This paper focuses on a little-known aspect of the first constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire: the introduction of idare-i örfiyye (an equivalent of the state of siege) into the Ottoman legal system. With a name rooted in the Ottoman legal tradition and a definition clearly inspired by the nineteenth-century French “état de siège,” the idare-i örfiyye was a case of legal hybridization that combined the Ottoman political and legal tradition with transnational (or transimperial) legal circulation. This paper seeks to understand how and why different legal references were combined in order to make it possible, under exceptional circumstances, to suspend the ordinary legal order. At the same time, it analyzes the first application of the idare-i örfiyye, which occurred during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, to show how local and diplomatic reactions to this exceptional state of affairs were crucial for the further definition of the notion. Through a critical approach to legal texts and archival documents, the article discusses how various legal sources, the political context of the early Hamidian reign, and local experiences all shaped the notion of idare-i örfiyye, soon transforming it into a tool of government for exceptional and (more frequently) non-exceptional times.

Turkish constitutions have generally sought to limit the executive branch’s emergency powers by codifying and subjecting them to judicial and parliamentary supervision. In practice, however, ever since the single-party regime of the interwar years, cabinets have wielded wide powers to suspend rights and exercise discretion concerning both security issues and property and finance regimes. The result has been a legal system that, barred from explicitly embracing executive prerogative as a matter of principle, has instead dispersed “exceptional” powers throughout the fabric of the statutes, temporary laws, regulations, and decrees with which the state articulates its authority. The task of maintaining a semblance of normality and coherence within this scattered and contradictory system has been left to legal theoreticians. This article examines how three such theoreticians—the law professors Sıddık Sami Onar, Ali Fuad Başgil, and Ragıp Sarıca—responded to the cabinet’s recourse to emergency powers during the troubled 1930s and 1940s. Instead of defending rule-of-law principles, I argue, these formative figures integrated prerogative into the sphere of ordinary legality, thereby transforming exceptional powers into a normal mode of governance.

In September 2009, Turkey experienced a major reform of its pharmaceutical expenditure and price policy. By introducing a global budget, Turkey saved some 20 billion TL in public pharmaceutical expenditure in the 2010–2012 period. The lion’s share of this was achieved by introducing stricter price controls that reduced the profit margins of pharmaceutical producers and distributors (the populist policy solution), rather than by privatizing the cost of medicines through, for example, raising out-of-pocket payments (the neoliberal policy solution). This is a puzzle, given the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government’s usual preference for lenient and business-friendly regulation. This article explains the policy reform with reference to (i) the pronounced electoral interests of the AKP’s political leadership in not substantially reducing access to public health services, (ii) the absence of powerful business interests in high medicine prices, and (iii) the absence of a developmentalist commitment to an industrial policy strategy for the pharmaceutical sector. This case study holds important lessons for scholars of Turkish politics. It suggests that externally the AKP’s economic and social policies are driven by the interests of its two major constituencies (namely, lower-class voters and “Anatolian capital”), while internally they are shaped by two camps of policy makers (namely, neoliberal-minded technocrats and election-focused party leaders).

In this article, we investigate economic and political developments in Turkey’s construction sector over the last decade and consider their implications. We find that during the first term of the government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), thanks to administrative and economic incentives, both private and public construction rose considerably. Despite the construction sector’s contribution to growth, there is also evidence of a transfer from the industrial sector toward the construction sector, which led to significant decline in the trend growth of the industrial sector in the era prior to 2006. Such evidence disappears in the post-crisis period, when the growth of private construction slows. However, overcentralization, clientelism, an absence of transparency, and limitations on citizen participation in urban planning remain as problems that need to be addressed through urban reform.

This article explores the discursive reasons behind the paradoxes in Turkey’s foreign policy since the onset of the Syria crisis. By looking at representation of Turkey’s Syria policy in two prominent pro-government newspapers, Star and Yeni Şafak, the authors highlight the significance of the February 2012 episode, after which Ankara experienced deep discursive dilemmas for three reasons: the uncertain portrayal of the dyadic context, the ambiguous framing of third-party roles, and ambivalent agenda building. Despite the shadow of imminent civil war, Turkey’s foreign policy elite refrained from framing the real risks arising within Syria. Idealistic-normative calls appealed to massacre rhetoric in order to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, the geopolitical framing of third-party roles did not assist in the building of diplomatic ground for international intervention. Quite the contrary, it led to the shaping of public opinion toward realistic-utilitarian interference. Swinging between intervention and interference, Ankara pushed itself toward a liminal position. Even though the Turkish government’s rhetorical ambivalence helped to sway anti-war domestic public opinion, it did not help to control the spiraling of Syria into civil war. That is to say, the ambivalent agenda building in the critical February 2012 episode perpetuated paradoxes in Turkey’s Syria policy and left lingering implications for the transformation of the Syrian crisis in the years to come.