract and commercial lawyers. This paper offers a broad framework for understanding the different ways through which relational theory might have an impact on contract doctrine going forward, and evaluates the promises and perils of doing so.

Proportionality has been testing the judiciary for decades. However, a single replicable model of proportionality has not been consistently applied by the courts. This paper explores the differential application of proportionality in English law. It is argued that these differential approaches create doctrinal confusion and give rise to numerous shortcomings. These shortcomings include: (i) the a priori weighting of fundamental rights; (ii) undue deference to state institutions; and (iii) variable judicial scrutiny dependent upon the source of the rights in question. It will be argued here that the courts ought to adopt a common standard of proportionality review in all proceedings concerning fundamental rights. The viability of this approach will then be tested against existing case law.

This paper provides an in-depth case study of the enforcement of copyright in photographs by certain rights-owners today: freelance professional photographers who derive income from the exploitation of photographic copyright. Referring to the theoretical framework of Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, the paper reflects on the implications of the case study for the nature and function of copyright in a specific context today. Bringing the experience today into conversation with the enforcement of copyright by professional photographers in past times (the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries), the paper notes the influence of the bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation (ie exploitation through picture libraries) on legal decision making in a particular forum today: the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Small Claims Track. The paper concludes with more general reflections on the case study's implications for the courts and copyright policy-makers today.

In 2008, Lord Reed in his paper ‘Foreign precedents and judicial reasoning: the American debate and British practice’ noted the lack of full scholarly consideration of judicial comparativism in the UK. Ten years later, judicial reference to foreign judgments is still a very common phenomenon in this jurisdiction, however very little has been written about it. This paper assesses the UK Supreme Court's constitutional law jurisprudence in light of the main themes and arguments underlying the international debate concerning judicial comparativism. I argue that: (i) the use of foreign law is constitutionally legitimate where clear statutory language is respected; (ii) transferability concerns are mitigated by the interwovenness of the global common law system; and (iii) methodology concerns are mitigated by the UK Supreme Court's flexible, humble approach, which applies careful scrutiny to the foreign authorities put before it. Foreign judgments, I conclude, are never followed blindly or arbitrarily, and perhaps this is why there is no domestic debate about judicial comparativism, not even in the constitutional sphere.