We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human counterpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of others’ incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilibrium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.

Many studies report on the association between 2D:4D, a putative marker for prenatal testosterone exposure, and economic preferences. However, most of these studies have limited sample sizes and test multiple hypotheses (without preregistration). In this study we mainly replicate the common specifications found in the literature for the association between the 2D:4D ratio and risk taking, the willingness to compete, and dictator game giving separately. In a sample of 330 women we find no robust associations between any of these economic preferences and 2D:4D. We find no evidence of a statistically significant relation for 16 of the 18 total regressions we run. The two regression specifications which are statistically significant have not previously been reported and the associations are not in the expected direction, and therefore they are unlikely to represent a real effect.

Neoclassical theory holds that different sources of income are fungible at the margin. In contrast, mental accounting holds that appropriate uses for income vary by source, making them infungible. This study investigates which theory better describes giving at the margin when income may have multiple sources. Dictators accrue differing amounts of (1) earned income from a real-effort task, (2) windfall income, or (3) both. I find that dictators treat marginal earned and windfall income as partially infungible, supporting mental accounting. Dictators who had a single income source gave 14% of a marginal windfall token and 5% of a marginal earned token. Strikingly, dictators who had income from both sources were sharply less generous with each, giving only 2% and 1%, respectively. Multiple accounts enabled greater selfishness at the margin. A follow-up experiment shows that two accounts must be qualitatively different, not just multiple in number, to produce this effect.

We examine the ability of eye movement data to help understand the determinants of decision-making over risky prospects. We start with structural models of choice under risk, and use that structure to inform what we identify from the use of process data in addition to choice data. We find that information on eye movements does significantly affect the extent and nature of probability weighting behavior. Our structural model allows us to show the pathway of the effect, rather than simply identifying a reduced form effect. This insight should be of importance for the normative design of choice mechanisms for risky products. We also show that decision-response duration is no substitute for the richer information provided by eye-tracking.

It has been observed that, in a variety of tasks, losses have a larger impact on behavior than do gains of equal size. This phenomenon is referred to as loss aversion. It is thought that the negativity bias in behavior is reflected in and potentially causally related to a negativity bias in emotional arousal. We examine skin conductance responses—a psychophysiological marker for emotional arousal—during the anticipation of gains and losses. In contrast to most previous research, gains and losses were separated from each other and symmetric in magnitude. We found that skin conductance responses during the anticipation phase increased with the magnitude of both gains and losses. Contrary to the predictions of the loss aversion hypothesis, the anticipation of a loss did not elicit stronger reactions than the anticipation of a gain of equal size.

Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.

Experimental asset markets with a constant fundamental value ($\mathrm{F}\mathrm{V}$) have grown in importance in recent years. A methodological examination of the robustness of experimental results in such a setting which has been shown to produce bubbles, however, is lacking. In a laboratory experiment with 280 subjects, we investigate whether specific design features are sufficient to influence experimental results. In detail, we (1) vary the visual representation of the price chart, and (2) provide subjects with full information about the FV process. We find overvaluation and bubble formation to be reduced when trading prices are displayed at the upper end of the price chart. Surprisingly, we do not find any effects when subjects have full information about the FV process.

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of deliberation time on behavior under risk and uncertainty. Towards this end we ask our participant to make quick, intuitive evaluations of a number of lotteries and report resulting certainty equivalents. Yet, we invite them to modify these initial decisions, whenever they find, after (additional) deliberation, that they do not precisely represent their preference. Both certainty equivalents are incentivized (a double-response method). The choice of evaluated lotteries allows us to semi-parametrically estimate the value function and the probability weighting function within the paradigm of the cumulative prospect theory. The main finding is that deliberation raises the probability weighting function (reduces pessimism), especially in the case of lotteries involving unknown probabilities.

I show how using response times as a proxy for effort can address a long-standing issue of how to separate the effect of cognitive ability on performance from the effect of motivation. My method is based on a dynamic stochastic model of optimal effort choice in which ability and motivation are the structural parameters. I show how to estimate these parameters from the data on outcomes and response times in a cognitive task. In a laboratory experiment, I find that performance on a digit-symbol test is a noisy and biased measure of cognitive ability. Ranking subjects by their performance leads to an incorrect ranking by their ability in a substantial number of cases. These results suggest that interpreting performance on a cognitive task as ability may be misleading.

