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A narrative approach to analysis of covert action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2024

Jack Duffield Open the ORCID record for Jack Duffield [Opens in a new window]
Jack Duffield*
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Independent scholar, London, UK
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Abstract

This article argues that covert action is subordinate to security narratives, with covert action demanded by, empowered through, and used to decisively impact the narratives of security threat that concern a state’s key power-granting audiences. A narrative approach to analysing covert action is developed based on narratology and securitisation. This approach reconciles the paradoxical historical record of implausible deniability with International Relations theory, and challenges other risk-led approaches to understanding covert action. The narrative approach is supported by a class-severity model which updates existing ladder models of covert action escalation, enabling scholars to both detect occurrences of covert action and suggest attribution to an actor – a vital initial step for the study of non-Western covert action in particular. The narrative approach also enables the effectiveness of covert action to be measured in terms of its impact on security narratives, overcoming the limitations of existing approaches. The article employs these tools to analyse Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, delivering new insight and identifying areas for further study for a key non-Western user of covert action.

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Keywords

covert actionnarrativenarratologyRussiasecuritisation
Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The British International Studies Association.

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Footnotes

This article has been updated since it was originally published. A notice detailing this has been published.

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