Loss framing and checklist formatting are two oft-cited tools for encouraging behavior change, but there is little causal evidence on their impact in field settings. We partnered with the City of Philadelphia to test the effectiveness of these tools to increase completion of the City’s wellness program. In our experiment, 5235 City employees and retirees were randomly assigned to receive one of four postcard versions (using a 2 × 2 design), whereby we varied both framing (gain or loss) and how instructions were provided (information only or information in checklist format). Our results suggest that neither loss framing nor the checklist formatting significantly influenced the likelihood that individuals would complete the wellness tasks, or how quickly they completed the tasks. We conclude that this specific form of employee behavior may be difficult to influence through the “passive” behavioral interventions we tested, and suggest that a more “active” approach may be required in such instances.

The high rewards people desire are often unlikely. Here, we investigated whether decision-makers exploit such ecological correlations between risks and rewards to simplify their information processing. In a learning phase, participants were exposed to options in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In a subsequent risky choice task, where the emphasis was on making either a ‘fast’ or the ‘best’ possible choice, participants’ eye movements were tracked. The changes in the number, distribution, and direction of eye fixations in ‘fast’ trials did not differ between the risk–reward conditions. In ‘best’ trials, however, participants in the negatively correlated condition lowered their evidence threshold, responded faster, and deviated from expected value maximization more than in the other risk–reward conditions. The results underscore how conclusions about people’s cognitive processing in risky choice can depend on risk–reward structures, an often neglected environmental property.

The evidence on the welfare effects of kinship is mixed, suggesting both positive and adverse effects of kinship. This study looks into the differential effects of kinship on trusting and trustworthy behaviour by investigating the subjects’ motives and drivers of differential behaviour towards kin and non-kin. We conducted an economic experiment with households of rural India. We found that kin are trusted more than non-kin and that differential trust towards kin and non-kin is mainly driven by higher other-regarding preferences towards kin rather than being due to differences in expected reciprocity between kin and non-kin. We observed a heterogeneous effect of kin on trustworthy behaviour: kin exhibit low trustworthiness when they are not close to other kin, while they exhibit higher trustworthiness when they have close kin in the network.

We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contribution games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct stereotypical behaviours, which together account for about 90% of participants. Compared to the previous approaches, our method produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications.

Garbarino et al. (J Econ Sci Assoc. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-018-0055-4, 2018) describe a new method to calculate the probability distribution of the proportion of lies told in “coin flip” style experiments. I show that their estimates and confidence intervals are flawed. I demonstrate two better ways to estimate the probability distribution of what we really care about—the proportion of liars—and I provide R software to do this.

When making decisions, people tend to look back and forth between the alternatives until they eventually make a choice. Eye-tracking research has established that these shifts in attention are strongly linked to choice outcomes. A predominant framework for understanding the dynamics of the choice process, and thus the effects of attention, is sequential sampling of information. However, existing methods for estimating the attention parameters in these models are computationally costly and overly flexible, and yield estimates with unknown precision and bias. Here we propose an estimation method that relies on a link between sequential sampling models and random utility models (RUM). This method uses familiar econometric tools (i.e., logistic regression) and yields estimates that appear to be unbiased and relatively precise compared to existing methods, in a small fraction of the computation time. The RUM thus appears to be a useful tool for estimating the effects of attention on choice.

Consumers typically overstate their intentions to purchase products, compared to actual rates of purchases, a pattern called “hypothetical bias”. In laboratory choice experiments, we measure participants’ visual attention using mousetracking or eye-tracking, while they make hypothetical as well as real purchase decisions. We find that participants spent more time looking both at price and product image prior to making a real “buy” decision than making a real “don’t buy” decision. We demonstrate that including such information about visual attention improves prediction of real buy decisions. This improvement is evident, although small in magnitude, using mousetracking data, but is not evident using eye-tracking data.

Protocol analysis, in the form of concurrent verbal ‘thinking aloud’ reports, is a method of collecting and analyzing data about cognitive processes. This approach can help economists in evaluating competing theories of behavior and in categorizing heterogeneity of thinking patterns. As a proof of concept, I tested this method in the context of a guessing game. I found that concurrent think aloud protocols can inform us about individual’s thought processes without affecting decisions. The method allowed me to identify game theoretic thinking and heterogeneous approaches to unravelling the guessing game. The think aloud protocol is inexpensive and scalable, and it is a useful tool for identifying empirical regularities regarding decision processes.